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Despite an abundance of research on the representation of groups and minorities in 
traditional (mass) media, little work has focused on the representation of others on 
social media platforms, especially Twitter. More specifically, to the best of my 
knowledge, no study has yet approached the representation of Saudis on Twitter from 
a Critical-discourse and Corpus Linguistics perspective. Hence, the overall aim of this 
thesis is to investigate how Saudis are represented in tweets in English from Australia, 
Canada, Great Britain, the United States and the rest of the world during two tragic 
events at Mecca in 2015 (the crane collapse at The Holy Mosque and the stampede at 
Mina). 
          Unlike studies of media representation which focus on a one-to-many text 
context, the current study investigates the bottom-up discursive practices on social 
media, namely, the user-generated microblogging service, Twitter. The data comprise 
89,928 tweets (1.9 million tokens) collected during the tragic events at Mecca starting 
from 10 September 2015 over a one-month period and including all English tweets 
mentioning Saudis.  
          Drawing on theories from Critical Discourse Studies, the thesis deploys 
concepts and tools from the Discourse-historical approach and Systemic Functional 
Grammar. These are also supported by corpus-assisted methodologies to unravel the 
linguistic patterns associated with Saudis across five corpora. Integrating both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches substantiates the findings of the current study 
as well as enhance the synergy between Critical Discourse Studies and Corpus 





         The analysis revealed a hegemonic negative representation of Saudis across the 
corpora. Themes relating Saudis to war, terrorism and corruption are more prevalent 
than others. Constructing Saudis in relation to Islam and wealth (oil) triggers negative 
discourse prosody of extremism and corruption. Tweets about the tragic events at 
Mecca were generally condemning and reproachful. Additionally, comparing each 
corpus with others did not produced contradictory results, but rather triangulated the 
hegemonic, negative discourse recurring across the corpora, which sustains online 
racist and Saudiphobic discourse. These findings correspond remarkably to earlier 
findings identified in the analyses of representations of Muslims in Western media. 
The findings contribute to the ongoing academic discussion on the relationship 
between traditional media and social media regarding whether social media represent 
a largely safe space for maintaining and developing alternative discourses, or if it can 
mirror and reproduce existing hegemonic discourses, which may result in even 
stronger polarising effects on public discourse. In light of these findings, Twitter 
seems to serve as an online amplifier that mirrors and reinforces existing discourses in 
traditional media that are likely to have even stronger polarising effects on public 
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Hajj (Pilgrimage): the fifth pillar of Islam that must be carried out at least once in the 
lifetime by every able-bodied Muslim. It is the largest annual convention of Faith in 
the world that requires traveling to Mecca. Hajj is performed based on predetermined 
dates, times, and places (Hameed, 2010). 
Islamic: relating to or characteristic of Islam or its adherents. Something is Islamic or 
Muslim when it is constituted as such through discourses, practices, communities and 
structures that are concerned with matters of Islam (traditions, symbols, figures, 
concepts, rules, stories, etc.) and claim a transcendent authority by reference to Allah, 
the Qur’an and the Sunna (Petersen, 2012, p. 5). 
Islamization:  a contemporary phenomenon partly associated with the postcolonial 
era and partly seen as an assertion or re-assertion of identity in response to 
modernization. Islamization is a quest for the Islamic ideal. It is an attempt to restore 
the pristine Islam perceived to be lost or disrupted as a result of Western colonial 
domination (Othman, 2003, p. 124). 
Salafism (Salafiyya): refers to the movement that believes that Muslims should 
emulate the first three generations of Islam referred to as the pious forefathers (al-
salaf al-salih) as much as possible in all areas of life (Meijer, 2009, p. xiii). Salafism 
preaches a return to the study of the basic sources of Islam (the Holy Quran and the 
Hadith) and rejects blind following of the four canonical law schools (Madhhab), 
though it accepts individual interpretation (ijtihad) along strict lines (ibid., p.4). 
Anyone who adheres to Salafism is called Salafi. 
Shia: (or Shiite) which means party or faction is an Islamic minority sect who believe 
that the successors of the Prophet Mohammed are his son-in-law, Ali ibn Abi Talib, 
and his descendants. The term first appeared with reference to those who followed Ali 
ibn Abi Talib in the wars that he fought as a (fourth) caliph against the Umayyads in 
656 AD.  
Sunni: refers to ‘Ahl-as-Sunnah’ which means the people of the tradition; it is the 





conform to the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed and recognise the four Caliphs as 
the true successors of the Prophet.  
Wahhabism: (often described as the orthodox Sunni Muslim sect) a movement that 
follows the doctrine of Mohammad ibn Abd Al-Wahhab, who proposed a correction 
movement during the foundation of Saudi Arabia; the essence of the Wahhabi mission 
was to revive pure devotion of worship to God alone” (Commins, 2005, p. 3). 













Chapter 1. Introduction  
1.1. Background 
Upon arriving in the UK in 2014, I started taking driving 
lessons with an English woman, along with two Saudi 
friends. A few months later, my instructor told me that she 
met her friend over the weekend, and as she told her that she 
was teaching three Saudi women to drive, her friend 
shouted: “Be careful, they might attack you!” 
Although my instructor was kind enough to defend my friends and me at that time, I 
felt really intimidated by her friend’s comments, and I kept wondering what made her 
think of us in that way. This incident brought to mind the murder of a Saudi, PhD 
student, Nahid Almanea, who was stabbed to death in Colchester, Sussex while going 
to university in June 2014, three months before I arrived in the UK. The murder was 
suspected of being a religiously-motivated crime (Duggan, 2014). Several cases of 
Saudi students being killed were also reported in the USA, Canada, Australia, 
Germany, and Malaysia, although the motives behind some of these crimes were not 
identified (AlHasan, 2016). These cases, of course, are not restricted to Saudis: Arabs 
and Asians have been subjected to hate crimes in the UK after terror attacks, such as 
9/11, which can lead to “a permanently higher post-attack level” (Hanes & Machin, 
2014, p. 22). 
            Several attacks and crimes have also been committed against Muslims around 
the world. At the time of writing, another vicious attack recently took place: the 
shootings in two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, on 15 March 2019 during a 





year-old Australian gunman who was identified as being “clearly connected with alt-
right and white supremacist groups that conflate Islam with terrorism and most likely 
was carefully groomed by their networks” (Besley & Peters, 2019, p. 5). Studies have 
shown an increase in the percentage of hate-motivated crimes around the world. 
Williams, Burnap, Javed, Liu, and Ozalp (2019) state that hate crimes have increased 
recently and that “the highest number of hate crimes in history was recorded by the 
police in England and Wales in 2017/18 … [with] a 17 per cent increase on the 
previous year and a 123 per cent increase on 2012/13” (p. 93). This increase in hate 
crimes against other groups and minorities can be linked to online hate discourse. 
Williams et al. (2019) state that offline hate crimes and hate speech online correlate 
strongly with the occurrence of significant events, such as “online terror attacks, 
political votes and court cases” (p. 94). In fact, Williams (2019) stresses the 
interconnectedness of online hate speech and offline violence, stating: 
Online hate speech tends to spike for 24–48 hours after key national or 
international events such as a terror attack, and then rapidly fall, 
although the baseline of online hate can remain elevated for several 
months. Where it reaches a certain level, online hate speech can translate 
into offline hate crime on the streets. (p. 9) 
Such negative online discourse can be associated with the role of both the mass media 
and social media in provoking negative attitudes against others and transferring hate 
speech into offline, street violence. Several studies argue that the role of both the mass 
media and social media in public discourse is vigorous and can sometimes be harmful. 
Miranda, Young, and Yetgin (2016) state that both social and mass (traditional) media 





inevitable evils accompany the societal benefits of social media and that mass media 
is having a detrimental effect on public discourse” (p. 303).  
            In fact, media can play a significant role in determining what information the 
public has, and this has rationalised the current focus of research on "how the media 
shapes public knowledge, attitudes, and behavior" (Shojaei, Youssefi, & Hosseini, 
2013, p. 585). Mass media are perceived not only as a way of transmitting 
information and thoughts, but rather "as shaping opinions and presenting particular 
versions of reality" (Ameli, Marandi, Ahmed, Kara, & Merali, 2007). One theme that 
has prompted much research is the representation of minorities and other social 
groups in the mass media and how such portrayals reflect on their images in society 
and the literature, especially in terms of the use of language. Media representations do 
not only mirror the reality, "representations in the media such as in film, television, 
photography and print journalism create reality and normalise specific world-views or 
ideologies" (Fürsich, 2010, p. 115).  
            Unlike mass media, however, the new advances on the Internet, particularly 
Web 2.0, have provided (to some extent) a more liberated space for all users to share, 
participate and engage in the virtual world through what is known as social media. 
Web 2.0 refers to “a group of technologies which have become deeply associated with 
the term: blogs, wikis, podcasts, RSS feeds etc., which facilitate a more socially 
connected Web where everyone is able to add to and edit the information space” 
(Andersen, 2007, p. 5). In comparison with mass media channels where a particular 
group chooses and displays content (McCombs & Shaw, 1972), social media have 
succeeded in attracting the attention of millions of users, as well as influencing 
individuals and society (Sormanen & Dutton, 2015). Merchant (2009, pp. 108–109) 





• Presence: Web 2.0 spaces encourage users to develop an active presence 
through an online identity, profile or avatar. 
• Modification: Web 2.0 spaces usually allow a degree of personalisation such 
as in the design of the user’s home page and personal links, or in the creation 
of an on-screen avatar. 
• User-generated content: Web 2.0 spaces are based upon content which is 
generated within and by the community of users rather than provided by the 
site itself. 
• Social participation: Web 2.0 spaces provide an invitation to participate. This 
derives, in part, from the above three points. 
           On examining the current literature, studies on microblogging services or 
social networking sites (SNSs), such as Twitter, are few concerning the representation 
of social groups compared to studies of mass media. Researching media 
representations of subgroups, or others, has been widely undertaken by researchers on 
different forms of media production: on TV and movies (Flood, Nickels, Hutchings, 
& Miazhevich, 2007; Shaheen, 2003), newspapers (Baker, Gabrielatos, & McEnery, 
2013; Kahani-Hopkins & Hopkins, 2002; Kassimeris & Jackson, 2011; Rakesh & De, 
2015) and arts and photography (Born & Hesmondhalgh, 2000; Desai, 2000). These 
studies explain the role of media in sustaining negative stereotypes of others and 
elucidate how the “the sheer propensity of imagery works to maintain, confirm and 
recreate problematic representations ad infinitum” (Fürsich, 2010, p. 116). On the 
other hand, little attention has focused on examining the representation of other 
groups in social media, especially Twitter (section 2.3.6). More specifically, and at 
the time of writing these lines, the representation of Saudis in English tweets has not 





investigate the representation of Saudis on Twitter during two tragic events at Mecca, 
with a focus on tweets in English. 
1.2. Background to the study: Why Saudis, why Twitter? 
Being a Twitter user (or tweeter) myself, this has tempted me to select Twitter as the 
data source for my research for several reasons. One is that Twitter is considered to be 
one of the fastest-growing microblogging sites, currently the most prominent social 
media service (Murthy, 2012). When the data were collected during the spring of 
2016, Twitter was already attracting over 300 million monthly active users (Clement, 
2019). It has also received extensive coverage by the media, triggered by significant 
natural disasters or by political events and figures, such as Obama, who adopt Twitter 
in their political campaigns (Mischaud, 2007). Another reason is that Twitter succeeds 
in attracting the attention of many Internet users. Twitter gains in significance because 
of its accessibility and affordance (to an extent) to almost everyone, and as it has 
progressively “infused itself into daily life—regardless of one’s geographical 
location” (Walck, 2013, p. 66). Finally, Twitter is seen as a breaking news source. In 
fact, it is regarded as the preferred social media source for breaking news (Osborne & 
Dredze, 2014). Moon and Hadley (2014) state that Twitter has become a primary 
news source for traditional media, “journalists embraced Twitter as a new channel for 
information gathering. TV frequently cited Twitter as a sole or a primary source” (p. 
289).  
            Being Saudi, it also intrigued me to examine how tweeters perceive us 
(Saudis) on Twitter, given that Saudi Arabia ranked fourth among the leading 
countries of Twitter users in January 2020 (Clement, 2020). Further, Saudi Arabia has 
received considerable attention in the media over the years, as the world’s largest oil 





and Medinah (Al-Rassi, 2019). After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, Saudi Arabia has seen 
extensive media coverage as 15 out of the 19 attackers were identified as Saudis (Al-
Shami, Al-Nuaimi, & Al-Alma'y, 2019). In addition, the United States-led war on Al-
Qaida in Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq all brought Saudi Arabia into media 
focus, as it has been a strong ally of the U.S. government (Blanchard, 2015). Lately, 
Saudi Arabia has joined international coalition forces against the Syrian regime and 
Saudi-led Arab coalition forces against Houthi groups in Yemen (ibid.).  
           The debates around Saudi Arabia's role in these events has led to an increase in 
discussions and conflicts on different media sites (Reaboi, 2019) and, accordingly, 
Saudis are likely to be represented based on their country's reflection in those media. 
These representations have received little attention from researchers, with the focus 
being mainly on the representation of Saudi women in Western newspapers (Adham, 
2012; Eltantawy, 2007; Kaufer & Al-Malki, 2009).  
1.3. Saudi Arabia: A historical context 
Saudi Arabia is located in the Middle East in the Arabian Peninsula, and is recognized 
as the home of the holy sites of Mecca and Madinah. It is also known globally as the 
largest oil exporter around the world with its production of oil and gas that is vital to 
the global market. The state formation underwent several phases that ended in 
establishing the contemporary Saudi State or the Kingdom of Arabia in 1932 
(Altoaimy, 2017). According to Alhazmi and Nyland (2015), Saudi Arabia is one of 
the few countries that did not experience a direct Western colonisation. Consequently, 
it survived any religious, political, or cultural disruption or upheaval that other Arab 
countries experienced during Western colonisation. This survival resulted in making 





political system controlled by a monarchy” (Salamah, 2016, p. 6). The population 
comprises a mixture of ethnic communities (tribal and non-tribal) because of 
migration within the country and “from migrants from other countries travelling to 
Saudi Arabia for religious purposes. As a consequence, Saudi Arabia does not 
comprise of a single ethnic community” (ibid., p.7).  
            However, the success which accompanied the formation of the Saudi State 
relied heavily on the allegiance of the House of Al-Saud with an Islamic movement 
that was known as the Wahhabism (or Salafi) movement, which linked to the religious 
reformer Mohammad ibn Abd Al-Wahhab and became the official religious doctrine 
of Saudi Arabia since then. In its core essence, the Wahhabi movement endorsed 
Tawhid, the oneness of God, as the primary theology. According to Nevo (2006), 
Mohammed ibn Abd Al-Wahhab started preaching in Najd and central Arabia in the 
1940s in pursuit to reform Islam. He called for: 
The reinstatement of exactly the same  religious, social and political customs 
that had been practised by the prophet Muhammad and his followers, namely 
adherence to the Quran and the sunna as the only sources for religious 
conduct, and the rejection of any new element or concept introduced into 
Islam thereafter; those were branded as bid'a… Not only is God omnipotent, 
he is the one and only who is such. No person or object possesses divine traits, 
so no one and nothing can or should mediate between a human being and God. 
The use of such an intermediary was considered shirk (polytheism, idolatry). 
(pp. 16-17)   
Although the term was not rooted in terror originally, Wahhabism has become 





criticised for its extreme approach and terrorist inspiration (Blanchard, 2008). And as 
Wahhabism was claimed to influence terrorist-categorised groups such as ISIS and 
AlQaeda, it was officially declared “the main source of global terrorism” by the 
European parliament in Strasbourg in 2013 (Telegraph Reporters, 2017). 
            The religious establishment remained in power and governed the Saudi 
society, maintaining its grip over the legal and educational systems. However, the 
country’s rapid modernisation and openness to the West had led to opposing 
movements by several preachers and scholars, such as the Islamic Awakening 
movement (Sahwa), in the 1980s and 1990s which aimed at reviving the “religious 
conservatism and reinforcing the Islamic identity of Saudis” (Altoaimy, 2017, p. 18). 
The Saudi society is considered conservative and private and often described as 
patriarchal and male-dominated (Alwedinani, 2017), with the Islamic rules and 
principles governing all aspects of life. Such religious control has led to a wide 
criticism especially in western media, focusing on gender segregation which was 
often linked to inequality and oppression towards women, such as enforcing modest 
clothing (hijab), and banning women from driving and jobs that were restricted only 
to education and medicine (Alsaleh, 2012).  
            Nevertheless, this situation has changed with the ruling of the late king 
Abdullah bin Abdulaziz who started the initial steps in promoting gender equality in 
education, health, and employment since 2005 (Alhazmi & Nylan, 2015). Women 
were able to vote in municipal elections and study abroad through the King Abdullah 
scholarship program. In 2019, during the reign of King Salman, the crown prince 
launched Vision 2030 which promised to increase social freedom and democracy, 
reducing unemployment, and improving the social welfare system. Women were 





by June 24, 2018. They were also allowed to travel without a guardian’s permission, 
register births, marriages and divorces, to be guardians to minors and to be issued 
official family documents (Rashad & Kalin, 2019). 
1.4. Aim and Research Questions (RQs) 
This research aims to explore how bottom-up discursive strategies were at play in the 
representation of Saudis on Twitter during the tragic events at Mecca. I adopt Critical 
Discourse Studies (CDS) and Corpus Linguistics (CL) approaches to examine data 
from Twitter as one aspect of social media microblogging services to answer the 
following overarching question: How were Saudis represented in English on Twitter 
by tweets in Australia, Canada, Great Britain, the United States and the rest of the 
world in September 2015, the period including the two tragic events at Mecca? This 
question can be broken down to include the following sub-questions (RQs 1–4): 
1. How are Saudis represented across the five corpora?  
2. What discursive strategies are employed in tweets in representations of 
Saudis? 
3. To what extent are Saudis represented differently by tweets in Australia, 
Canada, GB, USA and rest of the world corpora? 
4. What are the reasons and potential consequences for discourses about Saudis 
identified through the findings for the above research questions? 
1.5. Structure and organisation of the thesis  
In the last section of this chapter, I present an outline of the thesis and provide a brief 
discussion of what each chapter includes. Chapter 1, as discussed above, introduces 
the topic of the current thesis. It offers the background to the research problem and the 





a gap in the existing research while highlighting its academic significance within the 
current literature.  
            Chapter 2 conducts a detailed literature review of relevant research. It is 
divided into two parts: the first part reports on the methodological framework upon 
which the analyses in this thesis are based, i.e. CDS and CL. The second section 
presents a detailed account of studies of the representation of other groups in both 
mass and social media. It also reports on the notion of discourse and its social nature. 
This chapter concludes by reviewing studies on representation on social media and 
Twitter, with a focus on studies that tackle the representation of Muslims, as they are 
the most analogous and representative group of Saudis on Twitter.  
            In Chapter 3, I present an overview of the methodology of the thesis. The 
chapter is divided into two parts. The first part discusses Twitter, along with its 
definition and conventions. I also describe the data collection process and how I 
compiled the data and reference corpora. I also consider the ethical considerations that 
should be acknowledged while researching Twitter data. The second part presents the 
analysis tools used throughout the thesis. It offers an explanation of the corpus tools 
and statistical standards I used to analyse the data both quantitatively and 
qualitatively.  
            Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present the data analysis in relation to the first three 
research sub-questions. Chapter 4 sets out the basis for the analysis. It aims to answer 
RQ-1 by first identifying the dominant themes and topics around Saudis during the 
tragic events at Mecca, which result from the analysis of the keywords of five corpora 
together (FCT). Chapter 5 also aims to answer RQ-1 by examining the themes 





analysis of the keywords in Chapter 4. Chapter 6 answers RQ-2 by triangulating 
another corpus tool, i.e. collocation. Chapter 7 aims to answer RQ-3 by analysing the 
differences between the five corpora. The last chapter, Chapter 8, reviews each 
research question and links the findings of all the analysis chapters as it looks for 
cumulative evidence building up across different topics to answer RQ-4. An overall 
conclusion is drawn while identifying recurring patterns and inconsistencies. The 
chapter concludes by highlighting the limitations of the current study as well as 
making suggestions for future research.  
 















Chapter 2. Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter conducts a review of the literature that informed this research. It is 
divided into parts: part one introduces the theoretical framework upon which the 
analyses that follow in Chapters 4–7 are based. Section 2.1 starts with a general 
introduction to the field of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS). This is followed by a 
detailed discussion of the various CDS approaches I rely on in this research in 
sections 2.2.1–2.2.4. Section 2.2.5 concludes the first part of this chapter with a brief 
introduction to Corpus Linguistics (CL) and the efficacy of combining it with CDS. 
The second part of this chapter will introduce the notion of discourse and its social 
nature. I will then draw upon the role of media in discourse in Section 2.3. Next, I 
introduce representation (Section 2.4) with some related concepts, such as ideology, 
identity and collective identities, in sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3. The next sections review 
studies of representation in the mass media and social media, as well as case studies 
from newspapers on the representation of Muslims and Saudis. After that, in Section 
2.4.5, I discuss representation in social media. The chapter concludes with a summary 
section (2.5). 
2.2. Part One: Theoretical framework 
2.2.1. Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) 
The introduction of Web 2.0 has generated immense data that are valuable for 
linguistic analysis. Barton and Lee (2013) assert that the Internet can provide 
accessible and large amounts of data which create links between different areas of 





Linguistics. However, understanding how language conveys meaning goes beyond a 
mere examination of a clause or sentence, it rather requires a deep understanding of 
the context or situation in which language is used. According to Wodak (2001), 
critical approaches to language use have existed in human societies for a long time. 
Among these approaches to language is Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), which is 
used throughout my research.  
            CDS first emerged in the early 1990s as Critical Discourse Analysis. 
However, van Dijk (2013) asserts that CDA is not a method of critical discourse 
analysis since, he argues, being critical is a state of mind rather than explicit methods 
that researchers apply in their analyses. In the current study, I adopt van Dijk’s 
proposal that Critical Discourse Analysis is ultimately a critical way of approaching 
scientific data and, henceforth, use the term CDS. According to Wodak and Meyer 
(2016), CDS can be defined as "a school or paradigm … characterized by the 
common interests in deconstructing ideologies and power through the systemic and 
retroductable investigation of semiotic data (written, spoken or visual)" (p. 4). CDS 
analysts also seek to position themselves and their interests explicitly while, at the 
same time, "retaining their respective scientific methodologies and remaining self-
reflective of their own research process" (ibid., p. 4). 
            One of CDS' central objectives is to view the choices offered by language (that 
are produced in a text) as a possible medium through which the ideological products 
of a specific discursive situation can be regenerated. This means that CDS aims to 
locate language choices preferred by speakers/writers which can convey specific 
ideologies. In Fairclough and Wodak (1997), this is explained as the "working 
assumption" which holds that "any part of any language text, spoken or written, is 





words, any given discourse can represent a certain view of the world, specific societal 
relations among participants and specific social individualities consistent with the 
goals, contexts and recipients of the discourse (Sahragard & Davatgarzadeh, 2010). In 
its core concern, CDS approaches to discourse analysis "try to provide an account for 
the links between the language (discourse) and its higher up social macrostructure, 
which in turn try to explain the processes of production and interpretation of discourse 
in a society" (KhosraviNik, 2010, p. 56). In sum, Bloor and Bloor (2013, p. 12) 
highlight the main objectives of CDS analysis as follows: 
• to analyse discourse practices that reflect or construct social problems; 
• to investigate how ideologies can become frozen in language and find ways to      
break the ice; 
• to increase awareness of how to apply these objectives to specific cases of   
injustice, prejudice and misuse of power.    
            CDS is also multidisciplinary in nature; it goes beyond mere linguistic tools 
and methods to examine the ways in which discourse and language are utilised to 
accomplish social purposes and how such utilisation can contribute to maintaining or 
changing society (Bloor & Bloor, 2013). Yet, linguistic analysis remains a central 
principle of CDS. What differentiates CDS from other linguistic studies, however, is 
"its stringent application of linguistics" (Hart, 2014, p. 6). That is to say, linguistic 
analysis is seen as the medium through which CDS critically examines discourse. In 
addition to linguistic tools, CDS is seen as multidimensional: researchers do not 
confine themselves to particular methodologies or tools, they also deal with different 
types of data and draw on a different range of methods, from the humanities to 
cognitive science (Hart & Cap, 2014). This multidimensional nature makes CDS a 





combined with other approaches in my research, I introduce some central concepts in 
CDS in the following subsections.    
2.2.1.1. Critique 
One of the central tenets of CDS research is its criticality. CDS is critical in the sense 
that it “influences all levels of analysis, such as the identification of a social problem, 
data selection, methodology and analysis. ‘Criticality’ is directly linked with the 
concept of contextualization and, hence, the essential inter-disciplinarity” of CDS 
(KhosraviNik, 2009, p. 479). The term critical can, however, be misleading as it can 
suggest a negative evaluation (Bloor & Bloor, 2013), yet in CDS research, “it is used 
more with the sense of critique”, which means that the analysis can occasionally be 
directed towards positive outcomes (ibid., p. 5).  
2.2.1.2. Discourse  
Reisigl and Wodak (2005) define discourse as: 
[A] complex bundle of “simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic 
acts that manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as 
thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as ‘texts’, 
that belong to specific semiotic types, i.e. genre.” (p. 36) 
CDS views discourse as a form of “social practice”, which implies a dialectic 
relationship between “a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s), 
and social structure(s) which frame it: the discursive event is shaped by them, but it 





(little “d” discourse)1 affects and is affected by other elements, which in turn cannot 
be reduced to one another: “they are different, but not discrete” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 
3).  
            From a critical discourse perspective, Fairclough (2003) distinguishes between 
discourse as a count noun and non-count noun; the latter refers to “language and other 
types of semiosis as elements of social life” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 26). Discourse in its 
abstract sense (as a mass noun) can signify the historical background and social 
domain in which the discourse under investigation is enacted, e.g. “late 19th century 
political discourse” (Koller, 2012, p. 21). This notion of  discourse acknowledges that 
“the contexts of production, distribution and reception influence the make-up of 
concrete textual instances and that these texts, in turn, have an effect on social reality” 
(Zotzmann, & O’Regan, 2016, p.7). Whereas the former, discourse as a count noun, 
denotes the “representation and construction of reality from a particular point of 
view” (Koller, 2008, p. 11) and the use of language in different social domains, such 
as media discourse, academic discourse, political discourse, etc. Discourses can be 
seen as “ways of signifying experience from a particular perspective” (Fairclough, 
1995, p.135) and can represent the same area of the world from different perspectives 
or positions, e.g. US elite media discourse about China policy (Lee, 2002) and war 
discourse in Sri Lanka (Frerks, 2013). In this study, discourse is used in its countable 
form and refers to tweeters’ particular ways of representing Saudis drawing on 
linguistic resources which encode combinations of personal views and beliefs as well 
as social values and norms.  
 
1 Gee (2015) differentiates between “little d” discourse which refers to the analysis of language in use 
and “big D” discourse which refers to how groups of people enact specific identities and activities (p. 





            Discourse can be implicitly indexed through language which reflects the 
speaker/writer’s opinions on any issue or topic following their world view or 
knowledge, such as the phrases “think before you print” and “be green”, which can 
denote a “pro-environment” discourse (Al-Hejin, 2012, p. 14). Discourse can also be 
explicitly identified through the specialised knowledge of academic or social analysts 
to describe the language of, for instance, the racist discourse of the British National 
Party (Werbner, 2005). However, discourses cannot be identified easily unless they 
are coherent and meaningful; this meaningfulness is usually defined in terms of local 
or global unity or coherence (van Dijk, 1983). Local coherence requires that the 
clauses and sentences which make up the discourse are related and meaningful and 
that the propositions they express are also related. Whereas the global coherence 
relates to larger parts of the discourse, namely themes or topics; both “are accounted 
for theoretically in terms of so-called “semantic macrostructures.” Thus, a fragment of 
a discourse or a whole discourse is considered to be globally coherent if a topic 
(represented by a macroproposition) can be derived from such a fragment” (ibid., 
p.25). In the current research, for example, the tweets constitute Twitter discourse 
about Saudis, yet this discourse cannot be considered coherent unless these tweets are 
meaningfully related and that certain topics or themes (global coherence) can be 
derived from them, such as war, religion, Mecca events and so on.  
            However, while van Dijk uses both terms themes and topics synonymously2 
(see also Allard & Ulatowska, 1991; Calhoun, 2012; Glosser & Deser, 1991), other 
researchers set boundaries between the two (Downing, 2015; Jones, 1977; McCabe, 
1999; Wical, 1999). For instance, Wical (1999) state that themes are broader and can 
 
2 Themes and topics are discussed here in relation to Discourse Analysis rather than the syntactic 





link different topics together; a “theme identifies which topic is really being discussed 
and what is being Said about that topic” (p. 19). Wical also adds that every “sentence 
in a discourse can be said to have a topic, explicitly Stated or implied, and a focus, or 
Something that is being Said about the topic” (p. 11, capitalisation in original). A 
theme refers to the central idea or the main thread of different levels of discourse 
(Jones, 1977), while topic is most commonly used to refer to the aboutness in a text 
(Downing, 2015; McCabe, 1999). Such differences, in fact, do not indicate sharp 
boundaries between themes and topics: though themes seem to be general and 
encompass the topics in a discourse, both terms contribute to global coherence which 
gives discourse its meaningfulness. Consequently, and following van Dijk (1983), 
both terms are used synonymously in this research.  
            Discourse is also socially constitutive (reproduces and sustains power) and 
consequential (gives rise to issues of power). The discursive practices in a given 
society can have significant ideological effects that arise from unequal power 
relations, such as social classes, ingroups/outgroups, gender inequality and ethnicity, 
which position people and represent things accordingly (Reisigl & Wodak, 2016, p. 
6). Consequently, language users can “interpret, represent, reproduce or change social 
structures such as social inequality and injustice” as they are members of groups and 
communities and have their mental representations and discourses (van Dijk, 2009, p. 
66). To better understand the outcomes of the discursive strategies of language users 
in discourse, analysts can examine what happens when people talk or write, which are 
texts. This necessitates differentiating between discourse and texts, which I will 






A text refers not only to written and printed texts and transcribed (spoken) 
conversations and interviews, but it can also be extended to include non-linguistic 
elements, such as images, symbols and audio effects (Fairclough, 2003). Texts differ 
from discourse as they represent the materialised form or the realisation of discourse 
in its abstract sense. Texts can also be a means of demystifying the “social identity of 
their producers and address the supposed identities of their readers, and texts for [a] 
massive audience … actively construct imagined identities for their consumers, 
creating for them positions they may or may not occupy” (Dremel & Matić, 2014, p. 
159). Therefore, texts form a crucial unit of analysis in this study, since tweets (the 
data) can reflect tweeters’ discursive practices while representing Saudis on Twitter.   
2.2.1.4. Intertextuality and interdiscursivity 
Intertextuality refers to the ways in which texts implicitly or explicitly recontextualise 
or incorporate other texts. It can also (partly) represent people’s presuppositions and 
assumptions when they talk or write (Fairclough, 2003). These relations between texts 
are established through transferring arguments from one text to another, through 
references to the same event(s), through explicit references to actors or topics and so 
on (Wodak & Meyer, 2016). Intertextuality can be explicit, involving the manifest 
and literal incorporation of texts (e.g. direct quotations), or constitutive, which refers 
to “the configuration of discourse conventions that go into [text] production” 
(Fairclough, 1992b, p. 271). On the other hand, interdiscursivity analysis focuses 
partly on “identifying which discourses are drawn upon, and how they are articulated 
together” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 128).   





The dialectical-relational approach to language, as proposed by Fairclough (1992), 
perceives discourse within three dimensions (Figure 2.1). First, the text dimension, 
which “attends to language analysis of texts”. Second, the discursive practice 
dimension, which “specifies the nature of the processes of text production and 
interpretation”. Third, the ‘social practice’ dimension, which “attends to issues of 
concern in social analysis, such as the institutional and organizational circumstances 
of the discursive event and how that shapes the nature of the discursive practice, and 
the constitutive/constructive effects of discourse” (p. 4). The key issue is that texts do 
not operate in a vacuum but rather have dialectical, interrelated relationships with the 
society: societal trends influence texts through interaction which, in turn, is shaped 









           Following these dimensions of discourse, Fairclough (1998/2001, p. 26) 
distinguishes three stages in the critical analysis of discourse. The first stage is 






















is “interpretation”, which concerns the “the relationship between text and interaction – 
with seeing the text as the product of a process of production, and as a resource in the 
process of interpretation”. The third stage is ‘explanation’, which concerns “the 
relationship between interaction and social context – with the social determination of 
the processes of production and interpretation, and their social effects”. In the current 
research, the analysis is not conducted in stages, since it follows a data-driven 
approach. However, the analysis oscillates between these stages, tweets are described 
and then interpreted, and when a social effect is evident, it is then explained.    
2.2.3. The Discourse-historical approach (DHA) 
2.2.3.1. Historical dimensions 
The Discourse-historical Approach (henceforth DHA) is one of the prominent 
approaches of CDS. According to Wodak (2009b), the DHA “focuses on multiple 
genres, large data corpora and on argumentative, rhetorical and pragmatic 
interdisciplinary analysis, while integrating multiple layers of socio-political and 
historical contexts in order to theorize dimensions of social change and identity 
politics” (p. 1). However, what distinguishes the DHA from other approaches to the 
critical analysis of discourse is its ability to integrate interdisciplinary and 
multimethodological ways with different types of empirical data and contextual 
information (ibid.). The context, thus, constitutes an inherent part of the DHA’s 
analysis of discourse, which takes into consideration four levels (Wodak, 2015, p. 5):  
▪ the immediate language, or text-internal cotext;  
▪ the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, 





▪ the extralinguistic social variables and institutional frames of a specific 
“context of situation”; and  
▪ the broader sociopolitical and historical context, which discursive practices are 
embedded in and related to.  
The DHA recognises the importance of examining the intertextual influence of, for 
instance, Saudis’ historical representation in Western media in the current discourse 
on Twitter (see Section 2.3.4.2).  
2.2.3.2. Discursive strategies 
In addition to the importance of the contextual and background information of texts, 
the DHA also aims to identify the effects of specific discursive strategies which serve 
to present groups or individuals positively or negatively (Richardson & Colombo, 
2014). A discursive strategy can be defined as “a (more or less accurate and more or 
less intentional) plan of practices, including discursive practices, adopted to achieve a 
particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal” (Wodak, 2009b). The 
following discursive strategies are relevant to the current research. Nomination 
strategies, which refers to the ways in which persons, objects, phenomena, events, 
processes and actions are named and referred to linguistically in texts (Reisigl & 
Wodak, 2016). Predication strategies, which refers to the qualities or characteristics 
ascribed to social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions 
mentioned in the discourse (ibid.). Perspectivisation strategies, which refers to the 
ways (perspectives) in which speakers or writers position their points of view and 
express their involvement in the discourse (Wodak, 2015). Finally, Intensification 
strategies, which refers to the modification of the “epistemic status of a proposition by 





2.2.4. Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) 
Both CDS and Systemic Functional Linguistics (henceforth SFL) have matching 
views of discourse: CDS is concerned with addressing issues of power and inequality 
in discourse, similarly SFL (M. A. K. Halliday) with its inception of language as “an 
ideologically committed form of social action” (Martin & Wodak, 2003, p. 3). SFL 
views language as a social semiotic system which enables individuals to communicate 
three fundamental types of meanings (referred to as metafunctions): (1) ideational, 
which refers to how participants convey their experience of the external world; (2) 
interpersonal, which refers to how language users enact social roles and maintain 
interpersonal relations; and (3) textual, which refers to how ideational and 
interpersonal meanings facilitate text interpretation (Matthiessen & Halliday, 2009, 
pp. 12–13).    
2.2.4.1. Transitivity 
In order to identify the different ways in which media streams depict social agents and 
represent them accordingly, linguists employ a variety of analysis tools. As Hart 
(2014) states, "linguistic expressions do not correspond directly with the realities they 
describe", but rather "the grammar of representation, located in the ideational function 
of language, yields a linguistic product which reflects but a particular take on reality 
which may thus be ideologically confused" (p. 19). One of the crucial components of 
the ideational metafunction is transitivity. Transitivity in SFL is concerned with “the 
type of process expressed in the clause, with the participants in this process, animate 
and inanimate, and with various attributes and circumstances of the process and the 
participants” (Halliday, 1967, p. 38). Processes in the transitivity system are of six 





Actor who performs the action, and the Goal or Patient receiving the action (p. 179). 
Mental processes include the Sensor and the Phenomenon being sensed; these can 
also be subdivided into Cognitive (e.g. think), Perceptive (e.g. see), Emotive (e.g. 
love) or Desiderative (e.g. wish) (p. 208). Relational processes include Identifying 
processes (e.g. Sam is the manager) and Attributive processes (e.g. Jane is smart) (p. 
215). Verbal processes include the Sayer, Receiver, Verbiage and Target (p. 255). 
Behavioural processes are grammatically more like those of doing and include the 
Behaver as a human participant (e.g. Tim is coughing) (p. 251). Finally, Existential 
processes represent something that exists or happens (e.g. there is a problem) (p. 256).  
           Transitivity has proved to be informative in critical linguistics as an “essential 
tool in the analysis of representation” (Fowler, 1991, p. 70). Transitivity in SFL is a 
system of options, and the choices that language users make among these options can 
mirror a particular point of view and hence imply ideological significance (ibid.). Lee 
(2016) points to the role of transitivity in representation, stating that:   
The significance of transitivity in linguistic representation derives from the 
fact that the various participant roles associated with different process types 
… project a cline of dynamism … so that depending on which participant 
role a character is mostly associated with in a text, he/she may come across 
as relatively more active or passive (or more powerful or powerless). (p. 467) 
However, despite some difficulties in identifying certain process types or roles that 
participants play in these processes (Thompson, 2013, p. 95), transitivity remains a 
systematic and intuitive way to identify linguistic choices that “play a fundamental 





there are certain ideological differences that are conveyed either tacitly or overtly” in 
texts (Chilton, 2007, p. 402).  
2.2.4.2. Modality 
In SFL, modality is often presented through the interpersonal metafunction of 
language. In the current research, three types of modality are relevant. The first is 
deontic modality (Nuyts, 2006, p. 4), which is traditionally defined in terms of 
obligation and permission as an “indication of the degree of moral desirability of the 
state of affairs expressed in the utterance, typically, but not necessarily, on behalf of 
the speaker” (e.g. You should be thankful). The other type is epistemic modality 
(Nuyts, 2001, p. 21), which refers to the “evaluation of the chances that a certain 
hypothetical state of affairs under consideration (or some aspect of it) will occur, is 
occurring or has occurred in a possible world” (e.g. Ann will/may not come). The last 
type is dynamic modality (ibid., p. 3), which is traditionally “characterized as an 
ascription of a capacity to the subject-participant of the clause (the subject is able to 
perform the action expressed by the main verb in the clause)” (e.g. Mary can sing).       
2.2.5. Corpus linguistics (CL)  
Corpus linguistics (henceforth CL) can be defined as “a way of using computers to 
assist the analysis of language so that regularities among many millions of words can 
be quickly and accurately identified” (Baker & McEnery, 2015a, p. 1). CL can 
provide a means for empirical language analysis. In fact, CL is often used to answer 
wider research questions, “in areas such as language teaching and learning, discourse 
analysis, literary stylistics, forensic linguistics, pragmatics, speech technology, 
sociolinguistics and health communication, among others” (McCarthy & O’Keeffe, 





that used in CL cannot produce meaningful analyses by itself. Background 
(contextual) information and transitivity cannot, at least for now, be delivered via 
software analysis. Nevertheless, CL is not an end in itself, rather, it can lead to 
insights beyond grammar and lexis through the applications of its techniques to 
answer various research questions (McCarthy & O’Keeffe, 2010). CL’s basic 
techniques can also make a valuable contribution to the study of discourse from a 
critical discourse perspective (Hardt-Mautner, 1995).    
           There are different types of corpora, depending on the research goals. The most 
important type (for discourse analysis) is the specialised corpus (Baker, 2006, p. 26), 
which is used “to study aspects of a particular variety or genre of language”, such as 
examining the language of academic essays or newspapers. The other type is the 
reference corpus, which consists of a large body of texts and is “representative of a 
particular language variety” (ibid., p. 30). Following Tognini-Bonelli (2001), two 
approaches to CL research are identified: corpus-driven and corpus-based. The 
corpus-driven approach means that the analyst does not have a prior hypothesis or 
make assumptions about the data and his/her findings are strictly based on the 
findings emerging from the corpus. Whereas the corpus-based approach relies on the 
corpus to validate pre-existing claims, theories or findings from other research. The 
current research adopts both approaches, although it follows a corpus-driven approach 
with the corpus being the basis of observation (without prior assumptions or theories). 
However, a corpus-based approach is also used to verify/validate any emerging 
phenomena (e.g. a recurring pattern). Incorporating one of these approaches (or both 
of them) can assist the researcher’s arguments about certain texts or discourses 
(Subtirelu & Baker, 2017).        





In this section, I will briefly introduce some basic CL concepts that are used in this 
research.  
• Tokens: the overall number of words in a corpus  
• Lemma: is “the canonical form of a word” (Baker, 2006, p. 55) or “a set of 
lexical forms having the same stem and belonging to the same major word 
class, differing only in inflection and/or spelling” (Francis & Kučera, 1982, p. 
1). For example, the lemma WRITE includes writes, written, writing and wrote.3 
• Span: refers to the number of words located to the left and right of the node. 
• Dispersion: “The rate of occurrence of a word or phrase across a particular file 
or corpus” (Baker, Hardie, & McEnery, 2006, p. 59). 
• Cluster: a term used to refer to a group of words in a sequence (pattern).  
• Concordancer: “a software tool that searches through a corpus for each 
instance of a given word, phrase or other element and the immediate context in 
which each instance occurs, to create a concordance” (Baker et al., 2006, p. 
44). Modern concordancers, such as WordSmith, makes it possible to look at 
word forms in several ways, each of which has significance for the researcher 
(Tribble, 2010). A concordancer also enables the researcher to examine the 
context of the node within one or two mouse clicks. Using a concordancer is 
of crucial importance as the bulk of this research is carried out through 
concordance analysis.  
 





• Keywords: Scott (1997) defines a keyword as “a word which occurs with 
unusual frequency in a given text. This does not mean high frequency but 
unusual frequency, by comparison with a reference corpus of some kind” (p. 
236). Keywords can locate existing discourses as well as reveal techniques 
that highlight and normalise some discourses over others (Baker, 2006).  
• Collocation: refers to a “relationship of habitual co-occurrence between words 
(lemmas or wordforms)” (Stubbs, 1995, p. 24). Examining the collocates of a 
word can both assist in the semantic analysis of a word and provide 
information about the most salient or frequent notions related to the word 
(Gabrielatos & Baker, 2008). Integrating collocation analysis within a CDA 
framework can be fruitful since one of CDA’s aims is to show how discursive 
practices in texts are linked to issues of power and domination in society and 
the interplay of discourse in reproducing and challenging dominance (Salama, 
2011). In this way, “collocation (as a linguistic-discursive practice) may well 
be linked to different ideologies as ‘the basis of the social representations 
shared by members of a group’” (ibid., p. 317). 
• Colligation: a “form of collocation which involves relationships at the 
grammatical rather than the lexical level. For example, nouns tend to colligate 
with adjectives while verbs tend to colligate with adverbs” (Baker et al., 2006, 
p. 36).   
• Discourse prosody: (also referred to by Louw (1993) as semantic prosody) 
refers to “the way that words in a corpus can collocate with a related set of 
words or phrases, often revealing (hidden) attitudes” (Baker et al., 2006, p. 





writer’s attitude and can be “evaluative”, as it expresses “the speaker's reason 
for making the utterance, and therefore identify functional discourse units” (p. 
65).  
2.2.5.2. Combining CDS and CL   
To use CL methods along with CDS in analysing texts is not an innovative research 
practice, although both are considered as new in linguistics (Baker et al., 2008). In 
fact, analysing language through a corpus approach "dates back to the pre-Chomskyan 
period when it was used by field linguists such as Boas (1940) and linguists of the 
structuralist tradition, including Sapir, Newman, Bloomfield and Pike" (McEnery, 
Xiao, & Tono, 2006, p. 2). CL in linguistics can be understood as "an approach that is 
grounded in empiricism and has much in common with other approaches in the social 
sciences where samples are taken in order to make generalisations about a wider 
population" (Baker, 2014b, p. 7). Mautner (2016, pp. 155–156) outlines three factors 
when incorporating CL with CDS: 
▪ Corpus linguistics allows critical discourse analysts to work with much larger 
data volumes than they can when using purely manual techniques. 
▪ In enabling critical discourse analysts to significantly broaden their empirical 
base, corpus linguistics can help reduce researcher bias, thus coping with a 
problem to which CDA is hardly more prone than other social sciences but for 
which it has come in for harsh and persistent criticism. 
▪ Corpus linguistics software offers both quantitative and qualitative 
perspectives on textual data, computing frequencies and measures of statistical 





researcher can assess individual occurrences of search words, qualitatively 
examine their collocational environments, describe salient semantic patterns 
and identify discourse functions.  
            Using corpora has become very popular for several reasons, such as their 
enormous size, broad social, geographic and linguistic range, up-to-dateness,  
multimodality and affordable accessibility (Fletcher, 2012). In fact, incorporating 
CDS research with corpus tools can assist researchers to, first, work with large 
volumes of data; second, reduce researcher bias, which is a problem often associated 
with CDS researchers; and lastly, corpus tools allow both the qualitative and 
quantitative textual analysis of data, enabling researchers to examine word 
occurrences as well as their semantic patterns and discourse functions (Mautner, 
2016). 
             However, both CDS and CL are criticised for their limitations. CDS is 
criticised for its methodological weaknesses, given its qualitative approach to 
analysing language, which can lead to “fragmentary [and] exemplificatory” text types 
(Fowler, 2013, p. 8). Subjectivity is also another drawback that Widdowson (2000) 
criticises CDS for, as the researcher’s presumptions heavily influence the data 
analysis. Similarly, CL is criticised for its inability to represent the reality, i.e. what 
people really know or think. Widdowson states that CL can only reveal what people 
unintentionally do with language, depending on the analyst’s observations, rather than 
the introspection of the language user (2000). Other issues include CL’s quantitative 
nature, data decontextualisation and representativeness (Handford, 2010).    
             To mitigate these criticisms, analysts can improve their methodological rigour 





that the “use of large reference corpora in CDA, for purposes of comparison with a 
text(s) under investigation, reveals salient linguistic features in that text. In this way is 
arbitrariness, and thus analyst subjectivity, reduced since it is the software which 
reveals salience and not the analyst” (2010, p. 565). Furthermore, a CL methodology 
can allow a higher degree of objectivity. That is, it enables the researcher to analyse 
texts (comparatively) while avoiding any predetermined assumptions regarding their 
linguistic or pragmatic/semantic content (Gabrielatos & Baker, 2008, p. 7).  
            The synergy of both CDS and CL has proven useful in researching media 
representations of social actors and minority groups (Al-Hejin, 2015; Baker, 2014a; 
Baker et al., 2008; Baker et al., 2013; KhosraviNik, 2010a, 2010b; KhosraviNik, 
Krzyżanowski, & Wodak, 2012; Rasinger, 2010). One of the novel synergies of both 
CDS and CL is presented by the work of Baker et al. (2008) A useful methodological 
synergy? Combining critical discourse analysis and corpus linguistics to examine 
discourses of refugees and asylum seekers in the UK press, in which they examine the 
discourse on immigration in UK newspapers. The analysis includes a 140-million-
word corpus about refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants and was carried out in 
different stages, using both qualitative and quantitative techniques. Baker et al. argue 
that the “combination of methodologies traditionally associated with CDA (DHA) and 
CL in research projects, and their potential theoretical and methodological cross-
pollination, seem to benefit both CDA and CL. Combining methods strengthens the 
theoretical basis of both [the] DHA and CL” (p. 297). They also note that using CDS 
and CL can supplement both approaches: CL analysis, especially concordance 
analysis, “can be positively influenced by exposure and familiarity with CDA 
analytical techniques, and the theoretical notions and categories of DHA can inform 





            Using both approaches has also proven fruitful in investigating Twitter data, 
with CL providing quantitative analysis while processing thousands of tweets and 
CDS qualitative and contextual analysis that can together substantiate the findings of 
both. 
2.3. Part Two: Discourse and media 
2.3.1. Discourse as a social practice 
As a part of socializing, people gain acquaintance with a variety of discourses, either 
acquired through experience or teaching.  (Bloor & Bloor, 2013) 
Fairclough (1995) states that discourse is commonly used in social theory and analysis 
"to refer to different ways of structuring areas of knowledge and social practice". In 
this sense, discourse is "manifested in particular ways of using language and other 
symbolic forms such as visual images" (p. 3). In what way is discourse considered a 
social practice? By saying that discourse is a form of social practice, I refer to the 
"relatively stabilised form of social activity (examples would be classroom teaching, 
television news, family meals, medical consultations)" (Fairclough, 2001, p. 1). Each 
form of practice resembles an expression of the "diverse social elements within a 
relatively stable configuration, always including discourse" (ibid., p. 1). Social 
practices can also be oriented either economically, politically, culturally or 
ideologically, and discourse is then involved in each one of them (Fairclough, 1992b). 
However, van Leeuwen posits some differences between discourse and social 
practice. On the one hand, a discourse can be recognised by "itself [as] social practice, 
discourse as a form of action, as something people do to, or for, or with each other". 
On the other hand there is "discourse in the Foucauldian sense, as a way of 





social practice(s)" (cited in Wodak, 2001, p. 9). However, as this research applies a 
critical discourse approach, I use the two terms suggested by van Leeuwen, who 
presents discourse as both a tool for initialising power and ideology and a tool for 
representing and establishing the social reality.       
             Discourse can also play a vital role in shaping and changing the social system 
and in forming ideologies. For the current study, ideology can be defined (according 
to van Dijk, 1998) as the "basis of the social representations shared by members of a 
group". This definition presumes that "ideologies allow people, as group members, to 
organise the multitude of social beliefs about what is the case, good or bad, right or 
wrong, for them, and to act accordingly"(p. 8). van Dijk (2009) also asserts that as 
part of language users and community members, people with their discourse and 
mental representations resemble an integral element in society. Thereby, they can, 
through language use within the social structure, "interpret, represent, reproduce or 
change social structures such as social inequality and injustice" (p. 66). Discourse can 
also be a concrete part of ideology: Fairclough quotes Pêcheux et al.’s (1979) 
contribution to evolution of the notion of "language as one crucially important 
material form of ideology", so that discourse can reveal the "effects of ideological 
struggle within the functioning of language, and, conversely, the existence of 
linguistic materiality within discourse" (1992b, p. 30). This research aims to explore 
social practices that affect the discourse about Saudis on Twitter and seeks to unravel 
the different ideologies inherent within it.  
2.3.2. The role of media in discourse   
In the context of this study, a comprehensive meaning that encompasses old and new 





through which people produce, store, distribute, and 'consume' symbolic material on a 
mass scale: television, radio, the press, the Internet, and so on" (Graham, 2004, p. 54). 
According to Fetzer (2014), mediated discourse (or media discourse as I shall refer to 
it henceforth) is basically linked to the "advent of printing, access to education and 
media literacy, and more recently with the electronic transmission and multiplication 
of data" (p. 365). However, Fairclough (1995) differentiates between reporting written 
or spoken talk and the representation of discourse in news production, where the latter 
involves choice in interpreting and then representing it in one or more ways. 
             Emerging from the idea that discourse can only be construed and understood 
in context, the context itself is constituted through social, political and cultural 
conditions (Figueiredo, 2004). Thus, the context of a certain event is crucial in 
interpreting the discourse surrounding that event: the discourse of individuals is 
profoundly shaped and affected by the context in which it is generated. Media 
projections and representations can, thereby, play a vital role and participate in 
modelling the discourse of the public. Chouliaraki (1999) argues that media can create 
a reality (through discourse) for individuals who live within the society's system as 
residents. These individuals are "drawn into informed debates" and local and 
international issues that "weigh heavily on the formation of public opinion" (cited in 
Polovina-Vukovic, 2004, p. 155). It is through media language, which can be one of 
the most powerful ways, “that discourses can be circulated, maintained or challenged 
due to the fact that media language has a large audience and is plentiful” (Baker, 
2014b, p. 107). Media discourse, according to Talbot (2007), is entrenched in people's 
lives and their daily communication, thereby, "attention to media and the circuit of 






2.4. Media representations: An overview 
"We cannot communicate unless we share certain representations” 
(Moscovici & Markova, 2000, p. 274) 
Representation denotes how people perceive the reality and project that reality onto 
their lives and the lives of others. Hart defines representation as being concerned with 
"the depiction of social actors, situations and events" (2014, p. 19). To identify 
representation, researchers need to recognise it as a "discursive structure": this 
approach to representation "examines representation in the form of an interrelated 
circle of meaning" (Ameli et al., 2007). Fairclough (2005) argues that through 
semiosis (discourse in an abstract sense), people can represent the world, act and 
interact through modality, and construct identities, both personal and social (p. 58). 
Language offers participants a range of linguistic choices, and it is through these 
choices that representation highlights particular aspects of identity that language users 
wish to conceal or draw attention to, added to their effect on implying ideologies and 
ethics that cannot be expressed explicitly (Machin & Mayr, 2012). The following 
sections offer an overview of how media representation can influence ideology and 
establish identity and collective identities.  
2.4.1. Media representations: Ideology and stereotyping 
Nowadays, both mass and social media are seen as key elements in society and can 
play an influential role in the formation of individuals' awareness of daily issues 
(Shirky, 2008; Wodak & Meyer, 2009). Media are also perceived as not only a way 
for transmitting information and thoughts, but also "shaping opinions and presenting 





mirror the reality, as "representations in the media such as in film, television, 
photography and print journalism create reality and normalise specific world-views or 
ideologies" (Fürsich, 2010, p. 115).  
             Quoting Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, and Sasson (1992), when they refer to a 
general, accepted argument that media can have an effect on society: 
We walk around with media-generated images of the world, using them to 
construct meaning about political and social issues. The lens through which 
we receive these images is not neutral but evinces the power and point of 
view of the political and economic elites who operate and focus it. And the 
special genius of this system is to make the whole process seem so normal 
and natural that the very art of social construction is invisible. (p. 374) 
In fact, Graham (2004) asserts that new forms of media disturb and change evaluating 
systems of meaning, in and outside the systems of society. It is through media that 
certain people, who have access to the discourse of the public or hold authority and 
power, can gain control in the formation of public knowledge (van Dijk, 2005).        
             Representing social actors in the media can also illustrate the different 
ideologies via which such representation is constructed. Fairclough (1995) states that 
the media representation of discourse can be regarded as ideology formation. He adds 
that discourse representation in news media can be seen as an ideological process of 
considerable social importance, and that “the finer detail of discourse representation, 
which on the face of it is merely a matter of technical properties of the grammar and 





             In different media contexts, the representation of subgroups and minorities 
can be an essential factor that contributes to unravelling how mainstream audiences or 
majorities perceive them in society. Media do not only construct subgroups and 
minorities by silencing their voices but also portray them in negative and constrained 
ways that stereotype them badly in the eyes of others (KhosraviNik, 2009). Media 
representations can also be an indicator revealing "[t]he inequality inherent in social 
structure … perpetuated in the internal organisation of the process, and in the 
representation of actors" (Rakesh & De, 2015, p. 13).  
             I refer finally to the disputes in some works in the literature regarding the 
actual impact of media and the extent of such impact on the public and the society. 
Comstock (1986) states that the myth of media affecting people's lives is often 
exaggerated, assuming that the public’s exposure to media does not necessarily entail 
explicit effects on their actions or thoughts. In addition, Mutz, Sniderman, and Brody 
(1996) assert that it is quite difficult to show the real effect of mass media on people's 
opinions, and that the 1940s and 1950s scholarly consensus assumes only a minimal 
effect of media over society. However, one cannot deny that media can play a role in 
influencing the public who are exposed to or have access to them, often noticeably 
present in current societies and to varying extents. For instance, Fürsich (2010) argues 
that several social science researchers of mass communication "ascribe to the media a 
central or at least an important role in contemporary society when it comes to defining 
and explaining issues of civic concern" (p. 115). Talbot (2007) also argues that most 
people are affected by media discourse. Besides its unquestionable role in the modern 
era, "the media have largely replaced older institutions … as the primary source of 





people's realities, the implications for the power and influence of media discourse are 
clear" (p. 3).      
2.4.2. Identity and media representations  
Can media representations be a medium for establishing identity and collective 
identities? To answer this question, it is important first to draw on the definition of 
identity as defined in the literature. According to Blommaert (2005), identity simply 
means "who and what you are" (p. 203). In Arabic, identity, 'Alhawyya', is defined as 
the absolute truth of a person and his/her core characteristics (Almaany, 2015).  
However, such definitions flatten the concept and may distort the ways in which 
identity can be understood, as "identities are multiple and overlapping and context-
sensitive, and some are relatively trivial or transient" (Shaw, 2010, p. 32). According 
to Howarth (2002), identity is not static but "continually developed and contested 
through others’ representations of our claimed social groups … identities are always 
constructed through and against representations" (p. 20). 
            The discourse of identity construction has been central to research in a wide 
range of disciplines, such as the social sciences and humanities; there are also diverse, 
often contradictory analytical methods that researchers used to theorise and analyse 
identity (Santhakumaran, 2007). Arguably, theories of identity have fallen into two 
categories: constructionist or essentialist. The essentialists view identity as a "product 
of the minds, cognition, the psyche or socialisation practices, and is constructed only 
through binary oppositions: nature vs culture, insiders vs outsiders" (Georgalou, 2014, 
p. 19). In contrast, constructionists view identity as a social construct, "it is whatever 
people agree it to be in any given historical and cultural context". Constructionist 





identity, and how far the meaning of identity can be shaped in different texts and talk 
(Benwell & Stokoe, 2006, p. 9). For the purposes of the current study, a 
constructionist approach for defining identity is adopted as my study examines how 
identity is performed and constructed by others through social media discourse.    
2.4.3. The representation of collective identities  
In the previous section, I discussed the notion of identity and how it is constructed 
through discourse. However, in constructing others' identity and referring to them as a 
unified self, then it is collective identity that is being constructed. A collective 
identity, or collective identities, according to Koller (2014), can be understood as 
"socio-cognitive representations of the group self, including its attributes, relational 
behaviour, goals and values, which are constitutive and negotiated by the interactions 
within a discourse community" (p. 148). 
            The representation of others also has a strong influence over identity 
construction. De Cilia, Reisigl & Wodak (1999) assume that "there are certain 
relations (of transfer and contradiction) between the images of identity offered by 
political elites or the media and ‘everyday discourses’ about nations and national 
identities" (p.154). For Durkheim (1989), representing collective identities "is a 
‘social fact’ which is imposed on us, difficult to challenge, uniform and coercive in its 
effects" (cited in Howarth, 2011, p. 7). Through practising discourse in societies, 
"socio-cognitive representations that a text producer holds about a social group, be it 
their own or another, translate into the textual construction of a collective identity for 
it" (Koller, 2012, p. 20). However, representing collective identities usually serves 
certain ideologies and is bound up with employing some political policies (Khan & 





Hollywood Vilifies a People, examines over 900 Hollywood movies to explore the 
negative images through which Muslims and Arabs are represented. He argues that 
through the repetition of negative portrayals of Arabs and Muslims in these movies, 
"slanderous stereotypes have affected honest discourse and public policy" (p. 172). 
Shaheen also criticises the absence of true critique and the public silence towards 
these negative images, and how that might promote extreme stereotyping.  
             Researching collective identities is important in researching social behaviour. 
Simon and Klandermans (2001) state that collective identity is an important and 
illuminating variable that helps researchers to better understand "when and why 
people stereotype themselves and others, discriminate against out-groups in favor of 
in-groups, and accept influence from in-group members but reject influence from out-
group members" (p. 320). In addition, studying collective identities can provide 
answers to questions, such as how people understand the world around them, how 
they make sense of some social and cultural products, such as objects, texts and 
practices, and consequently produce meaning (Johnston, 1995). 
2.4.4. Representations in the mass media 
Quoting Fairclough's (2013) view of news media:  
[T]he balance of sources and perspectives and ideology is overwhelmingly in 
favour of existing power-holders … media operate as a means for the 
expression and reproduction of the power of the dominant class and bloc. 
And the mediated power of existing power-holders is also a hidden power, 
because it is implicit in the practices of the media rather than being explicit. 





Researching media representations of subgroups, or others, has long been undertaken 
by researchers looking at different media outlets: on TV and in movies (Flood et al., 
2007; Shaheen, 2003), in newspapers (Baker et al., 2013; Kahani-Hopkins & 
Hopkins, 2002; Kassimeris & Jackson, 2011; Rakesh & De, 2015) and in arts and 
photography (Born & Hesmondhalgh, 2000; Desai, 2000). However, examining the 
literature shows that a great deal of research has been devoted to the representation of 
other groups in newspapers. Hence, this research will expand the attention paid to 
news discourse by bringing into focus the social media platform Twitter. 
             The language of news has an influential role on society and politics, and also 
education: “[b]y being exposed to news, people make connections and try to 
understand and explain how events reported in the media relate to society as a whole" 
(Caldas-Coulthard, 2003, p. 273). In response to current social norms that render 
taboo negative views of other groups, Every and Augoustinos (2007) state that 
"[t]hose who wish to express negative views against out-groups take care to construct 
these views as legitimate, warranted and rational, denying, mitigating, justifying and 
excusing negative acts and views towards minorities in order to position themselves 
as decent, moral, reasonable citizens" (p. 412). The discourse of newspapers tends to 
control subgroups, reinforce ideologies and emphasise negative characteristics (van 
Dijk, 1998). In the following sections, I report briefly on existing studies that tackle 
the representation of Muslims in the Western press, as they have tackled Muslim 
representations more often over different time periods and as Muslims are the most 
analogous, representative group of Saudis. I also report on the current research on the 
representation of Saudis in the next sections.   





Media representations of Islam and Muslims is not a novel topic, it has been discussed 
widely by writers and researchers in different fields and with varied interests (Ali, 
2012). A great deal of research has studied the representation of Muslims in the 
media, especially the Western and European media. How Muslims are represented in 
media streams has been discussed extensively since the 9/11 attacks on commercial 
buildings in New York in 2001 (Moore, Mason, & Lewis, 2008). These studies have 
revealed hostility and Islamophobic discourse in Western media since those 
September attacks, which result in aggressive treatment and intensive othering of 
Muslims (Haw, 2018). In fact, it is those “adhering to the Islamic faith [who] seem to 
be the most feared and targeted in Western societies, more so than any other 
immigrant group” (Wilkins‐Laflamme, 2018, p. 87). Researching media also marks 
the growth of anti-Muslim discourse, depicted in newspaper articles in the European 
press by right-wing groups seeking support (Baker et al., 2013). 
             Several studies have examined the representation of Islam and Muslims and 
other minority groups in the Australian media (Ali & Khattab, 2018; Hebbani & 
Wills, 2012; Kabir, 2004). Researching the representation of Muslims in the 
Australian press finds that the opposition to Muslims settling in Australia is due to 
either their failure to adapt (conform) to Australian culture and values or their 
attempts to break the law or change it (Fozdar & Low, 2015; Kabir, 2004; Pedersen & 
Hartley, 2017). Kabir (2004) has also studied Muslims’ settlement in Australia from 
the convict, colonial period to the multicultural period, using archival research, 
interviews with different racial and ethnic groups and data from the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics Census. She states that Muslims were discriminated against and 
marginalised and were subject to policies of discrimination and isolation whenever 





minority groups, such as Asians and Aborigines (p. 318). In fact, Islamophobic 
discourse has consequences, as attested to by several violent attacks against Muslims, 
mostly women wearing hijab. Akbarzadeh (2016) stresses that: 
[A]fter extensive community consultation in 2015, the Australian Human 
Rights Commission noted that the Australian government’s decision to raise 
the official terror alert level to “High” in August 2014 “made many 
Australian Muslims feel a sense of ‘us versus them’”. Physical violence 
against Muslims merely compounds the message of not belonging that has 
become commonplace within the Australian political debate. The climate has 
inevitably influenced the Australian Muslim community, with the assumed 
connection between Australian Muslims and terrorism poisoning attitudes 
and eroding the sense of belonging, especially amongst the youth. (pp. 5–6) 
A key example of violence practised against Muslims in Australia is the Cronulla 
beach riot incident in Sydney in which 5000 white Australians congregated to reclaim 
their beach and verbally and physically attacked Lebanese Australians. Poynting 
(2006) describes the event as “a violent attack by members of a dominant ethnic 
group against a minority, in order to put them back in their place … fuelled by 
alcohol, attacking anyone of ‘Middle Eastern appearance’” (p. 85).                 
             In the Canadian media, researching the misrepresentation of minority groups 
is preoccupied with two streams of views: “underrepresentation (or absence) of ethnic 
minorities” and “misrepresentation (or negative portrayal) of ethnic minorities” 
(Mahtani, 2001, p. 101). Both streams have similar impacts on minorities’ conditions, 
which limit citizenship and provide “justification for the continued oppression of 





minority groups in Canada can affect the ways in which the public accept these 
groups in Canadian society, and asserts that when “media representations fail to 
represent Canada’s minorities with sensitivity, the entire country suffers the 
consequences” (p. 125).  
             In another study, by Steuter and Wills (2009), they examined Canadian 
newspapers’ coverage of the War on Terror and the war on Iraq and Afghanistan from 
2001 to 2009, focusing on the use of metaphors. Their findings show clear evidence 
of the use of dehumanising metaphors in newspaper headlines. Steuter and Wills state 
that news reporters also use animalistic terms and metaphors to refer to the 9/11 
terrorists, such as “rats” and “cockroaches”. These terms are also used “in 
descriptions of combatants in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as of Muslims in general” 
(p. 13). Muslim women are also studied in the Canadian media (Bullock & Jafri, 
2000; Hirji, 2011; Khan & Eid, 2011; Korteweg, 2008; Thomas, 2015). For instance, 
Thomas (2015) studied the Canadian government’s decision to ban the niqab in 
citizenship ceremonies. Using a critical discourse approach, she analysed 80 Canadian 
newspaper articles and government releases over the ban. She concluded that the 
Canadian government perceives niqab as oppressive and distinct from Canadian 
values. Though the media present opposite views of the ban, i.e. opposing and 
supporting ones, “these views homogenized Muslim women rather than illustrating 
the diversity of their experiences and practices … These viewpoints also speak to the 
perception of Muslim minorities in Canadian society … that certain Islamic practices 
contradict Western values” (p. 198). 
             The representation of Islam and Muslims in the UK had also been extensively 
studied by several researchers (Allen, 2012; Ameli et al., 2007; Baker, 2010; Baker et 





media represent Muslims as opposing British values (Moore et al., 2008), an alien 
‘other’ (Saeed, 2007) and dangerous and terrorist others (Sian, Law, & Sayyid, 2012). 
Sian et al. (2012) examined the representation of Muslims in three British newspapers 
over three months from a critical discourse perspective. Focusing on four themes, 
Sian et al. found out that, in these newspapers: 
[T]he logics of the ‘us’ and ‘them’ discourse to frame Muslims were almost 
always constructed as belonging ‘outside’ the nation. The representations 
were hostile and strongly Islamophobic which facilitated the development of 
a hysteria and overwhelming sense of fear by insisting that terrorists are 
‘lurking’ on the streets of Britain ... The recurring use of words such as 
‘fanatic’, ‘terrorist’, ‘fundamentalist’, ‘radical’ and ‘extremist’ … imprint a 
particular image of the Muslim ‘enemy’, this image circulates globally as 
well as nationally with the continuation of the war on terror which has been 
typically constructed as a war between the west and Islam. (p. 264)  
             In addition, Baker et al.'s (2013) corpus project echoes significant findings 
that match previous research on Muslims representations in the press. In analysing 
200,000 British newspaper articles between 1998 and 2009, Baker et al. employed a 
combined approach of CDS and CL to examine the representations of Islam and 
Muslims over time, using an almost 143-million-word corpus. The results conform to 
earlier research which posited Islam and Muslims as “a difficult issue that needs to be 
addressed”, along with existing bias in media discourse which associates words with 
Muslims and Islam and provoke negative associations for both, predominantly in the 
context of conflict and as causes for concern (p. 66). They also found out that the 





Muslim community and Muslim world … to construct a homogenous category of 
Muslims, often differentiated from the UK or “the West”” (Bednarek, 2015, p. 407).   
             In the US, researching the media reveals negative representations of Islam 
and Muslims, resulting in Islamophobic discourse and constructing them as a 
threatening entity (Ahmed & Matthes, 2017; Bowe, Fahmy, & Matthes, 2015; 
Kassimeris & Jackson, 2011; Khan et al., 2019; Powell, 2011). Ahmed and Matthes 
(2017) state that there is a dominating, antagonistic discourse in Western media which 
represents Islam and Muslims negatively, with much of the tension in relationships 
with Muslims being in the US. In his study of the media reporting of the 11 terrorist 
attacks that occurred or were stopped on 11 September 2001, on the World Trade 
Centre in New York and elsewhere, Powel (2011) states that the media proved to be 
biased in representing Islam and Muslims adversely. Using content analysis, he 
concludes that the media succeed in presenting “Muslim terrorists … as unacceptable, 
while domestic terrorists were excused due to mental issues”. The US media 
demonise Muslims while Christians are humanised; this creates “a climate of fear that 
supports U.S. attacks on countries with a large Muslim population … and a fear of the 
outsider other was intensified … to justify otherwise unjustifiable acts of war to 
“protect our freedom” (p. 108).  
             Similarly, Kassimeris and Jackson (2011) examined the discourse of media 
representing Muslims as it was constructed after the 9/11 attacks in The Weekly 
Standard magazine. They found that neoconservative writers tend to construct a 
subjective Muslim identity to legitimise certain actions as necessary and inescapable. 
They also expose how the Eurocentric narrative (a belief that favours Europeans, 
among others) promotes certain concepts, such as evil and freedom, to construct a 





rationale for war" (p. 31). Muslim women are also subject to media bias and 
misrepresentation in the US. They are presented as either agentless victims who are 
subject to oppression (Mishra, 2007b) or as a source of threat with their hijab that 
resembles a radical ideology which could lead to terrorism (Byng, 2010).   
             The representation of Islam and Muslims in the media is also investigated in 
other countries around the world. In Danish newspapers, for instance, Jacobsen, 
Jensen, Vitus, and Weibel (2012) conducted two case studies to explore the means 
employed by the media to reproduce ethnic and racial inequities. They looked at a 
period of two months in 2011, from mid-October to mid-December. Their findings 
show that newspapers constructed a negative and misleading image of Muslims and 
Islam, and therefore "contributed to a general climate of intolerance and 
discrimination against Muslim minorities" (p. 1). They also state that newspaper 
stories frame Muslims and Islam negatively and limit their representation to certain 
issues such as "extremism, terror and sharia, whereas positive actions and critical 
topics like racism and discrimination against Muslims were more or less nonexistent 
in the media coverage" (p. 1). Media reporting tends to be biased and to exclude the 
voices of minorities, and "when Muslims were given voice, the same few publicly 
visible and vocal actors appeared. At the same time, the lives and opinions of the less 
visible majority of Muslims more or less vanished in the media coverage" (p. 53).   
             In a study by Luqiu and Yang (2018), they examined the representation of 
Islam and Muslims in Chinese state news media over ten years, using content 
analysis, questionnaires and surveys. They concluded that Muslims are portrayed 
negatively by Chinese state media and that non-Muslim Chinese people also held 
negative stereotypes of Muslims. A survey of Chinese Muslims shows that they are 





that after the 9/11 attacks, the Chinese media were heavily affected by the Western 
media’s coverage of Islam and Muslims. This results in a negative framing of Islam 
and Muslims and contributes towards an Islamophobic discourse in Chinese media 
reports. Luqiu and Yang (2018) also argue that for over a decade, the Chinese media 
did not present any information about Muslims, their religion or culture, but rather 
“devote[ed] most of their coverage to religious extremists… [and] created an image of 
Muslims as a threat, and terms such as ‘Arab’, ‘Muslim’, and ‘Islam’ have become 
inextricably linked with ‘terror’” (p. 613).  
             In his article Mass Media and Muslims in India: Representation or 
Subversion, Kumar (2011) examines the representation of Islam and Muslims in 
Indian mainstream print media with a focus on the rape case of a Muslim woman by 
her father-in-law, using content analysis. Kumar states that Muslims in the Indian 
media are generally “under-represented among the newsmakers, experts, and citizens 
presented by the news media” (p. 75). He also asserts that the negative stereotypes 
that people hold of minorities in India, including Muslims, have been influenced by 
“the media to which Indians are exposed”, and when Muslims receive attention from 
the media, “they are more apt to be portrayed as villains” (p. 75). Kumar quotes Dilip 
Padgaonkar, an eminent journalist, who states that the Indian media are biased against 
Muslims, who are often stereotyped “as ‘fanatical’ and ‘fundamentalists’. Often, the 
acts of a few individuals belonging to the community are seen as approved by the 
entire community” (p. 60). Such media stereotypes, Kumar argues, result in 
subverting people’s comprehension of the reality and proliferating false images of 
disfavoured minorities, i.e. Muslims. 





Negative portrayals and stereotypes and xenophobic discourse in the media do not 
operate in a vacuum but, instead, can have consequences for the targeted groups. 
According to Armoudian (2015), disseminating particular (negative) portrayals of 
other groups can “impact emotions and behaviors toward them, particularly during 
conflict. When extremely negative, these portrayals can be used to justify harmful 
behaviors”. He also adds that “the norms and structures of professional journalism can 
moderate extreme portrayals” (p. 360). 
             Despite their existence before the 9/11 attacks, negative attitudes towards 
Islam and Muslims have increased considerably; the September attacks generated a 
climate of Islamophobic and anti-Muslim attitudes in several countries (cited in Ogan, 
Willnat, Pennington, & Bashir, 2014, p. 28). In the United States, for example, the 
number of hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims increased dramatically in the 
months and years following 9/11. The FBI reported an increase of 1,600% between 
2000 and 2001. And although the number of such crimes decreased in subsequent 
years, it remained five times what it used to be in 2000 (Disha, Cavendish, & King, 
2011). In the UK, the percentage of offline crimes and physical attacks against 
Muslims increased following the Woolwich murder of the British soldier Lee Rigby 
in 2013, such as sabotaging mosques and pulling off Muslim women’s veils (Awan & 
Zempi, 2017). A report conducted by the British association Tell MAMA (2017), 
which aims to counter anti-Muslim crime, concluded that “victims of Islamophobia 
usually experience indeed both online and offline harassment” (p. 9). In this report, 
the researchers also found out that the media’s extensive coverage of the EU 
referendum (also known as Brexit) was strongly linked to increased reporting of hate 





Misleading statements about Islam and Muslims from public figures and 
sections of the press are, intentionally or otherwise, contributing to pre-
existing anti-Muslim echo chambers online which find validation in such 
statements. Others may find their prejudicial views reinforced in print and 
broadcast media, which may, in turn, give a measure of legitimacy and 
justification for some to carry out pre-motivated or opportunistic forms of 
hate crime. (p. 9) 
             In Canada, Perry and Poynting (2006b) demonstrate how the Canadian media 
have vilified Muslims and presented them in adverse depictions. These “negative 
media portrayals, together with discriminatory rhetoric, policy and practices at the 
level of the state create an enabling environment that signals the legitimacy of public 
hostility toward the Muslim communities” (ibid., p. 1). Hate crimes against Muslims 
have increased in Canada since the 9/11 attacks. Negative attitudes towards Muslims 
by Canadian citizens have increased from 30 to 45 per cent, which results in “a high 
level of harm and fear for the Muslim population” (Helly, 2004, p. 35). Furthermore, 
in Australia, Poynting and Noble (2004) investigated the experiences of Arabs and 
Muslims in Australia post the 9/11 attacks in a report to the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission (HREOC). They state that racially-based attacks against 
Muslims and “Middle Eastern appearance residents” started after the Gulf War in 
1991. However, the 9/11 attacks prompted another sharp outbreak of severe incidents, 
such as “women having their hijab torn at in public places, of people being spat upon 
or more violently assaulted, of incidents of arson, vandalism, threats and harassment” 
(ibid., p. 4). Poynting & Noble argue that the media participated in triggering several 
instances of “racial vilification in the recent events”, as the terms Muslims or Arabs 





before the September 11 attacks” (p. 4). Further, the sudden interest in stories that 
were similar to the 9/11 attacks prompted an increase in cinematic productions in 
which Arabs are the antagonists (Alalawi, 2015). This negative portrayal of Arabs led 
to institutionalising bias and racism against them in the US and worldwide, so that:    
Being an Arab or Muslim even those with Muslim sounding names becomes a 
target of discrimination because of the strong association with terroristic 
activities. Consequently, these discrimination and attacks gave rise to inhuman 
and nefarious treatment of Muslims especially those from Afghanistan, Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iraq. (ibid., p. 58)     
2.4.4.3. The representation of Saudis in the mass media 
Saudi Arabia has been under a Western media focus for several years since the 9/11 
attacks (Blanchard, 2015). Saudi Arabia is well-recognized as being the administrator 
of the birthplace of the Islamic faith for Muslims around the world. Saudi Arabia is 
the world’s largest oil exporter and producer, and also has the highest oil reserves in 
the world, thereby influencing the global prices of oil (Tisdal, 2015). Since the 
September 11 attacks, Saudi Arabia has been under the scrutiny of media coverage as 
15 of the 19 attackers were Saudis (Al-Shami et al., 2019). In addition, the United 
States-led war on AlQaeda in Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq brought Saudi 
Arabia into the media focus, as it has been a strong ally to the U.S. government. 
Lately, Saudi Arabia has joined international coalition forces against the Syrian 
regime and Saudi-led Arab coalition forces against Houthi groups in Yemen 
(Blanchard, 2015). The debates around Saudi Arabia's role in these events have led to 
an increase in discussions and conflicts on different mass media and social media 





             Researching the literature shows little attention being paid towards how 
Saudis, as a collective term, are represented in the mass or social media. The 
representation of Saudis has received little attention from researchers, focusing only 
on the representation of Saudi women in Western newspapers (Adham, 2012; 
Bashatah, 2017; Dahlan, 2011; Eltantawy, 2007; Kaufer & Al-Malki, 2009; Mishra, 
2007a), in Middle Eastern media (Aljuwaiser, 2018; Lida & Avoine, 2016; Sakr, 
2008) and their practices and self-presentation on social media (Al Maghlouth, 2017; 
Guta & Karolak, 2015; Odine, 2013). Nahid Bashatah (2017), for instance, examined 
the representation of Saudi women in British newspapers, using a conceptual 
framework, such as content and framing analyses, and focusing on four British 
newspapers during the period 2005–2013. Her study revealed that Saudi women are 
represented negatively in British newspapers when compared to their Western 
counterparts. Bashatah argues that the absence of understanding of cultural and social 
differences in the journalism realm leads to misconceptions and negative stereotypes 
of Saudi women. She also notes that her study findings echo the same negative 
depictions of Muslim women in the Western media, which have been heavily 
influenced by an Orientalist ideology, which presents Muslim women in similar 
cultural frames.  
             In the Middle Eastern media, Lida and Avoine (2016) examined the 
representation of Saudi women (in addition to Iraqis and Bahrainis) in three online 
Arab newspapers in English that are based in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Iraq. In light 
of the driving-ban issue, Lida and Avoine state that the Saudi Arab News newspaper 
is ambivalent in presenting Saudi women’s efforts to lift the driving ban, being 
portrayed as “very pale” (p. 42). They also argue that “politics, driving cars and 





activism, they are still denied a social space” (p. 42). Lida and Avoine also note that 
Arab News refrains from referring to some discriminatory situations for Saudi women, 
such as male guardianship and sex segregation. Yet, it often presents some of the 
achievements of a certain fringe of Saudi women. Their study adopts a critical 
approach towards international media criticism of the oppression practised against 
Saudi women, “thus exposing Saudi government policy towards women's rights” (p. 
44).      
2.4.5. Representation through the lens of social media 
The swift change in traditional media, from mass content, audience and production to 
more electronic and digital content and virtual communities, is extensively 
documented in recent research (Harrison & Barthel, 2009). With the introduction of 
Web 2.0, the second generation of the World Wide Web (Reddick & Aikins, 2012), 
users can generate content and participate online through socially-based websites, or 
what is known as social media. Among the different definitions of social media from 
different researchers (Page, Barton, Unger, & Zappavigna, 2014; Reddick & Aikins, 
2012; Shirky, 2008), I find Cho's (2013) definition of social media to be a 
comprehensive one because he incorporates a wide range of computer applications 
and software connected with the Internet, and serving different purposes. According 
to Cho, social media is:   
[A]n umbrella term that refers to a broad array of Internet-based computer 
programs and applications that invite user-generated content and audience 
participation, enable direct peer connection and networking, and offer a 





other, more specific concepts, such as Web 2.0 and social network sites 
(SNSs). (p. 1974) 
            The new advances in the Internet, particularly Web 2.0, have enabled (to an 
extent) a more liberated space for many users to share, participate and engage in the 
virtual world through what is known as social media. In comparison with traditional 
mass media channels where a certain group chooses and displays the content 
(McCombs & Shaw, 1972), social media have succeeded in attracting the attention of 
millions of users, in addition to their impact on individuals and society (Kent & 
Taylor, 2014). According to Stefanone, Lackaff, and Rosen (2010), "the development 
of social media platforms enables non-media professionals, or ''normal people", to 
participate in a newly accessible media environment, not just as an audience member, 
but also as multimedia producers" (p. 510). Page et al. (2014) argue for social media 
affordances that can be understood better as "developing from and overlapping with 
earlier forms of communication". Though it is complicated to assign boundaries to the 
different genres on the Web, social media emphasise "recency and real-time 
communication … collective groups … communication to be highly contextualised 
and to use an increasingly wide range of multimodal resources which are often 
embedded in complex semiotic groups rather than distinctly separated" (p. 24).  
             In addition, social media can also have an impact on society and social 
spheres, as well as affecting popular culture. Burns (2009) and Couldry (2012) discuss 
the role of social media in shaping the social, economic and political domains. Burnes 
states that social media have proven to be profoundly influencing the business sphere, 
as well as religious and public activities, and participants' interactive relations. He 
also adds that what is most affected by social media is popular culture, as social media 





culture products, in a way altering their real concept. Couldry also stresses the 
importance of digital media for society the economy, and political scales. He also 
emphasises the change that media can enact in the ways people speak of society and 
how constructing inequities can take place.   
             Bardici (2012) further highlights social media's role in society in her research 
on the representation of social actors during the Egyptian revolution. Through 
representation, Bardici asserts that social media provide public spaces in which 
individuals can draw attention to the abuse and corruption of the government. She 
adds that social media websites, such as Facebook, Twitter and web-blogs, are 
perceived to strengthen "the collective identity of Egyptians worldwide to support the 
struggle against the regime. This was driven by the oppressive conditions under which 
the Egyptians had lived for long" (p. 20). Mautner (2005) argues for the importance of 
examining Web discourse as an influential factor to construct social relations and 
representations of reality, through CDA inspired research. He stresses that: 
[T]the Web has become a major arena in which practically every aspect of 
social life is being enacted. In a variety of domains – from the intensely 
personal and local to the public and global – discourse on the Web is now a 
key factor in constructing representations of reality and social relationships, 
while also establishing new conventions for both textuality and 
intertextuality. Because the medium is so dynamic and flexible, it reacts with 
unprecedented speed and precision to social change; because it is more 
widely accessible than print media it is inherently more democratic and 
backgrounds (and in some cases obfuscates) power differentials. (p. 22) 





Despite the abundance in mass media research (see section 2.3.4), few studies have 
utilised CDS and CL approaches in examining online data (Mautner, 2005), 
particularly the representation of social actors and minority groups on social media 
platforms, mainly Twitter. Researching Twitter data has been carried out by 
researchers from different disciplines and through diverse methods and approaches 
(Bruns & Burgess, 2012). Zimmer and Proferes (2014b), in their study of Twitter-
based research, examined a corpus of a full-text, academic research between 2006 and 
2012. They state that the majority of research that uses Twitter for data collection and 
analysis comes from “computer science, information science, and communications … 
business, economics, education, medicine, political science, and sociology” (p. 253). 
They also note that the main approaches used in the analyses rely on content analysis, 
sentiment analysis, predictive or correlational analysis, and traffic or network 
analysis.  
             Three studies, however, which use Twitter data are relatively significant in 
the context of the present study, two of them utilised both CDS and CL approaches in 
their analyses. The first study is by Baker and McEnery (2015b), Who benefits when 
discourse gets democratised: Analysing a Twitter corpus around the British benefits 
street debate, in which they examine the discourse around people who receive 
government support (benefits) in the UK between 2008-2009 and 2010–2012. Their 
purpose was to investigate whether the discourse on benefits in the conservative 
tabloid The Sun is refuted or articulated among Twitter users. They also sought to 
assess the compatibility of combining methods, such as CDS and CL, in identifying 
similar discourses of earlier studies of newspapers. Baker and McEnery show that 
Twitter discourse allows a multiplicity of voices different from newspapers’ discourse 





or even an ‘imagined community’” (p. 262). Keyword analysis (as well as clusters 
and concordances) also proves useful in identifying different discourses on benefits 
on Twitter. Baker and McEnery note that tweets use dehumanising language while 
referring to both the rich and the poor, which may be due to the “sense of distance and 
immediacy brought about by online communication [which] explains the use of taboo 
and inflammatory language” (p. 262). Others, they assert, argue that Twitter allows 
people to communicate messages that might be avoided in face-to-face 
communication, such as “making death threats” (p. 262). 
             The second study is by McEnery, McGlashan, and Love (2015), Press and 
social media reaction to ideologically inspired murder: The case of Lee Rigby, in 
which they analyse the reactions of both the UK press and social media (Twitter) to 
the murder of an English soldier in London by two converts to Islam. Employing both 
CDS and CL, the researchers examine the reporting of the murder in the press and on 
Twitter using a diachronic, contrastive approach to explore whether the event is static 
or subject to change over time. McEnery et al. state that the mainstream media have a 
substantial presence on Twitter and play an important role in guiding and steering 
social media discourse (but the opposite is less true), and that “analysts should always 
consider the role that the press are playing in forming that discourse” (p. 237). They 
also argue for the ability of CL to process and analyse large bodies of tweets as well 
as small ones. Twitter, they note, allows a multiplicity of voices and “provides a 
forum within which oppositional discourses co-exist” (246).  
             The last study is by Awan (2014), Islamophobia and Twitter: A Typology of 
online hate against Muslims on social media, in which he examines tweeters’ 
reactions to the murder of Lee Rigby in Woolwich, south-east London. Awan aims to 





perpetrators on Twitter. Awan analysed 500 tweets from 100 different accounts and 
hashtags to offer an account of Islamophobic discourse on Twitter. He stresses that 
“[c]yber hate remains a complex problem and with the emerging rise of online anti-
Muslim hate, prejudice, discrimination, and threats there is an urgent need to examine 
this area in more depth” (147). This research, hence, aims to contribute to CDS 
research by combining it with a CL approach in examining Twitter data, particularly 
the representation of Saudis in English tweets.  
2.4.5.2. The representation of Saudis on Twitter 
Examining the literature shows that only a few studies have examined Saudis on 
Twitter. Most of these studies focus on the Saudi women driving ban (Addawood, 
Alshamrani, Alqahtani, Diesner, & Broniatowski, 2018; Aljarallah, 2017; 
Almahmoud, 2015; Altoaimy, 2017; Zamakhshari, 2018), social media’s impact on 
Saudi women’s political awareness (Altuwayjiri, 2017), Saudis’ views of 2030 Vision 
(Alkarni, 2018) and Twitter and Saudi women’s rights (Alkowatly, 2019). In these 
studies, however, the data focus on how Saudi tweeters react or interact with the 
issues being investigated; none of these studies tackles others’ (non-Saudi tweeters) 
reactions to issues related to Saudis (men or women). In fact, up to writing this 
review, no study has yet examined the representation of Saudis by others on Twitter 
and in English tweets. Therefore, this research aims to fill this gap and contribute to 
studies on the representation of other groups in social media (Twitter) by focusing on 
Saudis as data for analysis.  
2.5. Summary 
To sum up, this chapter provides a brief overview of the main theoretical concepts 





This review, I hope, demonstrates how the approaches used in this research do not 
only theoretically harmonise but each one of them can afford appropriate tools that 
can handle the various linguistic topics and patterns which emerge from Twitter or 
tweet corpora. This chapter also gives an overview of the notion of discourse and how 
it is shaped and affected by traditional media. A review of the literature that tackles 
analogous case studies of the representation of others, particularly Muslims, in mass 
media and social media, which deploy both critical and corpus approaches, is also 
addressed. The chapter concludes with a brief overview of salient research on the 
representation of others on Twitter and an overview of current studies about Saudis in 
particular, where the current research situates its significance and contribution to 















Chapter 3. Data and method  
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter is in two parts. Part one (section 3.2) begins with some background 
information about Twitter, as one of the well-known SNSs, along with its definition 
and related conventions. Another two sections discuss issues concerning acquiring 
historical data from Twitter (section 3.2.3), as well as ethical considerations that 
should be considered with Twitter data (section 3.2.4). Part two (section 3.3) details 
the method and procedures I follow to acquire and process the data corpus and the 
reference corpus. This is followed by an explanation of the corpus tools and statistical 
standards that I utilise to analyse the data both quantitatively and qualitatively.  
3.2. Data 
3.2.1. Twitter as a data source 
In this section, I report briefly on Twitter as one of the prominent, constantly evolving 
social networking sites (SNSs). Twitter is considered to be one of the fastest-growing 
microblogging services, among other social media platforms (Chae, 2015). 
Microblogging refers to “[i]nternet services that allow the users (bloggers) to post 
brief online messages (“status updates”) that are visible to their social network” 
(Kirilenko & Stepchenkova, 2014, p. 2). In addition, microblogging services allow 
“users to exchange small elements of content such as short sentences, individual 
pages, or video links” (Mukherjee & Bhattacharyya, 2012, p. 1850). According to 
Marwick and boyd (2011a), Twitter is considered to be one of the platforms that are 
offered by microblogging services, which “prompts users to answer the question 





messages that range from humor and musings on life to links and breaking news” (p. 
116).  
            Twitter was developed by “a San Francisco-based 10-person start-up called 
Obvious” and introduced to the public in October 2006 (Honey & Herring, 2009, p. 
1). Tweeters could send messages with a 140-character limitation on post length; 
however, this changed in 2017 as Twitter doubled the character count from 140 to 280 
characters (after the data for the current study were collected). Posting tweets takes 
place via Twitter's main website or other related websites, as well as third-party 
clients, such as smartphones and other devices. Users can share their tweets, or they 
can keep them private and visible only to trusted followers. Tweeters can also freely 
choose whom to follow, and who follows them. Besides posting tweets, participants 
can share photos, videos and links, including shortened URLs. The data in 
microblogging services, as in Twitter, are episodic with posts listed in the user’s 
account chronologically (boyd, Golder, & Lotan, 2010; Honey & Herring, 2009; 
Marwick & boyd, 2011b; Xifra & Grau, 2010; Zappavigna, 2011). According to 
Statista.com, by 2019, Twitter was already serving 275 million monthly active users 
worldwide, with an average of 500 million tweets sent each day (Internetlivestat, 
2019). 
            Twitter is considered to be an influential social media source due to several 
important features, such as establishing communities, interaction and collective action 
groups (O'Leary, 2015, p. 227) and can be a good representation of reality (Letierce, 
Passant, Breslin, & Decker, 2010). Twitter can provide factual information and 
breaking news and deliver users’ opinions on and reactions to tweeted topics (ibid.). 
Both interaction and communication on Twitter can be a valuable source to examine 





abundance offered by microblogging services, like Twitter, marks them as appealing 
sources of data, such as for analysing sentiments and mining opinions (Pak & 
Paroubek, 2010).  
            However, there has been some debate concerning the nature of Twitter as a 
new stream of communication and its vitality to support and offer rapport in human 
relationships. For instance, Lee and Kim (2014) found out that SNSs (in their case 
study, Twitter) function like “an extension of, rather than an alternative to, face-to-
face interaction, such that those with stronger affiliative need, yet lacking 
communication skills, are less likely to utilize Twitter to expand their social 
boundaries” (p. 304). This view suggests that social interaction on Twitter is 
somehow erratic, and that “most of the links declared within Twitter were 
meaningless from an interaction point of view” (Huberman, Romero, & Wu, 2008, p. 
8). Lee and Kim also argue against virtual communities: they stress that Twitter’s 
amenability to provide extensive interpersonal networks beyond users’ everyday 
encounters “may create another layer of divide between more and less communicative 
individuals, which is not fully captured by the sheer size of one’s Twitter network” 
(2014, p. 304).  
            Nevertheless, such claims can be challenged given the increasing popularity of 
Twitter and empowered by its conventions (such as hashtags), which create “the 
possibility of ambient affiliation. [Users] affiliate with a copresent … impermanent, 
community by bonding around evolving topics of interest” (Zappavigna, 2011, p. 
800). Zhao and Rosson (2009) also assert that the affordability of Twitter, along with 
its mobility and low cost, all contribute to the fact that it shapes “a new informal 
communication channel that complements other forms of interaction” (p. 252). 





(democratised) “conversation”, where everybody can participate, and it can be a 
powerful tool that connects users together. They also add that “‘tweeting’ is a 
significant social practice worthy of attention”, and even if users refrain from 
participation, “they have become aware that Twitter is impinging on many areas of 
life that touch upon the mass media” (p. 45). 
3.2.2. Twitter conventions 
Twitter participants, being acquainted with the technical affordances of SNSs, are 
provided with a series of (evolving) conventions which allow them to modify and add 
content to tweets. To facilitate their interactions, users make use of some conventions 
allowed by Twitter’s website, such as the @ sign that indicates addressivity, RT 
marking a retweet and the # (hashtag) which tags certain topics for users to follow 
(boyd et al., 2010; Zappavigna, 2011). Participants can interact with each other 
directly through Twitter’s main website, either via desktop or third-party devices 
(such as smartphones) or through other applications that present microposts in 
different ways and forms, such as Tweetdeck (Gillen & Merchant, 2013). In this 
study, I will briefly discuss some of these basic conventions to facilitate 
conceptualising Twitter as a textual space.  
3.2.2.1. Timeline 
The timeline is one of the central aspects of Twitter, which users see when they are 
logged in. It represents the homepage of the tweeter and displays a stream of tweets 
listed in chronological order, posted by those who follow or are being followed by the 
tweeter, as well as suggesting content powered by Twitter. Users can interact through 
their timelines: by clicking on a tweet post, it expands and displays the whole content 





like tweets on the timeline. In addition, the timeline features users’ profiles 
(depending on the type of application), which display a user’s avatar, bio and any 
other personal metrics, such as the total number of tweets, numbers of followers and 
followees, likes, media, tweets and replies, direct messages and so on. Users can also 
choose to have their tweet stream public or protected, albeit the Twitter default is 
public, and their profiles are public and minimal (boyd et al., 2010).  
3.2.2.2. Addressivity @ (mention) 
Twitter users employ the @ character, or ‘at’ symbol, which “indicates that the 
username which follows it is addressed in the tweet and the structure functions like a 
vocative, that is, as a form of address”. Although it is positioned initially in a tweet, 
the @ character can function in different places, in “a medial or final position” 
(Zappavigna, 2011, p. 790). A tweeter can choose to explicitly message another 
tweeter (e.g. @YemenPostNews shame on Saudis and capitalist allies) or mention 
another user in the tweet to indicate a reference rather than addressivity (e.g. 
seriously? @JebBush, in the pocket of Saudis). According to Bay (1998), addressivity 
in online chatting functions similarly to “gaze … in face-to-face” conversations, in 
which the exchange is directed at the target user or the whole group (cited in Honey & 
Herring, 2009, p. 2). Another feature that relates to addressivity is the reply. It refers 
to the platform-provided feature to communicate with a tweet author by clicking on 
Twitter’s ‘Reply’ (indicated by the icon) button in response to a tweet (Purohit et 
al., 2013).  
3.2.2.3. Retweet (RT) 
A retweet is the “Twitter-equivalent of email forwarding where users post messages 





follows the “RT @user msg” form (boyd et al., 2010, p. 1). The number of retweets is 
displayed below posts and indicated by the sign . An RT can also be modified: this 
occurs when the tweet is forwarded by another user to his/her followers. The 
modification takes place when users add their comments, commonly at the beginning 
of the tweet, followed by RT shortening and ending with the original message (Page, 
2012). Purohit et al. (2013) assert that an RT does not only circulate information but 
rather constitutes a conversation, in the sense that it embraces other users being 
involved within the tweet together with the tweeter. Following a methodological 
decision described in section 3.3.2, RTs are not included in the analysis of the current 
study for two reasons: first, RTs can cause skewed frequencies in wordlists (Baker & 
McEnery, 2015b); and second, I am mainly interested in the original uses of language. 
Yet, RTs could be an interesting area for future research (section 8.4).     
3.2.2.4. Like  
Twitter also allows users to like a tweet by clicking on a small heart-shaped icon (♡) 
which indicates their endorsement of or sentiment with the tweet content. In simple 
terms, the Like function on Twitter “is the simplest thing a person can do to show and 
provide support. Favoriting identifies the issue as important and offers a fundamental 
level of acknowledgement to the poster” (Hosterman, Johnson, Stouffer, & Herring, 
2018, p. 84).     
3.2.2.5. Hashtags (#) 
A hashtag is a word or phrase that includes “alphanumeric characters prefixed with 
the pound sign. Authors use hashtags “liberally within tweets to mark them as 
belonging to a particular topic, and hashtags can serve to group messages belonging to 





“a tweet's meaning such as its topic or its intended audience” (Efron, 2010). Hashtags 
also mark searchability; that is, users can trace back any topic of interest by placing 
the hash sign # before keywords. This will list all the desired or related queries in 
chronological order. Hashtagging is a significant feature of Twitter as it highlights 
any emerging topic and circulates issues rapidly. Users can simply attach the hash 
sign to any evolving topic within the tweet and can even post a different number of 
hashtags within a single tweet. In the current research, hashtags are significant as they 
form part of the unique keywords lists in Chapter 7, and thereby can be indicative of 
the different ways in which Saudis are represented in each corpus. 
3.2.2.6. Followers and following 
An important feature of Twitter is the feasibility of networking (Preussler & Kerres, 
2013); that is, a tweeter adds or follows other users to his/her social network. These 
followers may (or may not) follow the tweeter. Consequently, the tweeter’s posts, the 
posts of his/her followers, and only those s/he is following are displayed in their 
timeline. Also, following a tweet does not necessarily entail a follow-back or signify a 
virtual friendship.  
3.2.3. Twitter historical data 
Despite them being accessible online, collecting Twitter data are not always 
reachable. In fact, Twitter historical data are only available via “large-scale 
institutional or corporate involvement, as both technical and contractual challenges 
must be met”. And while acquiring data is theoretically available via Twitter, “the 
process of obtaining it is in practice complicated, and requires a sophisticated 
infrastructure to capture information (beyond one’s personal archive) at scale” 





            Twitter historical data used to be accessible to developers and skilled 
researchers in the early years through Twitter’s Application Programming Interface 
(API). The API allows developers to collect tweets from the public Twitter feed, i.e. 
tweets that are streamed through public (unprotected) accounts (Zappavigna, 2011, p. 
23). However, historical Twitter data have been made available recently by some 
commercial, third-party corporates through purchasing specific data sets (Giglietto, 
Rossi, & Bennato, 2012). Some corporations limit access to their data totally, others 
offer data for profit, while others provide small sets of data for university-based 
research (Burgess & Bruns, 2015). Though some websites offer free tools and 
software that can scrape historical data from Twitter, acquiring such data is becoming 
challenging and very difficult due to the constant changes to the terms of services on 
Twitter (Mishra, 2019). Generally, the only feasible way to obtain such access is to 
buy data at a varying cost from one of the authorised, commercial Twitter data 
resellers (such as Gnip and Datasift), “thus placing larger-scale access to Twitter data 
out of reach of most publicly-funded research projects and institutions” (ibid.). In the 
case of the current research, data were bought from a commercial company called 
Followthehashtag (section 3.3.1).  
3.2.4. Ethical considerations  
Researching social media is constantly evolving, and despite being public and open to 
everyone, there are still ongoing debates around the ethical issues that should be 
considered when approaching social media data. On Twitter’s Terms of Service 
webpage, it states that: 
               By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the Services,  





               right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish,  
               transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or  
               distribution methods (now known or later developed). This license  
               authorizes us to make your Content available to the rest of the world and  
               to let others do the same. 
Based on these terms and conditions, Twitter data are made public and thereby 
accessible to developers and to anyone outside Twitter. In contrast with other SNSs, 
such as Facebook that provides users with customised and highly detailed privacy 
settings that restrict access to certain content, Twitter’s terms of privacy are rather 
simple. Users can either choose to have their accounts public, accessible by anyone, 
or private, requiring permission to access all content (Zimmer & Proferes, 2014a). It 
is assumed, then, that some users may not be aware of the consequences of exposing 
their content to others. According to Zimmer and Proferes, publishing personal 
information or sensitive data can threaten users’ privacy if they are shared or leaked 
beyond their intended audience. Consequently, Twitter’s privacy becomes a “clear 
and present issue” (2014a, p. 170).  
             Nonetheless, such concerns should not restrict researchers from working with 
Twitter data, since there are not yet common grounds around the rules and ethics that 
researchers should adhere to while working with social media texts. Baker and 
McEnery (2015b, p. 247) state that there is no “current common consensus around 
best practice” when carrying out social media research, and that these ethical concerns 
should not hinder researching Twitter data. They also note that it is “important that 
researchers are able to show their data to readers, in order to demonstrate 
transparency, i.e. they have not made up their analyses”. Townsend and Wallace 





Twitter present less ethical issues than data which are found in closed or private 
online spaces” (p. 10). 
             In the current research, the consent of tweeters is not obtained as approaching 
all accounts for consent is not feasible, either because of the immense number of 
accounts in the corpus or because some accounts or tweets are suspended or deleted. I 
also take into account that some tweeters may not be aware of the Terms and 
Conditions on Twitter which allow publicising their tweets. Hence, and to mitigate 
privacy concerns, all of the examples presented throughout this thesis are listed 
anonymously, i.e. without users’ names. In addition, tweets that contain violent or 
sensitive content are not displayed. There are examples, however, that advocate 
threatening behaviour or contain improper language presented in this thesis: these are 
only used because either the tweet or the account is deleted, so that the identity of the 
tweeter remains anonymous.        
3.3. Methods 
The method section is divided into two main subsections. In the first subsection, I 
give an account of the data collection and design procedures. I first discuss (3.3.1) 
how the data are chosen and collected, presenting a rationale for this approach as well 
as a rationale for the whole thesis. In Section 3.3.2, I explain the steps followed in 
processing and filtering the data, explaining in detail how the data corpus and the 
reference corpus (Section 3.3.3) are selected and designed. I also shed light in Section 
3.3.4 on some issues related to Twitter data collection. In the second subsection (3.4), 
I outline the computer-based, corpus linguistics tools I employ in examining the 






3.3.1. Data collection: Acquiring raw data 
Data were purchased through a third-party commercial service called 
Followthehashtag. Like Datasift and Gnip, Followthehashtag gains access to Twitter 
historical tweets through the Twitter API. On its main webpage, Followthehashtag 
state that they “can perform nested searches, that is to say, use parentheses and 
common Twitter search operators to make even more complex searches than ones 
based on simple queries or advanced search features” (Followthehashtag, 2018). The 
main data were collected over a one-month period starting on 10 September 2015, 
which marks the occurrence of the first tragic event at Mecca (the crane collapse) and 
also covering the second event (Mina stampede) which took place on 24 September 
2015. This step is central to my research given the nature of the data: Twitter 
generates millions of tweets per day and this, in turn, makes it quite challenging to 
collect all tweets about Saudis without restricting the search criteria. A spike in key 
events, such as the tragic events at Mecca, would therefore trigger more tweeters to 
tweet about Saudis.     
            The basic search term utilised in collecting the data set centres around the 
word ‘Saudis’. This term is challenged by others, such as ‘Saudi’, ‘Saudi citizens’ and 
‘Saudi people’. The aim of my research is to examine how Saudis as social actors are 
collectively represented in English on Twitter, so it is likely that ‘Saudi’ as an 
adjective collocates with irrelevant words. The search query ‘Saudi’ yielded different 
results, either referring to geographic locations, such as ‘Saudi Arabia’ or ‘Saudi city’, 
or referring to a particular individual or object, such as ‘Saudi ambassador’, ‘Saudi 
prince’ or ‘Saudi government’, none of which conform to the aim of my research and 
research questions. This is also the case with the terms ‘Saudi people’ and ‘Saudi 





final search parameter that was used by Followthehashtag to scrape data was to 
collect all tweets in English containing ‘Saudis’ from 11 September 2015 to 11 
October 2015. The search query is represented by the following formula: lang:en 
since:2015-09-11 until:2015-10-11. The data were collected and available for 
download online on 15 March 2016 and exported in a compressed .zip file. This file 
included data packed in Excel files along with other relevant information, such as a 
search summary, stream of tweets, top retweets, favourites, geolocalisation, countries 
etc. The data filtering and processing are explained in detail in the following section 
(3.3.2).   
3.3.2. Processing and filtering data: Data corpora 
The data were extracted into an XLSX file format, with different columns providing 
data information: such as users’ names, bios, tweet content, date, country, place, 
following, followers and so on. The corpus comprises 89,929 tweets (1.9 million 
tokens). Among these, 44,968 are retweets that caused skewed data and, 
consequently, inaccurate frequency lists. Since I am interested in the original use of 
the language of tweets and in order to achieve as reliable results as possible, these 
retweets are deleted during the analysis stage. The resulting corpus comprises 497,523 
tokens.  
            The next step is to divide this corpus into sub-corpora based on the 
geolocations of the tweeters. The resulting four corpora represent Canada, Australia, 
Great Britain and the USA. This step is essential to the present research to answer the 
overarching question concerning the representation of Saudis in Australia, Canada, 
GB and the USA (these countries are among the top ten Western, English-speaking 





subsequent stages of cleansing and processing. Those stages are described below, and 
each builds on the work of the previous stage: 
• The data are split by country (AU, CA, GB, US, World) using Excel's filters. 
All columns are preserved. Saved in XLSX format 
• The data are processed through FireAnt to remove retweets using regex query 
^(?!RT). All columns are preserved and exported into CSV format. 
• The data are stripped of handles and URLs using Notepad++ queries 
http://t.co/.......... https://t.co/.......... @([A-Za-z0-9_]+). Only the tweet column 
is preserved, and exported into TXT format. Duplicates are then removed via 
Excel's "Remove Duplicates" function. 
• The data are stripped of special characters, multiple whitespaces, and Emoji 
encodings using Notepad++ F&R query: ([^a-zA-Z0-9\-\.\ \:\;\'\#\, 
\"\?\!\&\/\(\)]). Saved in TXT format 
The geolocations of tweets are based on the ‘home’ locations provided by users in 
their public profiles on Twitter (these values are provided with data by 
Followthehashtag). To validate this step, a random 20º longitude and 20º latitude 
specification was checked on Google Maps to ensure that the locations matched 
specified countries; among these, 16 coordinates matched the specified geolocations 
of tweets, thus it is safe to take these geolocations as correct. The rest of the tweets 
are grouped together as one corpus representing countries in the rest of the world. An 
initial letter system is used to refer to each corpus; the resulting corpora are the 
Australia corpus (AUSC), Canada corpus (CAC), Great Britain corpus (GBC), United 





             To answer RQs 1–3, it is essential to examine the overall, common 
representations of Saudis in tweets. Hence, the data are examined as a whole, and the 
acronym FCT is used to refer to the five corpora together. A wordlist and a keyword 
list for the FCT are generated and examined in order to locate common themes, ways 
of representations and discursive strategies employed by tweets in the aftermath of the 
two tragic events at Mecca.  
3.3.3. Reference corpus 
In order to answer the research questions and carry out the analysis, keywords 
(Section 3.4.3) in each corpus should be identified to facilitate locating the dominant 
discourse(s) about Saudis in the corpora. To do this, I decided to compile a 
comparable specialised reference corpus as this can, according to Baker (2006), 
“uncover evidence of particular discourse” and be a useful “benchmark of what is 
‘normal’ in language” for comparison with the target data (p. 43).  
            The reference corpus (henceforth RC) was also extracted from Twitter so that 
it can be compared to the data corpus. The RC contains about one million tweets 
collected through the FireAnt corpus tool (Section 3.4.2). FireAnt is used for the 
purposes of this study to generate a random corpus of general tweets in English. For a 
general reference corpus, there are no preset search parameters that are applied to 
gather the data, rather, the search is run until it hits one million words. The data were 
collected directly via the Twitter API; the search started on 23 May 2016, beginning 
at 17:14, and ended on the same day at 21:55. The resulting corpus thus comprises a 
one-million-word reference corpus of general, English tweets.  





Although Twitter can be a rich source for data, working with Twitter data can be quite 
challenging for several reasons. First, retweeting original tweets can cause skewed 
frequencies while generating keywords and wordlists (Baker & McEnery, 2015b). In 
my thesis, I have tried to overcome this issue by removing duplicates via the FireAnt 
and Excel Sheet duplicate-removing functions. Second, Twitter is a multimodal 
sphere, and these multimodal elements are lost while saving data to a different file 
format. However, this has not been an issue in the current research as multimodal 
analysis is not within the scope of this thesis. Third is retweeted tweets (RTs): in a 
few cases, the original tweet is deleted, and only retweeted tweets are left. This issue 
requires a manual check of all the occurrences of the retweets in the original data file 
to avoid tweet loss or repetition. Consequently, a single retweet is kept if the original 
tweet is deleted. Another issue also concerns modified tweets (MTs). Unlike RTs, 
tweeters reproduce the original tweet or part of it to fit in their own comments. In this 
case, MTs are not deleted as they are not mere repetitions but also contain original 
data from the other tweeter. Finally, although tweets are short and therefore easier to 
track along a single concordance line, most of the tweets are ‘conversational’, i.e. part 
of a conversational thread, such as replies, which makes their meaning ambiguous and 
cotext-dependent, such as in the following example: 
 
              @user         no, Saudis paid for it. 
 
In this tweet, the user uses the negation “no" as an answer to a yes/no question in 
another tweet, and it would be impossible to determine the meaning of this tweet. In 
this case, I have to refer to the original tweet and review the entire conversation in 





as when the original tweet or conversational thread was deleted. In this case, the tweet 
is not included in the analysis. Fortunately, only a few such cases were encountered in 
the corpus. 
3.4. Corpus linguistic tools 
Implementing a corpus linguistics approach is carried out via a variety of tools offered 
to researchers, both computer and Web-based tools. In the following sections, I will 
briefly introduce the corpus tools I employ in my research.     
3.4.1. WordSmith 
The main corpus tool utilised in the analysis is a PC-based program called WordSmith 
(version 7 Scott, 2019). Examining the keywords lists generated by WordSmith was 
usually my first step in exploring the FCT. This step was essential to address RQ-1 
concerning the current, dominant topics in the FCT, as well as RQ-4, which focused 
on differences in the representations of Saudis between the five corpora. WordSmith 
enabled me to examine common keywords in the FCT, as well as the ability to ensure 
the significance of each keyword and its commonality (recurrence) among the five 
corpora through extensive details of keywords, such as their frequencies and statistical 
values and their recurrence in the five corpora. WordSmith adopts predetermined 
statistical significance standards to measure the keyness of keywords (such as Log-
likelihood, Chi-square) and collocates. It also facilitates comparisons as it can display 
different statistical scores for collocates on the same page.  
            Concordance analysis also facilitated the qualitative analysis of keywords in 
the FCT via complete access to the tweets. Another feature of WordSmith is sorting 
concordance lines to the left or right of a node (search term); sorting concordance 





occur with Saudis in the FTC. This was particularly important in tracing back 
significant words that tended to collocate with Saudis; these words were examined 
later through concordance analysis. 
            However, filtering the data, removing duplicates and allocating spelling 
variations and mistakes were not offered by WordSmith. To do this, I utilised other 
tools, such as FireAnt, to filter the data by removing handles and duplicates (Section 
3.4.2). Handling spelling variations (e.g. Makkah/Mecca, Moslim/Muslim) and 
mistakes (e.g. y’all/you all) was done by exporting the data into an Excel spreadsheet 
and manually modifying misspelt words, using the Find and Replace function. The 
only way to identify these spelling mistakes was by examining the concordance of the 
tweets.  
3.4.2. FireAnt  
FireAnt is a PC-based corpus tool developed for extracting, exporting and visualising 
social media data (Anthony & Hardaker, 2017). FireAnt can collect Twitter data 
automatically, through Twitter’s API, and store them in a corpus for analysis with 
either FireAnt or other corpus tools, such as AntConc and WordSmith (Anthony, 
2018). It can also be a useful tool for preliminary, corpus-based discourse analysis, as 
it requires less complicated technical knowledge at the outset (ibid.). FireAnt can also 
filter data sets in different ways and export the results in different file formats.   
3.4.3. Keywords 
 As explained in Section 2.2.5.1, keywords are lexical items that tend to have 





corpus. In this section, I will briefly explain how keywords in the FCT are 
operationalised to answer RQ-1 How are Saudis represented across the five corpora?  
            The high frequency of some topics and discourses in a corpus can result in an 
emerging correlation with certain lexical items and patterns that are positively 
associated with those topics and discourses. In the FCT, for instance, keywords like 
bombing and civilians are likely to indicate a discourse about war. Since the FCT can 
contain a wide range of topics, given the breaking news on Twitter and different 
users’ accounts, keywords facilitate uncovering these topics, which can be highlighted 
when it comes to Saudis.   
            However, there are different statistical measures that determine the 
significance of both keywords and collocates. It should be acknowledged that 
applying different statistical standards can lead to varying results (Al-Hejin, 2012). In 
the current research, Log-likelihood (LL) is used as a measure of the keyness of 
keywords in the FCT. LL is a statistical significance measure or confidence level that 
frequency differences between two (or more) corpora are not due to chance (ibid.). I 
utilise LL in this research as “it tends to produce high-frequency keywords which are 
likely to indicate the most characteristic themes – or ‘aboutness’” (Brookes & 
McEnery, 2019, p. 9) of the tweets in the five corpora under investigation.  
            Keywords are generated using WordSmith by comparing each corpus with the 
one-million-word reference corpus, using the LL statistical measure. LL provides a 
keyness indicator by assigning each word a ‘p value’ which “represents the 
probability that this keyness is accidental. Therefore, the higher the keyness value and 
the lower the p value, the more distinctive a word is for a particular appeal” (Biber, 





conform to the following criterion that is set throughout the whole thesis: each token 
must have a frequency ≥ 3 and LL value ≥ 19.53, which corresponds to a p value < 
0.000001. This threshold is set as the default probability value by WordSmith. Using 
this value was, however, preceded by several attempts with different cut-off points in 
order to arrive at manageable keyword lists that could be analysed qualitatively. The 
other attempts produced thousands of keywords that would have been difficult to 
investigate qualitatively, especially with larger corpora. For instance, a lower p value 
produced fewer keywords with smaller corpora, such as the AUSC and the CAC, and 
higher cut-off points also produced thousands of keyword lists in larger corpora, such 
as the USC and the RWC. It was also crucial to examine the resulting keyword lists in 
each attempt to ensure that no further (new) topics or themes were neglected.  
3.4.4. Collocation 
Another corpus tool used to answer RQ-2 is collocation. A collocate (as explained in 
Section 2.2.5.1) is a lexical item that tends to occur with a node. From a critical 
discourse perspective, collocations can represent a “discursive practice that is 
textually instantiated in the form of frequent lexical co-occurrences, and that is 
therefore deemed to be a potential site for contested representations of participants, 
topics or events” (Salama, 2011, p. 338, italics in original). In the current research, 
examining the collocates of Saudis facilitated locating the discursive strategies with 
which tweets represented Saudis across the corpora. So, for instance, the collocation 
between the terms Saudis and think yielded the discursive strategy of 
‘Perspectivisation’, which reflected tweeters’ involvement in the representation of 
Saudis on Twitter. The collocation of women with Saudis also reflected a negative 





            However, in order to be included in the analysis, a collocate had to conform to 
the following statistical standards: 
1. Collocation span of ±5 to the left and right of the node Saudis 
There is not a consensus among corpus linguists regarding a fixed word span 
for collocation. McEnery and Hardie (2012) suggest that “collocation should 
not be controlled by fixed-length word spans” (p. 129). However, a span of ± 
5 (left and right) was chosen because significant lexical collocation is likely to 
occur within this range (Al-Hejin, 2012).   
2. Mutual Information (MI) score ≥ 3  
Following Brezina, McEnery, and Wattam (2015), MI score is used in this 
thesis as a collocation measure “because it is an association measure 
commonly used in corpus studies and implemented in a large number of 
corpus tools”. MI score is a measure of “effect size”, i.e. the correlation 
between the observed and expected frequency of occurrence between two 
lexical items (cited in Al-Hejin, 2012, p. 88). In order to reflect an appealing 
or significant collocational relationship, a word should have an MI score of at 
least 3 (ibid.).    
3. Log-likelihood (LL) value ≥ 15.13 (p < 0.0001) 
Another measure for collocation is Log-likelihood (LL). MI scores do not 
convey the statistical significance of collocates; therefore, LL is also used to 
assess the significance of collocation. A collocate has to have an LL value of 
at least 15.13; Rayson, Berridge, and Francis (2004) suggest that this threshold 
is the new (preferred) critical value for corpus linguists. 
However, identifying the collocates of Saudis in the data required exhaustive work, 





concordance line. As stated in Section 6.1, WordSmith generated thousands of 
collocates (6,677), most of which were function words so numerous and varied in 
their patterns, and cotext dependent, that, individually, each could present thousands 
of potential avenues of investigation that require extensive analysis of their 
concordance lines. Thus, to overcome this issue, I applied the following procedure: 
first, I investigated only the top 20 lexical collocates to undertake a manageable and 
systematic analysis, and second, I manually examined the co-text of each collocate in 
order to validate its co-occurrence with the node. To do this, I examined random sets 
of concordance lines (a hundred concordance lines at a time) for each collocate to 
ensure that the collocate falls within the span of the same tweet. This procedure has 
resulted in excluding the following words as they were miscounted as collocates of 
Saudis: now, world, new and same. Although these words co-occurred with Saudis in 
some tweets, they were not consistent collocates since they were a part of the 
preceding or following tweet, for example, in a sentence-initial position, e.g. (Now 
playing role of good boy 2 the world), (New post: “pilgrims Criticise Hajj 
Organization”), or in sentence-final position, e.g. (So the Saudis are both backing the 
terrorists and buying us off with tit bits on information on the same people?), (U.K. 
and Saudis in 'secret deal' over election to human rights council - World).  
3.4.5. N-grams  
Also referred to as ‘clusters’ and ‘lexical bundles’, an n-gram is a set of words (two or 
more) that co-occur, one after another, in a given corpus. Studying n-grams “is one 
way to operationalise the analysis of collocation” (McEnery & Hardie, 2012, p. 247, 
italics in original). For instance, the cluster Saudis are proved helpful in uncovering 
metaphors as one of the discursive strategies that could not be identified through mere 





3.5.  Summary 
This chapter started with a brief discussion of Twitter as the data source of the current 
study. The chapter is divided into parts; the first one briefly discussed the significance 
of Twitter as both a social media and research source. This was followed by an 
overview of Twitter conventions. I also discussed Twitter’s historical data, as well as 
the ethical considerations that should be considered while researching social media 
texts, such as Twitter. I then presented a detailed description of the procedures 
undertaken in building the corpora for this study. Another section outlined some of 
the issues that I encountered while analysing Twitter data. The second part of this 
chapter explained the corpus methods used to analyse the data. I described the corpus 
software used to filter and analyse the data, as well as the statistical standards used to 
compute keywords and collocates. Accounting for these standards was necessary in 
order to explaining the means for downsizing the numbers of keywords and collocates 
included in the analysis, so that qualitative analysis would be feasible to fulfil the 
CDS approach of this thesis. The next chapter (Chapter 4) begins the analysis by 
addressing RQ-1, which focuses on the representation of Saudis across the corpora by 
first examining the most commonly recurring topics and themes in the aftermath of 










Chapter 4. Identification and categorisation of topics associated with Saudis 
across the corpora 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter explores the representation of Saudis across the five corpora. It aims to 
address the first research question (How are Saudis represented across the five 
corpora?) through reporting the most salient themes and topics that are shared by five 
corpora. This reporting is achieved by an exploration of the top keywords in the five 
corpora together (FCT). Any interpretation of a single keyword or collocate is thus 
informed by the contextual, cotext information (events and issues) that tends to be 
associated with Saudis in each corpus. This chapter thereby provides many of the 
contextual clues necessary for analysing and interpreting the corpus linguistics 
findings that follow in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
4.2. The categorisation of keywords in the five corpora 
As the aim of this research is to examine the representation of Saudis in English-
language tweets, the corpus is divided according to the country of the tweeter, which 
is determined based on the criteria explained in Section 3.4.6. The resulting corpora 
are Australia, Canada, Great Britain, the United States and the rest of the world. An 
initial letter system is used to refer to each corpus as follows: AUSC, CAC, GBC, 
USC and RWC, respectively, where the last ‘C’ refers to corpus. The total numbers of 








 AUSC CAC GBC USC RWC Total 
Tweets 519 1,259 2,399 3,409 25,261 32,847 
Tokens 47,660 107,855 188,339 277,004 381,707 497,523 
 
Table 4-1: Total number of tweets and tokens for the five corpora 
 
 
            To answer RQ-1, How are Saudis represented across the five corpora?, the 
analysis utilises the keywords tool from CL. This tool is accessed through the PC-
based software WordSmith. Keywords analysis facilitates locating the most salient 
themes and topics linked to Saudis in the corpora by comparing the five corpora 
wordlists with a one-million-word reference corpus of general tweets. To be 
considered in the analysis of the current study, each keyword must have a frequency ≥ 
3 and an LL value ≥ 19.53, which corresponds to a p value < 0.000001 (statistical 
significance measures are explained in Section 3.4.3). The resulting keyword analysis 
for the RWC produced 500 keywords, the highest number of keywords among the 
five corpora. In comparison, the USC produced 493, the GBC 336, the CAC 227 and 
the AUSC 127 keywords (the smallest number of keywords).    
            Examining the keywords list, I chose the top 100 lexical keywords4 (with the 
exception of are, as a preliminary investigation showed interesting patterns of 
discourse associated with Saudis). Examining all the keywords in the corpora would 
have proven a far more difficult task, requiring a close reading of thousands of 
concordance lines. Besides, these top hundred keywords were sufficient to facilitate 
locating the most salient themes that tended to be associated with Saudis on Twitter in 
 





the aftermath of both tragic events, given that examining further keywords did not 
contribute towards locating new themes (an initial examination included the top 150 
keywords).  
            The next step is to categorise these keywords into themes, or topics, using 
concordance analysis. This analysis takes the cotext of each keyword into account. 
Accordingly, thematic categorisation can be fuzzy, as a single keyword may occur in 
different contexts. For instance, the word deaths belongs to the MECCA EVENTS 
category, but there are cases where deaths is also used in the WAR category. In fuzzy 
cases, I place the keyword in question in the category in which the keyword occurs 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4-2: Top 100 lexical keywords in each of the five corpora 
 
 
Table 4.2 displays the top 100 lexical keywords in each of the five corpora. Thematic 
groups are presented from top to bottom in order of the number of keywords in each 
category. The keywords per category are listed in order of frequency, from most 





these words are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, in addition to words that are 
common in only a few corpora and not the rest. As the aim of Chapter 5 is to examine 
the representation of Saudis in the five corpora, I explore the top hundred keywords of 
the five corpora together (henceforth the FCT) in that chapter. While Table 4.2 has 
outlined the topics highlighted in each of the five corpora, Table 4.3, below, 












Saudi, Iran, Arabia, Russia, US, Israel, Iranians, Iraq, Germany, 
Iranian, Israelis, Arab, Russians, Saudi’s, Americans, Turkey, 






Yemen, Syria, war, bombing, civilians, Syrian, Yemenis, rebels, 




Hajj, stampede, Mecca, pilgrims, crane, blame, deaths, Mina, 





crucify, terrorists, behead, crucifixion, beheading, terrorism, 



















are, build, selling 
 







Table 4.3 includes several keywords that are common to the five corpora. However, 
as shown, these keywords rank differently in one or more corpora and, consequently, 
not all of these keywords occur among the top hundred keywords in Table 4.2. For 
instance, the keyword Muslims is key in all corpora. However, in the CAC it ranks 
141st; in other words, it does not appear among the top 100 keywords. Each of the 100 
keywords in Table 4.3 is examined against the keyword list in each corpus to confirm 
its keyness (every keyword must conform to the pre-set criterion identified in Section 
3.4.3). In addition, each keyword is examined in context to ensure its conformity with 
the topics identified in Table 4.3. Having outlined this, common topics in the FCT are 
discussed in the following sections.  
4.2.1. GEOGRAPHY, COUNTRIES and NATIONALITIES 
With a total of 26 keywords, GEOGRAPHY, COUNTRIES AND NATIONALITIES 
is the largest category in the FCT. This category mostly relates to the current situation 
in the Middle East, particularly the wars in Yemen and Syria. The Middle East has 
been in crisis since the uprisings in several Arab countries in 2010, during the so-
called ‘Arab Spring’. The uprisings began in Tunisia and later spread to Libya, Egypt, 
Yemen, Syria and Iraq; Iraq was particularly afflicted, as the country has been in 
conflict since the Gulf War waged by the US-led coalition in 1991. Many of the 
associated keywords (e.g. Saudi (Arabia), Iran, Russia, US, Israel, Turkey, Germany) 
reflect other ongoing events in the area at the time. Saudi (1,894:12,394) functions as 
a modifier of Arabia (723:4,602) in 637 tweets to refer to Saudi Arabia as either a 
place (18 tweets) or a government (619 tweets). In the remaining 1,275 tweets, Saudi 
modifies other words (e.g. government, prince, king, diplomat, authorities) during 
references mainly to declarations, statements or events (such as the Hajj stampede). 







    
The Latest: Saudi king offers condolences over hajj tragedy            
UPDATE: Saudi officials: 107 dead in crane collapse at Mecca's   
Grand Mosque 
                
 
      
Iran (1,046:5,439) has had a tense relationship with both the West and the Middle 
East since the Islamic revolution and the US embassy crisis of 1979 and the Iraq War 
in 1980, during which the US, the West and Arabs united against Iran. The high 
frequency of Iran also arises from Iranian officials’ declarations and comments 
through the media and Twitter concerning both tragic events at Mecca. These 
statements mainly cast blame, accusing the Saudis of incompetence in failing to 
ensure pilgrims’ safety and condemning the suggestion that Iranian pilgrims were 
somehow at fault in the stampede. The tension is compounded by Iran’s current 
intervention in the wars in Yemen (supporting the Houthis) and Syria (supporting 
Assad). Russia (572:3,039) also occurs frequently in the FCT due to its intervention in 
the Syrian war in support of the Assad regime. Tweets associate Saudis and Russians 
in a binary relationship, as either opponents in terms of supporting two rival sides 
(rebels/Assad) or equals in terms of escalating the Syrian war, especially the refugee 
crisis. The US (1,701:2,804) and Israel (485:2,398) are also connected to the ongoing 
wars in Yemen and Syria. The United States supports the Saudi-led coalitions of Arab 
countries in both wars, while Israel is linked with Saudi support for terrorism. The 
frequency of US is also high due to the United States’ strong relationship with Saudi 
Arabia, which is considered an ally, and to the 9/11 attacks. Germany (241:1,034) is 
key in the FCT as it is linked with the news that the Saudis will build 200 mosques for 
the refugees in Germany (see Section 4.2.7 below). Turkey (195:804) is also frequent 
in the FCT due to its geographic location. Namely, Turkey shares a long border with 





a host country of Syrian refugees. However, these keywords are referred to in the 
analysis only when they contribute to revealing aspects of the representation of Saudis 
in the FCT.    
4.2.2. WAR 
The second largest category is WAR, with 16 keywords. These keywords include 
Yemen (1,808:12,276), Syria (801:4,339), war (757:2,896), bombing (341:1,861), 
civilians (341:1,857), Yemenis (180:1,286), rebels (185:1,150), Yemeni (162:1,107), 
crimes (207:1,079), Syrian (291:1,504), Syrians (145:929) bombs (212:549), killed 
(303:704), airstrikes (96:575), bomb (212:549) and inquiry (100:545). The 
prominence of this category can be attributed to the keywords Yemen and Syria, 
which both rank among the most frequent keywords in each corpus and in the FCT. 
This category associates the Saudis with the ongoing wars in Yemen and Syria. The 
war in Yemen broke out during the so-called Arab Spring uprisings in 2011, 
following the failure of a transition of power from the then president, Ali Saleh, to his 
deputy, Abdrabbuh Hadi (BBC, 2012). The situation was exacerbated with the rise of 
groups of rebels such as AlQaeda and the Houthis. These groups’ activities led to an 
intervention by a coalition of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, with the 
coalition supported logistically by the United States and France in 2016 (Musa, 2017). 
The war in Syria, on the other hand, started with protests against the fragile conditions 
under the ruling Assad regime; these protests gradually erupted into a civil war that 
killed thousands and displaced several million Syrians into refugee camps in 2011. 
The situation in Syria led to two opposing camps: Iran and Hezbollah, in support of 
the Assad regime; and a coalition of Saudi Arabia, and Qatar and Turkey, in support 
of the anti-Assad rebels (Barnes-Dacey & Levy, 2013). However, growing criticism 





and referring to several issues, such as Saudis’ support for terrorism, Saudis’ killing 
of civilians, and Saudis’ handing of the refugee crisis (Sons & Matthiesen, 2016). 
Since Twitter is interactive and public by nature and “has become a regularly used 
source for newspaper journalists” (Broersma & Graham, 2013, p. 15), both events 
have been the subject of considerable reporting by users on Twitter. Users have taken 
advantage of Twitter’s capacity to comment on the events by retweeting, replying and 
favouriting news accounts and sharing mass media posts and weblinks to articles 
originally published outside Twitter. Saudis’ role in both wars is represented 
negatively by tweeters. The military intervention in Yemen is described through the 
keywords killed, civilians, airstrikes and bomb. In the Syrian war, the Saudis are 
posited as supporting the rebels (including AlQaeda and AlNusra) by supplying arms 
and weapons.  
4.2.3. MECCA EVENTS   
The MECCA EVENTS category ranks third, comprising 15 keywords, such as Hajj 
(1,121: 8,107), stampede (505:3,557), Mecca (375:2,619), pilgrims (333:2,330), crane 
(240:1,540), blame (304:1,179), deaths (214:1,163), Mina (151:900), tragedy 
(176:879), toll (134:715), disaster (133:573), tents (88:562), collapse (112:552), 
mosque (133:767) and blaming (138:749.9). These keywords associate Saudis with 
the tragic events (i.e. the crane collapse and Mina stampede) which occurred at Mecca 
in September 2015. The expansion of the Holy Mosque was halted during the Hajj 
season; during this period, a crane collapsed on 11 September 2015 during a 
thunderstorm. The collapse caused hundreds of deaths and injuries. On the 24th of the 
same month, over a thousand pilgrims died or were injured during one of the Hajj 
rituals in Mina, a few kilometres from Mecca. The event started when pilgrims went 





The stampede occurred when some pilgrims were going towards Jamarat while others 
were going in the opposite direction. The crowds then became chaotic and people 
started falling down (BBC, 2015). 
          Although the time span for data collection was set to include tweets generated 
in the aftermath of both tragic events at Mecca, keywords related to those events do 
not dominate other categories in the FCT, but rather rank third after the 
GEOGRAPHY, COUNTRIES and NATIONALITIES category and the WAR 
category. Looking back at Table 4.2, the MECCA EVENTS category does not 
dominant over other categories; it ranks sixth in the AUSC, fifth in the CAC and the 
GBC, and third in the USC and the RWC. The first incident (crane collapse) is also 
less frequent than the second (stampede); among the total of 14 keywords in the 
category, only two keywords are associated: crane and collapse. Also, the keywords 
disaster and tragedy collocate with the stampede event more than with the crane 
collapse, which collocates with disaster in only nine tweets and tragedy in just three.       
           Hajj, which is mainly associated with the stampede event, is less frequent in 
the AUSC and the CAC, in part due to the smaller size of these two corpora. It is 
more frequent, albeit similarly dispersed, in the GBC and the USC. Finally, it occurs 
at the highest frequency in the RWC (see Figure 4-1 below). 
 
 





          Crane is also dispersed differently across the five corpora; with six tweets in 
the AUSC, 17 tweets in the CAC, 18 tweets in the GBC, 45 tweets in the USC and, 
finally, in the RWC, it is mentioned in 155 tweets. This variation in the dispersion of 
the main keywords in the MECCA EVENTS category can be attributed in part to the 
number of Muslims in each country, as well as the amount of news coverage of both 
events by the media inside and outside Twitter. The percentage of Muslims in each 
country varies considerably, e.g. Muslims represented 1.9% of the population in 
Australia, 2.8% in Canada, 4.6% in Great Britain and just 0.8% in the United States in 
2013/14 (Muslim, 2014). The low percentage of Muslims in the United States 
compared to the higher number of keywords supports the second assumption 
regarding the media coverage of both events. On Twitter, tweeting includes 
retweeting and hashtagging of both events. News accounts on Twitter may not have 
focused on Mecca events as much as on events in other categories (such as WAR) and 
hence do not make a major contribution to either event. In fact, neither tragic event at 
Mecca triggered any sympathy or sentiments of condolences; rather, tweets presented 
Saudis negatively, delivered through the keywords blame and disaster, as well as 
words like “incompetence”, “criticism”, “deadly” and “organizing”. The Saudis are 
blamed for the incidents and labelled as incompetent in their handling of the Hajj 
season and the maintenance of pilgrims’ safety. The crane collapse is also described 
as “karma” for the 9/11 attacks, the war in Yemen and for not taking in any Syrian 
refugees, as shown in the following examples: 
 
Example 3 
    
Example 4 
    
Karma on 9/11 for Saudis?! Maybe. At least 62 dead in Grand  
Mosque in Mecca from falling crane 
the Saudis seems 2 have a lot of bad fate! Karma striking for their 







4.2.4. TERRORISM and VIOLENCE 
The keywords in the TERRORISM and VIOLENCE category connect Saudis to 
issues related to terrorism and violence. Examples include crucify (292:1,946), 
terrorists (268:1,387), behead (244:1,566), crucifixion (188:1,234), beheading 
(155:1,063), funding (180:720), barbaric (94:578), arming (96:585) and hijackers 
(77:532). The keywords crucify, behead and crucifixion link mainly to a local issue in 
Saudi Arabia regarding the crucifixion (death) penalty for a 17-year-old protester, Ali 
Al-Nimr. Al-Nimr belongs to the Shiite group in the Eastern province of Saudis 
Arabia and comes from the family ‘Al-Nimr’, which is known for its anti-government 
position, especially his uncle, Nimr Baqir Al-Nimr (a Shiite sheikh in Saudi Arabia), 
who was executed in 2016 for using arms when confronting police, inflammatory 
speeches and foreign meddling in the kingdom. Ali participated in an anti-government 
protest in 2011 and was convicted for violating state security and joining a terrorist 
group. He was arrested and sentenced to death by crucifixion in 2014, though he 
remains alive and in custody today (France24, 2015). Although the Saudi government 
made no official declaration at the time, Al-Nimr’s case received some attention in the 
media and on Twitter. Tweets also use behead to refer to the method of carrying out 
the death penalty for witchcraft and sorcery (mainly used against women in the FCT), 
and they use this keyword in an attributive process that depicts Saudis as having a 
criminal nature (as beheaders). Beheading women for sorcery actually refers to a 
single case against a woman who was subjected to capital punishment in 2011 for 
practising witchcraft in the northern region of AlJawf in Saudi Arabia (Saudi woman 
executed, 2011); this was reported by different news outlets and websites, such as 





to a variety of conditions, such as causing someone’s death or declaring disbelief 
(AlHakami, 2004).   
             The keyword terrorists links Saudis to either the 9/11 attacks or supporting 
terrorist groups, such as ISIS in the wars in both Yemen and Syria. In the former case, 
tweets refer to the September attacks on the World Trade Center in New York in 
2001, where 15 out of the total of 19 attackers were reported to be Saudis. This 
attitude correspondingly reflects tweeters’ reactions towards their governments’ and 
political representatives’ alliances and arms deals with the Saudis. Other related 
keywords include terror (140:564), terrorism (154:739) and terrorist (92:278), which 
also link Saudis to the same issues. The keyword funding (including fund and funded) 
also links Saudis with the financial and material support for terrorist groups. 
Hijackers is another keyword which describes the Saudis as the main actors in the 
9/11 attacks. Use of this keyword not only stresses the Saudis’ responsibility but also 
calls for (violent) reactions against them, such as declaring war and destroying Mecca 
in response to the crane collapse event, as shown in the following tweet: 
 
Example 5    
 
 
with 17/19 hijackers on 9/11 Saudis...we should have nuked Mecca 
and sent the barbarians a message.... 
                
The keyword barbaric is also common in the FCT, either in reference to Al-Nimr’s 
case (eight tweets) or as an argument against the Saudis (e.g. regarding selling arms, 
human rights violations, holding a UNHRC seat). This keyword tends to be part of 
referential and predicative strategies that posit negative evaluations of Saudis, which 





4.2.5. POLITICS  
The fifth category, POLITICS, contains the following 10 keywords: rights 
(1,085:6,982), human (1,088:4,669), UN (800:4,074), oil (836:4,032), arms 
(442:1,861), allies (295:1,941), weapons (347:1,843) council (280:1,192), panel 
(190:810) and deal (310:564). As WordSmith treats compound words as single lexical 
units, a reference to the context through concordance lines is necessary in order to 
determine the exact meaning of a keyword and the semantic relationship with its 
collocates. So, for instance, the keyword rights collocates with human in 981 of the 
total number of rights tweets, referring mainly to the term ‘human rights’, whether 
with regard to the organisation itself (HR) or human rights records or conditions in a 
country. Another set of related keywords is UN and council, which constitute the term 
UNHRC. Keywords in this category are mainly used to reference one of two topics: 
the Saudis joining the Human Rights Council, or arms and weapon deals made 
between the Saudis and other governments (mainly Canada, GB and the USA). This 
topic is significant in the data as it correlates with designating Saudis to head a 
UNHRC panel; the envoy of Saudi Arabia was appointed to head an influential 
UNHRC panel in June 2015; however, the appointment only took place in September 
(Arbuthnot, 2015). This appointment triggered adverse reactions from the media, as 
identified in the data through tweets, replies and comments to media accounts 
reporting on the event.  
          Other significant keywords are oil, arms and weapons. Oil is one of the 
strongest keywords in the five corpora (ranking 13th in the list). Associating oil with 
Saudis is not novel, it dates back to 1933 when oil was first discovered; since then, 
“Saudi Arabia has gained recognition around the world primarily for its huge oil 





oil can be inferred from a statement by The Washington Post editor, who observed in 
the 1980s that “the world’s supplies of oil and price levels are manipulated and 
controlled by greedy Arabs” (Ghareeb, 1983, cited in, El-Farra, 1996). 
          Arms and weapons are also significant keywords in the FCT. However, they are 
more likely to occur in the POLITICS category than in the WAR category (out of the 
total number of tweets for both in the FCT, arms occurs in 312 tweets and weapons in 
231). The keyword deal refers mainly to either arms deals made with the Saudis by 
Western governments (specifically Canada, the United Kingdom and the United 
States) or to the deal designating the Saudis to the UNHRC, which was also 
negotiated between government members and the Saudis. 
4.2.6. RELIGION                      
Some keywords in this category are common among the five corpora, such as 
mosques (395:2,730), Muslims (484:2,307), Islam (330:1,496), Muslim (326:1,284), 
Sunni (157:957), Islamic (165:726), Wahhabi (91:650) and Shia (115:629). Others are 
unique to a single corpus, such as niqab, which only appears in the CAC (see Section 
7.4). However, a concordance analysis of the keywords in this category did not reveal 
any association with either of the tragic events at Mecca. For example, Muslims (484 
tweets) collocates with Hajj in only 16 tweets, with Mecca in 11 tweets, and with 
stampede in nine tweets. Examining the concordance of Muslim suggests a negative 
association with Saudis, as the term associates with words like “radical”, funding and 
killing, each of which suggests an extreme level of belief. Other tweets posit Muslims 
and Saudis as being in a counter relationship, with the former represented as 
victimised by the latter. Islam is also depicted as a victim of the Saudis, who have 





with tweeters referring to Saudi Arabia’s plan to build 200 mosques for refugees in 
Germany instead of taking in refugees themselves (see Section 4.2.7). 
          Other keywords (Wahhabi and Sunni) are used to modify Saudis, collocating 
with “extremist” and “Islamists”; these associations further suggest a negative 
discourse prosody regarding extreme faith. Sunni refers to the largest sect of Islam; 
the minority sect is Shia (or Shiite), whose name derives from the word ‘Sunnah’. 
Adherents of Sunnah conform to the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed and 
recognise the four Caliphs as the successors of the Prophet; Shia followers, however, 
believe that the successors of the Prophet are his son-in-law, Ali, and his descendants. 
This division has kept both parties locked in dispute for 14 centuries, and the tension 
has been compounded in recent years, particularly by the Shia in Iran.  
           Wahhabi is also among the top keywords in the FCT. This term refers to a 
Sunni group (among many other Sunni sects) that adopted a reform movement 
referred to as ‘Wahhabism’, which dates back to the 1740s. The movement follows 
the doctrine of Mohammad ibn Abd Al-Wahhab, who proposed a correction 
movement during the foundation of Saudi Arabia, namely “the essence of the 
Wahhabi mission was to revive pure devotion of worship to God alone” (Commins, 
2005, p. 3). The movement aimed to restore monotheistic worship of God and purge 
widespread delusory practices. Such practices include approaching tombs and shrines, 
which started in Najd (Eastern region of Saudi Arabia); the practice was backed by 
Mohammed bin Saud and flourished during the foundation of Saudi Arabia, 
continuing till modern times. It is now integrated into the official Sunni-Islam 
doctrine of Saudi Arabia. Although the term was not rooted in terror originally, it has 
become associated with terrorism in recent decades; the Wahhabi movement has been 





And as Wahhabism was claimed to influence terrorist-categorised groups such as ISIS 
and AlQaeda, it was officially declared “the main source of global terrorism” by the 
European parliament in Strasbourg in 2013 (Telegraph Reporters, 2017). On Twitter, 
users refer to Saudis as Wahhabis to portray them as either terrorist in nature or 
supporters and funders of terrorism and terrorist groups.  
4.2.7. SOCIAL ACTORS/GROUPS 
The social actors/groups category includes words referring to social actors, groups 
and names. These keywords include references to social groups like Saudis 
(20,810:150,949), ISIS (1,004:5,338), refugees (545:2,967), Houthis (206:1,484) and 
AlQaeda (128:888), as well as the names of social actors such as Assad (364:2,319), 
Putin (171:976), Bush (164:761) and Obama (294:652). The keywords Assad and 
Putin refer to the military regimes of both the ruling Syrian army and Russian forces. 
Both keywords are also associated with Saudis in terms of escalating the Syrian crisis 
(especially the refugee crisis). Bush and Obama are significant keywords due to both 
the relationship with the Saudis in terms of the long alliance between the United 
States and Saudi Arabia, especially in the war against terrorism launched after the 
9/11 attacks, and the current Saudi-led coalition in the Yemen and Syria wars, which 
are supported by the United States. Houthis is key in the FCT due to its association 
with the war in Yemen. The Houthis group is a key player in the civil war which 
broke out in Yemen in 2011, although it started as a preaching ‘Zaidi Shiite’ 
movement in the 1990s. The group’s increased enmity with the Saudis was elevated 
after Saudi Arabia backed the now-deceased president, Ali Saleh, and his military 
campaigns against the Houthis. The tension has continued since the establishment of a 
Saudi-led coalition in 2015. AlQaeda is significant in the data as tweeters associate 





support for terrorist groups (such as ISIS), especially in Yemen. However, two 
significant words, ISIS and refugees, have a strong relationship with the Saudis as 
keywords and collocates in the FCT; thus, a brief contextual background of each term 
is presented in the following paragraphs. 
           ISIS is an abbreviation standing for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The 
group, recognised as Jihadist militants, became known widely as ISIS as the militants 
became active in the Syrian war in 2012 (Hogeback, 2018). Though it first identified 
itself as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the group later took the name 
ISIS, which is abbreviated in Arabic as Daesh. As the group became well known in 
the world’s political domains, and since “English-speaking countries and news 
agencies have an aversion to long names”, the group quickly became known by the 
acronym ISIS. Since then, some media outlets and people worldwide, by influence, 
have started to use the term ISIS (Hogeback, 2018). However, the group has identified 
itself as the Islamic State (IS) since June 2014 (ibid.). In the FCT, the Saudis are 
associated with ISIS in a symmetrical relationship (such as “hand in glove”), or as 
creators and supporters of ISIS both materially and financially.  
          The keyword refugees refers to the Syrian refugee crisis; the UNHCR reports 
that 5.6 million people have fled the ongoing civil war in Syria since 2011 (unhcr.org, 
2018). Some of these refugees have fled to neighbouring countries and are displaced 
in refugee camps; others have sought asylum and refuge in Europe, particularly in 
Germany and Sweden. The refugee crisis has been recognised as “a topical issue in 
the media” (Patrascu, 2016, p. 8) and, according to Chouliaraki and Stolic (2017), it 
has been framed by media outlets in Europe in 2015 as “the continent’s main cause 
for concern and policy focus” (p. 14). On Twitter, discourse on the refugee crisis was 





in Europe (Germany in particular); this proposal triggered hostile reactions 
condemning the Saudis for not taking in refugees instead. In fact, however, there was 
never any official declaration from the Saudi government regarding building mosques 
for refugees. Withnall (2015) states that the German newspaper Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung quoted the Lebanese newspaper Al Diyar as the news source; 
since the latter news outlet is known for its hostile stance against the Saudis, it can be 
assumed that the proposal to build mosques for refugees was fabricated. 
4.2.8. PROCESSES   
This category comprises keywords that are grammatically classified as verbs, such as 
are (4,350:5,625), build (337:1,050) and selling (173:466). Are is one of the strongest 
keywords, as well as a strong collocate and cluster with Saudis in the FCT. Although 
grammatical words (or function words) are sometimes overlooked in corpus analysis, 
Pearce (2014) states that these “can offer insights into the representation of ideology 
… meanings and values which might not have been accessible if . . . only the 
apparently semantically ‘richer’ lexical words had been considered” (p. 24). A 
concordance check of are with Saudis revealed interesting patterns that may facilitate 
locating the discursive strategies employed in the representation of Saudis. 
Specifically, the cluster “Saudis are” discloses predicational strategies employed by 
tweeters while representing Saudis. Other keywords in this category include build and 
selling. The keyword build associates Saudis with the issue of building mosques for 
Syrian refugees in Germany, rather than accepting refugees (see Section 4.2.7), an 
issue that is condemned and debated by tweeters. Selling, on the other hand, correlates 
Saudis with arms and weapons deals made with Western governments and parliament 
members, especially in Canada, Great Britain and the United States. The process of 





which weapons are used to kill civilians. In addition, tweeters condemn selling arms 
and weapons to the Saudis, as tweeters assume that the Saudis will send them to ISIS. 
4.3. Summary 
This chapter has taken some initial steps towards answering RQ-1 through exploration 
of the top keywords of each of the five corpora and topics that tended to be associated 
with Saudis in the aftermath of the tragic events at Mecca. This exploration has also 
facilitated locating common keywords that are shared by the corpora (the FCT), 
keywords that are more common in some corpora than others, and keywords that are 
unique to a single corpus.  
            The initial categorisation of topics surrounding Saudis after the tragic events at 
Mecca introduced in Table 4.3 shows that the top two categories, GEOGRAPHY, 
COUNTRIES and NATIONALITIES and WAR, have more frequent keywords 
compared to other categories the FCT. The time span of the data is set around both 
tragic events and includes the 14th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade 
Center in New York in 2001. However, neither the tragic events nor the 9/11 attacks 
seem to skew the results of the data; examining the resulting topics of the top hundred 
categories presented in Table 4.3 shows that the MECCA EVENTS category ranks 
third, after the GEOGRAPHY, COUNTRIES and NATIONALITIES category and 
the WAR category.     
            The high frequency of keywords in the GEOGRAPHY, COUNTRIES and 
NATIONALITIES category can be associated with the current situation in the Middle 
East, especially the wars in Yemen and Syria, but also the international coalitions and 
alliances discussed in the media and other events taking place in the region. Few 





referring to the official Iranian declarations that attribute blame to Saudi Arabia over 
the Hajj stampede. Alternatively, Iran is involved in both the Yemen and Syria wars, 
albeit more often with the latter due to Iran’s alliance with the Assad regime. This 
case also applies to the keywords US, Israel, Turkey, Qatar and West, which are either 
attributed to the wars in both Yemen and Syria or used to condemn these countries’ 
alliances and arm deals with the Saudis.  
            The keywords in the WAR category are mainly linked to the wars in Yemen 
and Syria: Saudis are linked to both wars due to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and 
the Saudis’ contributions to the international coalition against the Assad regime in 
Syria. However, Saudis are depicted negatively in the war context, represented as 
killing civilians and blocking UN enquiries into (their) war crimes in Yemen, or as 
supporting terrorist groups in Syria. Tweeters also condemn selling weapons and 
making arms deals with the Saudis, claiming that these weapons are used to kill 
Yemenis and/or transferred to terrorist groups like ISIS.  
            Saudis are also negatively represented in relation to the tragic events at Mecca; 
they are either subjected to blame by tweeters or reported as having been blamed by 
others over the Hajj stampede. The Saudis are accused of being incapable of 
overseeing the Hajj season and maintaining pilgrims’ safety. They are also criticised 
for blaming other pilgrims (like Africans) over the stampede. The crane collapse is 
also mocked by tweeters as “karma” for what the Saudis are doing in Yemen, for their 
role in the 9/11 attacks, and for not taking in Syrian refugees.  
            When it comes to terrorism and violence, the Saudis are represented as 
terrorists themselves or as funding and supporting terror and terrorist groups. The 





or arguing against the crucifixion penalty, which is applied for practising witchcraft 
and sorcery (referenced especially in its use against women in the FCT). The keyword 
hijackers links Saudis to the 9/11 attacks: tweets highlight the number of Saudis who 
are believed to have been involved in the attacks, quoting numbers (11,15,18 and 20) 
or using quantifying words, such as “majority”, “many”, “most” and “all”, to stress 
the Saudis’ responsibility for the attacks. Associating the Saudis with 9/11, 
consequently, was constructed as an argument against the war on Afghanistan and 
Iraq, which many tweets portray as irrational, arguing that the war should have been 
directed against the Saudis. 
            Saudis are also negatively depicted in terms of their religious affiliation. 
Saudis as Muslims are portrayed as embracing an extreme and radical form of belief, 
through the keywords Sunni and Wahhabi, which categorise Saudis as extremists and 
terrorists. Saudis are also depicted as victimising both Islam (such as “hijacking” and 
“killing”) and Muslims (such as mistreating and radicalising).   
             In Chapter 5, I explore the representation of Saudis more closely through 
examining common keywords in the FCT to answer RQ-1. This chapter also 
contributes to answering RQ-2 concerning the discursive strategies employed by 
tweeters in representing Saudis in Chapter 6. The differences between the corpora, 
including the keywords unique to each corpus, are addressed further in Chapter 7 to 








Chapter 5. The representation of Saudis in the FCT  
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter begins the exploration of the representation of Saudis in the FCT (five 
corpora together). It aims to address RQ-2 (How are Saudis are represented across 
five corpora?) by examining common keywords and collocates of Saudis in the FCT 
compared to a one-million-tweet reference corpus. To do this, I incorporate 
qualitative concordance analysis, keywords and qualitative analysis to substantiate my 
interpretations. The themes adopted in this chapter are guided by the initial 
categorisation of the common keywords in the FCT in Chapter 4.  
5.2. Dominant discourses in the FCT  
Table 4.3 in Chapter 4 summarises the most salient themes and topics that tend to be 
associated with Saudis after both tragic events at Mecca in the FCT. The themes 
adopted in this chapter resulted from an in-depth examination and concordance 
analysis, which yielded two issues that led to this re-categorisation. The first issue is 
that a number of keywords in these categories are frequent or significant due to some 
events that associate them with Saudis. For instance, the high frequency of keywords 
in the countries and nationalities category (such as Russia, Iran, Israel) is due to the 
military interventions in the current wars in Syria and Yemen. This also suggests a 
high coverage of news reporting that includes frequent references to these countries. 
An initial investigation of the concordance of these keywords did not link them 
directly with the representation of Saudis. Some of these keywords are present due to 
the reporting of events relating to the wars in the region, where the Saudis form a part 
of military coalitions in both Yemen and Syria, or due to political issues, such as 





issue, which concerns the interrelation of themes, which causes some keywords to be 
recurrent across different categories. For instance, the lemma TERROR coexists with 
Saudis in both the WAR and RELIGION categories, in addition to the TERRORISM 
and VIOLENCE category. Also, some categories include keywords that are unique to 
one corpus or shared by a few corpora and not the rest. These keywords are addressed 
in detail in Chapter 7, as this aims to answer RQ-3 which concerns the differences 
between the five corpora. For any keyword to be considered in the analysis, it should 
conform to the criterion set earlier for this study (see Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3), i.e. a 
minimum frequency ≥ 3 and an LL value ≥ 19.53, which corresponds to a p value < 
0.000001.  
             Having outlined the above points, and been guided by the thematic categories 
in Chapter 4, I choose the following themes (WAR, MECCA EVENTS, 
TERRORISM, RELIGION and OIL) that tend to be highlighted around Saudis and 
can contribute towards answering RQ-1 concerning the ways in which Saudis are 
represented by tweets in the FCT after both tragic events at Mecca. 
5.2.1. Saudis in the war context  
War is among the top hundred keywords (757:2,967)5 as well as a strong collocate of 
Saudis (464:5,867)6 in the FCT. This strong representation of war suggests extensive 
reporting of the situation in the area due to the ongoing conflict situation in the 
Middle East, since the start of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, the war on Iraq in 2003, 
the uprising of the so-called Arab Spring (which spread through Tunisia, Egypt, Libya 
and Yemen) and finally the revolution in Syria, all of which have drawn considerable 
 
5 This notation (frequency: LL value) will henceforth be used to save space. In this respect, (757) 
means the raw frequency of the term and (2,967) the log likelihood value. 





media attention. War reporting is also supported by the high frequency of two 
keywords, Yemen and Syria, in the FCT. On Twitter, this can be achieved via 
tweeting, retweeting and hashtagging news updates and news accounts. However, this 
raises a question concerning the significance of war and how far Saudis can be 
depicted and represented in the war context.  
             Examining the concordance of war shows that tweets associate Saudis with 
one of the following issues: war in general (rather than a specific war), war in the 
region (with a focus on the wars in Yemen and Syria) or war for oil. The frequency of 









                                           
Table 5-1: Raw frequency distribution of tweets about war in the five corpora 
 
 
The total number of tweets containing war in the FCT is 758 tweets. The highest 
number of tweets containing war relates to the ongoing war in Yemen (411 tweets), 
followed by 173 tweets relative to the war in Syria, and then tweets in the Other 
category which concerns war in general, not relative to a specific war, and finally war 
 Yemen Syria Oil Other 
AUSC 14 7 2 3 
CAC 15 6 11 4 
GBC 40 18 4 12 
USC 46 25 22 16 
RWC 296 117 60 61 
 
Total 






for oil (78 tweets). Tweets about the wars in Yemen and Syria are discussed in the 
following subsections, whereas war for oil is addressed in Section 5.2.2. However, 
tweets associating Saudis to war generally are labelled as Other and are discussed 
below. 
             The Other category includes 45 tweets associating Saudis with two issues: 
tweets assume the Saudis will become involved in a war with Russia, which could 
lead to a Third World War (45 tweets), and 19 tweets questioning the war on terror 
led by Western countries, while turning a blind eye to Saudi terrorism. The “war on 
terror”, for instance, is condemned in tweets which perceive it as misleading because 
the Saudis finance terrorism, such as ISIS and the 9/11 attacks. Additionally, the 
Saudis are represented as a threat to the world and the Middle East, because they plan 
to launch a third World War (15 tweets), or a regional war (25 tweets), which is 
perceived as alarming and threatening. For instance:   
                 
Example 6         
 
Example 7        
 
Example 8        
If Saudis helped finance 9/11, "it would really call into question the  
 whole war on terror"  
The West and the Saudis have turned the whole of the Middle East  
into a dangerous place ready to explode into a regional war 
Saudis Mull Launch Of World War 3 As Russia Pounds Targets In 
Syria For Fourth Day 
 
Example 6 comments on an online article by the Wealth Daily7 account which is 
attached via a Web link. This article raises claims around the war on terror since it 
ignores the Saudis’ responsibility for the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and refers to a case 
 






raised by families of the victims of the attacks against the Saudis, which was later 
rejected by a federal judge. The article criticises the US government for refuting the 
case against the Saudis for a second time, although, according to Wealth Daily 
(2015):  
            It has long been held by some that the Saudi government was involved in the        
9/11 attacks, especially in the financing. Osama bin Laden was from Saudi                 
Arabia originally and 15 of the 19 hijackers were from there ... Former Florida 
Senator Bob Graham claims that the documents show that Saudi Arabia was 
the principle financier of the attacks. This, of course, would present a problem 
for the U.S. government, which considers the Saudis a staunch ally. 
Using direct quotes from the article, the tweet recontextualises the Saudis' 
responsibility for the attacks and associates it with the US-led "War on Terror". 
Through the use of the conditional phrase "if", the tweet highlights the Saudis' role in 
executing the attacks to criticise the US government for the "War on Terror", which 
targets terrorist groups and activities and neglects the Saudis. In this respect, the tweet 
attributes disloyalty and deception to the US government for its (ongoing) alliance 
with the Saudis, using a negative other-presentation strategy (van Dijk, 1999) which 
demonises both the Saudis for the 9/11 attacks and the US government for protecting 
them. The tweet in example 7 states that the Saudis, aided by the West, are 
responsible for turning the Middle East into an unsafe zone, which may lead to a 
“regional” war. It thereby suggests a severely negative role for the Saudis which, 
supported by the West, can be threatening and alarming for the whole area. While in 
example 8, the tweet claims that the Saudis plan to start a Third World War as Russia 
intervenes in Syria for a fourth day. The tweet presents the Saudis negatively by 





Launch Of World War 3", while ignoring the role of Russia, described in "Pounds 
targets" for successive days. These examples represent the Saudis negatively, using a 
negative other-presentation strategy (van Dijk, 1999), which constructs them as a 
violent out-group whose presence is dangerous and alarming to the Middle East in 
particular, and the whole world in general.  
             Having explained the representation of Saudis in light of the general sense of 
war, the following subsections discuss Saudis’ representation more specifically in 
terms of their roles in the wars in Yemen and Syria, given the significance of both 
keywords and since the majority of the keywords in the WAR category are connected 
with the wars in Yemen and Syria. 
5.2.1.1. The war in Yemen: Crime, terror and human rights manipulation  
In the FCT, there are 280 tweets about the war in Yemen, which is also among the top 
keywords (1,808:12,267) and a strong collocate of Saudis (995:191) (see Fig. 5-1, 










             The prominence of Yemen as a keyword and a collocate of Saudis raises a 
question concerning how Yemen is associated with the Saudis and how far this 
association can project a positive or negative representation of Saudis on Twitter. A 
concordance analysis shows that allocating Saudis to the war in Yemen centres on 
two key issues: war crimes that the Saudis are committing in Yemen and supporting 
terrorist groups. The first issue relates the Saudis to war crimes (135 tweets): this 
issue suggests a suspicious role which links the Saudis with the UN, where the latter 
is accused of providing cover for the Saudis’ war crimes and their obstruction of any 
investigation into Saudi violations in Yemen. In this respect, the Saudis are depicted 
as either willing to "commit war crimes" or "investigate themselves" in a UN inquiry 
into their own war crimes in Yemen, as illustrated in the following Figure 5.2: 
 
 
Figure 5-2: Concordance of Saudis and war crimes 
 
Looking at Figure 5-2 above, the Saudis are actively participating in war crimes in 
Yemen. Using the present continuous tense with a v+ing form indicates recency and 
continuity of action. Tweets also assume that the Saudis can disregard the UN through 





suggest that the Saudis dominate the UN, such as "UN jumps ship", and consequently 
can be rewarded for their war crimes instead of being held responsible or charged for 
them. Tweets also posit other ways that the Saudis control the UN, such as their 
capability of "blocking UN inquiry" or "sinking UN probe" and their ability to 
"investigate themselves" as regards their war crimes (lines 8–9). By linking their war 
crimes to their UN membership, the tweets, intertextually, reflect negative 
representations of Saudis to oppose designating them to the UN. The UN, 
accordingly, is represented as disempowered, illegitimate and deceptive. This 
negative portrayal of the UN is indicated by the agentive role which tweets assign to 
Saudis, such as their ability to “block”, “kill”, “prevent” and “scuttle” a UN 
inquiry/investigation into their crimes in Yemen. The UN is also described in negative 
predicates, such as "irony of the century", "joke", "disgrace" and "biased". In fact, the 
UN is presented as being worse than the Saudis, who are described in a negative 
predicate as "barbaric despots". The tweet criticises the UN for being "far worse" than 
the Saudis and condemns the Council for electing them in the first place, such as in 
the tweet below:  
 
Example 9       
  
The Saudis are barbaric despots. But, the UN is far worse 
because it is legitimizing and enabling the Saudis 
 
.                Associating Saudis with war crimes is also emphasised through other 
keywords, such as airstrikes (47 tweets), bombing (81 tweets) and killed (36 tweets), 
which affect civilians in Yemen. Tweets refer to airstrikes led by the Saudis as 
"deadly", they only kill civilians and destroy infrastructure in Yemen. For instance, 





wedding party and had casualties (127 tweets). Tweets refer to the Saudis’ role in this 
incident as deliberate and criminal, using material processes: "attack" (eight tweets), 
"bombing" (63 tweets), "hit" (15 tweets) and "targeted" (12 tweets). For example: 
 
Example 10        
Example 11               
 
Example 12        
Saudi-led airstrikes hit Yemen wedding party, killing at least 28.                                               
135 martyrs, 80 women within, in a genocide by Saudis targeted a  
wedding in Mocha district, Taiz city in Yemen. 
Saudis bomb Yemen wedding kill 131. Will UN Human Rights  
Comm investigate? Ask UN Chair: Saudi Arabia.                                              
 
 
In the examples above, the tweets deploy material processes: "hit", "targeted" and 
"kill", to refer to airstrikes which resulted in many deaths, including women and 
children. Using these processes ascribes direct and deliberate agency to the Saudis for 
the attack. In example 11, the tweet refers to the attack as "genocide" and uses the 
passive voice to shift the emphasis to the victims who are described as "martyrs" and 
"women". To further criminalise the Saudis, the tweet in example 12 quotes an online 
newspaper reporting the attack and comments further by asking whether the UN will 
investigate the incident. The tweet responds sarcastically, saying "Ask the UN chair: 
Saudi Arabia", which implicitly criticises designating Saudis to the UN. These tweets 
depict Saudis in a hostile way, by criminalising airstrikes which are presented as 
violating the laws of war, as they target civilians, and by mocking the UNHRC which, 
by designating the Saudis to the Council, covers up their violations and war crimes. 
             The second issue that links Saudis to the war in Yemen is terrorism, one of 
the recurrent topics for Saudis in the FCT. Terrorism is postulated through associating 





keyword (1,002:5,236) and collocate of Saudis in the FCT (548:101). This 
collocational relation posits another dark image of Saudis on Twitter since, first, both 
ISIS and AlQaeda are considered worldwide as terrorist groups (Martin & Solomon, 
2017); and second, this relation is a reciprocal one. The central notion in the Saudis-
ISIS relationship, as perceived in the tweets, is based on financial support and 
funding. The tweets tend to use the verbs "armed", "pay", "support", "send" and 
"fund" to refer to how the Saudis and ISIS cooperate. Conflating Saudis with 
terrorism in the Yemen war is also presented in collocation with AlQaeda (62:355.9). 
Saudis are represented as supportive of AlQaeda through active roles as agents in 
material processes, such as "arming", "fund", "help", "support", "sponsoring" and 
"backed", which indicate both moral and material assistance. Saudis are assumed to 
be parenting ISIS, as well as AlQaeda, and supporting them (with money and 




       
Example 14        
Example 15         
US allies & parents of AlQaeda & ISIS murder 27 in Yemen.  
 Well done Saudis. Hope Russians start bombing you too.         
Saudis after bombing send ISIS and others into Yemen! destroying.  
Terror from the air and on the ground: the #Saudis in alliance with  
AlQaeda wreck #Yemen  
               
Example 13 comments on an article in the New York Times about an airstrike by the 
Saudi-led coalition on a Yemeni wedding which killed 23 people. The tweet 
recontextualises the New York Times article about the airstrike on the wedding to 
condemn the US’s alliance with the Saudis, despite the latter allegedly attacking and 
killing Yemenis. It also links them to terrorism by describing their relationship with 





after bombing Yemen, the Saudis send ISIS, with others, to further destroy Yemen. 
Whereas in example 15, the tweet claims that the Saudis ally with AlQaeda to 
“wreck” Yemen, describing their role in Yemen as terroristic, attacking from both air 
and ground. Associating Saudis with both ISIS and AlQaeda, thus, serves to 
criminalise the Saudis’ role in Yemen and highlight their connection with terrorism 
and terrorist groups.  
              In fact, there is a tweet in which ISIS is represented as criticising the Saudis’ 
barbaric actions in Yemen, suggesting a more considerate nature of ISIS compared to 
a more aggressive side of the Saudis, such as in the following tweet:   
   
Example 16 When ISIS #daesh think #Saudis are barbaric, "bombing  
civilians" in Yemen...and condemn them     
 
Example 16 above states that ISIS (also referred to as 'Daesh') condemns the Saudis 
and perceives them as "barbaric" for targeting civilians in Yemen by bombing 
weddings. The tweet also includes a neutral emoji face, " ", which indicates a no-
comment response (or disbelief) of the tweet towards the proclaimed ISIS stance on 
the Saudis attacking the wedding. This contrast between the Saudis and ISIS is 
presented as ironic: though ISIS is known for its brutality in wars (Tarlow, 2015), the 
Saudis are presented as surpassing ISIS, to the point that it criticises the Saudis’ 
"barbaric" attitude towards civilians in Yemen.  
             A further transitivity analysis validates the above findings. Saudis are 
negatively represented as active agents in material processes in 489 tweets which 





introduced through other processes, such as: ''slaughtering", "attacked", "destroying", 
"butcher", "commit" and "wiping out". Some of these material processes (213 tweets, 
43%) are in the present continuous tense, suggesting continuity and recency, such as 
in the following examples: 
             
Example 17 
            
Example 18               
Example 19               
Example 20       
            




       
This is Sana a, capital of Yemen where Saudis are dropping 
American cluster bombs. Take a good look it could vanish. 
The Saudis are again murdering people in #Yemen from the skies   
You know Saudis are attacking Yemen, organized by Pentagon. 
Meanwhile the Saudis are bombing Yemen to smithereens right 
now  
creating more death destruction and potential refugees 
good point. No one seems to care the Saudis are butchering 
civilians in Yemen. 
In the examples above, tweets use the continuous present tense to describe the 
processes that the Saudis are engaged in in Yemen. When the Saudis are reported to 
be “committing”, “bombing”, “dropping”, “murdering” and “destroying” Yemen, this 
can evoke a sense of recency, continuity and persistence. Using verbs in the 
continuous aspect suggests that these actions are extended over time, and, in the 
current context, points towards an alarming situation caused by the Saudis in Yemen.     
             The tweets also deploy discursive strategies to represent the Saudis relative to 
the war in Yemen. Tweets employ nomination strategies to describe the Yemen war: 
"drone" (four tweets), "barbaric" (two tweets), "futile" (three tweets), and "genocidal" 
(four tweets), which ascribes a drastic image to the Saudis. The war in Yemen is also 
described as "overlooked" (nine) and "forgotten" (four), suggesting a conspiracy by 
the Saudis and others (such as the U.S.) to conceal their crimes against Yemenis. In 





Saudis bombed "precious" waterways in Yemen looking for oil. It describes the 
Saudis as "terrorists", which heightens the illocutionary force of the tweet to paint a 
vile image of the Saudis and condemn their role in the Yemen war. Tagging the war 
in Yemen as a "forgotten war", the tweet seeks to draw attention to the situation in 
Yemen and circulate this (negative) stance against Saudis. For example:      
                  
Example 22    Saudis r terrorists. video, Bombing 4 precious waterways that                                          
Saudi want 2 export oil. Google map #Yemen forgotten war  
                      
             There are also 11 tweets referring to the war in Yemen as a "Saudi war", 
whereas six tweets use war in collocation with “crimes”. Both usages stress the 
Saudis’ sole responsibility for this war, such as in the following tweets: 
 
Example 23  
               
Example 24             
The Saudis are insane and it's causing immeasurable suffering.— 
Saudi war in Yemen impossible to win   
Some of the Saudis war crimes victims, including father and son  
Laying dead killed by air bombing in Yemen  
 
 
The tweet in example 23 is a comment on another tweet from Al-Monitor, a US-based 
news website that is concerned with the Middle East. The tweet responds by 
condemning the Saudis, describing them as “insane”, and refers to their role in Yemen 
as causing "immeasurable suffering". The tweet recontextualises the text of the article 
to represent Saudis negatively and associates them with insanity so as to represent 
their role in the Yemen war as one that causes extreme and immeasurable suffering. It 





the article. While in example 24, the tweet includes pictures of smashed bodies and 
claims they belong to a "father and son" who were killed in an airstrike by the Saudi-
led coalition. The lexical choice, identifying the victims as "father and son", presents 
a stark reminder of the human toll of the war crisis and shows the devastating effects 
of strife and desperation often inflicted on children and families. Associating this 
image with Saudis highlights the viciousness of the action and portrays them as 
merciless and abhorrent. This depiction of Saudis as a violent out-group is a strategy 
that tweets deploy to highlight their negative actions/ qualities (Oktar, 2001). In sum, 
modifying the war in Yemen with Saudis holds them accountable for escalating the 
humanitarian crisis and portrays them as war criminals. 
5.2.1.2. The war in Syria: Terrorism support and refugee crisis    
The ongoing war in Syria is another theme associated with Saudis in the WAR 
category. Syria is a strong keyword (801:4,339) and collocate (306:69.7) of Saudis in 
the FCT. Examining the concordance for Syria shows that the tweets focus on three 
key issues: destroying Syria, arming and supporting terrorists and extremist groups, 
and the Saudis not taking in refugees but instead building mosques for them in 
Europe.  
             As with the first issue, tweets describe the Saudis’ role in Syria as one which 
is hostile and violent: Saudis are represented in material processes related to 
destruction, such as "destroyed", “bombing”, "destabilised", "attack" and "dragged", 







Example 25    
 
             
Example 26                  
Example 27        
    
Funding a bloodbath in Egypt, being a base to bomb Iraq, and now                  
bombing Syria, the Saudis will reap the harvest. Nothing goes 
unpaid 
now the Saudis can attack Syria and Russians. 
The US, Israel and the Saudis destabilised Syria and have been  
actively funding radical jihadists for years, fool.  
 
In these examples, tweets use the material processes "bombing", "attack" and 
"destabilised" to refer to the Saudis’ contribution to the war in Syria. In example 25, 
the tweet alleges that the Saudis’ role in Syria is mainly terrorising and destructive: it 
uses the idiomatic expression “reap the harvest” to threaten the Saudis with facing the 
consequences of their (negative) actions, and asserting that “nothing goes unpaid”. 
Similarly, in examples 26 and 27, both tweets use material processes of "attack" and 
"destabilised" to negatively refer to the Saudis’ role in the Syrian war. In example 27, 
however, the tweet claims that the Saudis (as well as the US and Israel) have been 
"funding radical Jihadists", which links them with terrorism. In fact, associating 
Saudis with "radical Jihadists" heightens the illocutionary force of the tweet, in that it 
poses the Saudis (the US and Israel as well) as another source of threat due to their 
financial support for extremist "Jihadists" who are often stereotyped in the media as 
“fanatic and cruel ‘Islamist terrorists’ who represent the main threat to Western 
civilians” (Boukala, 2016, p. 261). These negative depictions of Saudis are achieved 
through grammatical roles (active agents), lexical choices (material processes) and 
discourse warrants (negative roles in Egypt and Iraq and funding radical Jihadists in 
Syria).  
             Tweets also refer to the role of the Saudis in Syria as similar to what they are 





scenario in Syria that is parallel to that in Yemen (43 tweets), yet, such a scenario is 
often neglected by the media. For instance:  
 
                  
Example 28  
Example 29                   
Example 30      
 
       
the Saudis always wanted a "Yemeni" scenario for Syria   ) :)  
looks like the saudis are turning yemen into another Syria 
It`s just because THEY bomb in Syria. What Saudis do in Yemen    
don`t make it into news. Typical Double standards 
                                    
In example 28, the tweet claims that the Saudis intervene in Syria to make a similar 
"scenario" to that in Yemen, that is they plan to destroy Syria and kill civilians. 
Similarly, the tweet in example 29 claims that the Saudis are working on "turning" 
Yemen into a state similar to Syria. In example 30, the tweet is in reply to another 
tweet which condemns the Russian airstrikes for causing deaths among Syrian 
civilians. Though this tweet does not mention the Saudis, the tweet in example 30 
recontextualises it to compare victims of the Russian airstrikes in Syria to those killed 
by the Saudis in Yemen. It also criticises the media which ignore crimes committed in 
Yemen and prioritise those in Syria, since they are not committed by Saudis. The 
tweet describes the media's neglect of the Saudis' crimes in Yemen as "Typical 
Double standards", which implies a conspiracy and deception to conceal the Saudis' 
terroristic attitudes in Yemen.  
             The second issue that links the Saudis to the war in Syria concerns the refugee 
crisis. The tweets here question the Saudis' unwillingness to accept Syrian refugees 
fleeing from the war zone and, at the same time, offer to build mosques for them in 
Europe (particularly in Germany). This issue triggers tweets’ concerns about the 





Example 31                
 
Example 32                
 
Example 33                    
Saudis offer to build 200 mosques. In Germany. No joke.  
#refugees #crisis #europe 
Saudis bomb Yemen, pay ISIS and fund new mosques in EU for  
refugees. All as per plan. Infidel Europe being conquered.  
Saudis offering Germany millions to build Mosques a disgrace. Just  
take migrants don't give money. Long term issues for Europe 
 
These tweets represent condemnation of what is deemed to be a contradiction by the 
Saudis since, if they can build mosques for Syrian refugees in Europe, they can take 
them in instead. In fact, refugees collocates with mosques in 307 tweets in the FTC. 
These tweets refer to the Syrian refugee crisis, when some of them fled to Europe 
soon after the war broke out. The Saudis are reported by a Lebanese newspaper to be 
building over 200 mosques for Syrian refugees in Europe, especially in Germany (see 
Section 4.2.7). Consequently, this triggered vigorous reactions in tweets, which are 
mainly condemnatory and negative. Prior to discussing how tweets depict the Saudis 
in terms of the refugees and mosques issue, the frequencies of both terms as keywords 
are introduced first.   
             Both refugees (545:2,976) and mosques (395:2,730) are among the top 
hundred keywords and strong collocates of Saudis in the FCT. The collocation of both 
mosques and refugees (126 tweets) is posited as problematic and dangerous for the 
West by some users on Twitter. With the Saudis refusing to take refugees but building 
mosques for them in Europe, the tweets point to the Saudis’ contribution to what is 
proposed as being a threat to the West, intensified through using metaphors like 
“invasion” (Goodman & Speer, 2007), “floods” and “extermination”. Not accepting 
refugees is also suggested as being planned (an agenda) by the Saudis as means to 




















Saudis offer to build 200 mosques for "refugees". What, no   
churches? Could this be more blatant invasion/extermination of    
West?   
INVASION OF EUROPE ONGOING.... Europeans are   
CLUELESS. Saudis want to build 1 mosque for each 100                                             
Invaders! NoComment 
If we had stopped ASSAD AND ISIS, Syrians would stay in 
Syria. Saudis could take Syrians but they don’t. AGENDA= 
Make  Occident a MUSLIM WORLD! 
Europe is flooded with refugees while the Saudis have room for  
100,000's of people with A/C tents. They sit empty.  
The refugee scam is purely that. If they were real refugees, Saudis   
would take them, but Saudis need no more jihadis. 
Examples 34 and 38 are comments on the news that the Saudis propose to build 200 
mosques for refugees in Europe. This news is depicted as alarming in these tweets as 
they recontextualise the issue of Saudis building mosques for refugees with the 
refugees’ problematic arrival in Europe. Through using "invasion", "extermination" 
and "flooded" metaphors, tweets warn against foreseen threats inflicted by Syrian 
refugees fleeing to Europe, such as describing their arrival as "blatant invasion/ 
extermination" and an "INVASION OF EUROPE ONGOING". Tweets also claim 
that the Saudis deliberately plan to occupy the West and exterminate Westerners by 
refusing to take these refugees in. Likewise, in example 36, the tweet claims that the 
Saudis refused to accept these refugees because of their (hidden) "AGENDA", i.e. to 
Islamise the West, which is referred to as the "Occident". The tweet uses CAPS to 
emphasise and highlight the risks and threats that the Saudis and refugees constitute to 
the West. Such negative representations reinforce an 'us' versus 'them' discourse (van 
Teeffelen, 1994), which constructs the Saudis and Syrian refugees as out-groups who 
constitute a threat to Europeans and reveal a xenophobic discourse which depicts both 
as negative out-groups whose presence threatens peace in the West (Zaslavsky, 2017). 
This negative discourse about refugees is rooted in media discourse and reproduced 





enforces the ideology that the 'other' does not belong (Dunn, Klocker, and Salabay, 
2007).         
             The third issue associates refugees with Saudis in term of terrorism. Refugees 
are perceived as future terrorists since building mosques can breed terrorists (12 
tweets). Associating refugees with terrorism also recalls the 9/11 attacks (8 tweets). 
Tweets stress that the majority of the attackers were Saudis (15 of 19) to warn against 
an imminent threat which resulting from Saudis building mosques in Europe. These 
allegations suggest that there are criminal intentions behind the Saudis building these 
mosques for refugees, noting that mosques are labelled as "terror" and "Wahhabi". 
This issue is further exacerbated when tweets suggest that there are members of ISIS 
among the Syrian refugees arriving in Germany (5 tweets), which is seen as alarming 
and threatening. For example: 
 
 
Example 39                 
 
Example 40                 
 
Example 41 
           
 
Example 42                            
For the Invaders of Europe: Saudis to build 200 Terror Mosques  
in Germany 
Saudis offer 2 build Germany 200 mosques 2 indoctrinate 
terrorists suppose it makes it OK 
If 15 of the 19 #September11 terrorists were Saudis, should  
Germany let Saudi Arabia build 200 Wahhabi mosques for the 
refugees?                                                                                    
Saudis going to build 200 mosques in Germany for Syrian 
refugees (and ISIS jihadis) but won’t take any in their country 
 
In these examples, tweets visualise both the Saudis and Syrian refugees as a source of 
terror and threat: the Saudis being the primary source of the threat, the refugees the 
medium, and the West the eventual victim. This typology builds on two claims: first, 
tweets perceive the refugees as a problematic issue for the West by describing them as 





terrorism and threat, as tweets associate them with the 9/11 attacks; this, 
consequently, embellishes the issue of building mosques for refugees in Europe as 
these mosques are depicted as terror-producing places.        
             The last issue that links Saudis to the war in Syria is supporting terrorism (12 
tweets) and funding terrorist groups8 (73 tweets). Besides building mosques that can 
sponsor terrorism and breed terrorists, tweets ascribe negative roles to the Saudis in 
the war in Syria, which include supporting and funding terrorist groups, such as ISIS 
(48 tweets). Saudis are also represented as actively supporting terrorism in Syria 
through material processes by either "arming" (24 tweets), offering SUPPORT to (28 
tweets) or "funding" (16 tweets) groups that are linked with terror or by sending 
"Jihadists" (seven tweets) directly to Syria. For example:  
             
Example 43 
                   
Example 44 
                   
Example 45                    
our allies the Saudis are already in Syria, biggest financial  
supporters of ISIS                                       
What the Saudis mean to say is We will be increasing our funding  
Towards terrorism in #Syria  
Saudis think nobody knows they and Gulf friends are funding, 
arming and sending jihadis "killing machine" to Syria? 
       
These tweets emphasise the Saudis' role in Syria, being portrayed as supporting and 
funding terrorist groups financially, such as ISIS and "Jihadis". Contrary to their 
depicted role in the war in Yemen, Saudis are presented as contributing not to the war 
in Syria itself but to supporting and funding terrorism and terrorist groups. This 
negative contribution triggers tweets to condemn any alliance with the Saudis, such as 
in example 43, as the tweet mocks US government relations with the Saudis. The 
tweet expresses the user's involvement through the use of deictic "our", which situates 
 





the speaker and the government in the same boat (Ivanova, 2016). The user's 
involvement in the discourse carries an irony that mocks the US alliance with the 
Saudis by juxtaposing it with the Saudis being the "biggest financial supporters of 
ISIS". Tweets also postulate Saudi support and funding of terrorism in Syria as either 
open and public (example 44), or secret (example 45) by sending "Jihadis" who are 
described as a "killing machine" to Syria. As noted earlier, the term "Jihadis" presents 
a threatening concept of extremism and danger to the West (Boukala, 2016), and so 
associating it with supporting terrorism in Syria can re-instantiate a darker and 
threatening image of Saudis in the FCT.    
5.2.2. Mecca events: Saudis’ incompetence 
The top recurring keywords in the FCT which are related to the two tragic events at 
Mecca are Hajj (1,168 tweets), stampede (507), Mecca (377) and crane (240). 
Although the data were collected in the aftermath of both tragic events, the MECCA 
EVENTS category ranks third among the top dominating categories in the FCT. This 
suggests less media coverage of both the crane collapse and the Hajj stampede events 
compared to other categories where the focus is laid on the ongoing war in the region. 
However, the question raised here is whether both tragic events trigger a certain 
discourse around Saudis and whether this discourse promotes any negative/ positive 
representations. To answer this question, the top common keywords Hajj, stampede, 
Mecca and crane, are examined next using concordance analysis.  
              Hajj, ranking fourth among the top keywords (1,166:8,434), marks an annual 
religious occasion when Muslims perform the fifth pillar of Islam at Mecca. Hajj is 
most likely to co-occur with stampede which collocates with Hajj in 274 tweets, 





second tragic event (the stampede) occurred, whereas the crane collapse preceded 
Hajj by almost two weeks (see section 4.2.3). Mecca collocates with Hajj in 39 
tweets, with stampede in 73 tweets, with crane 69 in tweets.  
             Hajj collocates with Saudis in 656 tweets; however, this collocation is mostly 
one of blame. Saudis are either reported as blaming others (237 tweets) or being 
blamed for the stampede (155). In the first case, Saudis are reported as blaming either 
"God’s will" or the "pilgrims", especially Africans, who are described as "negroes", 
"black(s) pilgrims", and "dirt-poor Africans". Tweets argue against blaming (African) 
pilgrims to highlight the negative ways in which the Saudis deal with foreign 
pilgrims. For example: 
                
Example 46 
                   
Example 47 
                   
Example 48   
 
Example 49                  
I get angry when Saudis blame God. In every disaster, the Saudis  
say it is God's will. It is not God's will it is man's incompetence.' 
Obscenely wealthy Saudis blame dirt-poor Africans for the   
#HajjStampede  
Racist Saudis blame blacks for Mecca stampede that killed 717  
people 
LOL Racist fucking Saudis, Prince Khaled al-Faisal, blamed the  
stampede on "some pilgrims from African nationalities"         
 
Examining examples 46–49 shows that tweets emphasise the Saudis’ responsibility 
for the stampede and criticise them for blaming others rather than themselves. 
However, emphasising the Saudis’ responsibility for the stampede triggered negative 
representations of Saudis’ racist attitudes towards other groups, such as African 
pilgrims. Both are presented at binary oppositions: African pilgrims are presented as 
an inferior and disempowered group, through nomination strategies like "dirt-poor", 
"negroes" and "blacks"; and the Saudis are depicted negatively, using nomination 





stereotype Saudis negatively, as a powerful group, which is manifest in their racist 
and bigoted attitudes towards other, less powerful groups.                                                                                                       
           The collocation of Saudis with Hajj, therefore, can portray how tweets view 
them after the stampede event. Furthermore, Saudis are represented as exploiters of 
Hajj who use it as a means of milking other Muslims and as a money-making 
(minting) business. This claim is supported by nomination strategies which describe 
Saudis as "savages", "sick", "disaster", "mother fuckers" and "stupid", which 
promotes further hostile images of Saudis. These negative depictions suggest that Hajj 
is unsafe and in the wrong hands, leading some tweeters to urge the 
internationalisation of Hajj. Tweets claim that the current Hajj management, which is 
administered by the Saudis, caused the stampede. This claim results in growing 
demands for "broader participation and power sharing among the major countries that 
send the largest Hajj delegations every year" (Bianchi, 2015, p. 78). In fact, calls for 
the internationalisation of Hajj aim at the "tempering of Saudi Arabia’s exaggerated 
claims to sovereignty over the Holy Cities and the pilgrimage" (ibid, p. 78). Tweets 
suggest designating the "Turks" or "Iranians" to handle Hajj management instead of 
the Saudis, as in the following examples: 
 
Example 50 
                   
Example 51 
                    
Hardliners in Shiite rival Iran condemn stampede incident, say   
 Saudis should no longer handle annual #hajj 
 If Saudis can't handle Hajj maybe they should hand over its  
 management to Iranians or Turks. 
             As for stampede, tweets describe it as a "catastrophe" (three tweets), 
"disaster" (54 tweets), "crush" (27 tweets) and "tragedy" (51 tweets), and it is also 





stampede is described in binary sentiments: sympathy and "condolences", or criticism 
and "‘condemnation". The term “flooded” (62 tweets) is metaphorically used to refer 
to the immensity of the international reaction to the stampede. For example: 
  
Example 52 
                   
Example 53                   
Iranians slam Saudis: International condolences – and  
condemnation –  flooded into Saudi Arabia on Friday ...  
New post: "Iranians critical" International condolences – and                  
condemnation – flooded into Saudi Arabia on Friday…    
 
However, in studies on the representation of other groups, water metaphors, like 
floods, are considered harmful (Baker, 2010; Gabrielatos & Baker, 2008; 
KhosraviNik, 2009; Parker, 2015) and suggest exaggerated and undesirable effects. 
When both sympathetic and critical messages are described as "flooding", it entails a 
negative evaluation of Saudis in relation to the stampede and suggests that although 
the condolence messages are very numerous, they are also critical and adverse in tone.  
             The Hajj stamped also interrelates with other themes in the FCT, such as the 
war in Yemen (eight tweets). Tweets refer to the stampede as a Godly punishment for 
the Saudis’ negative actions in Yemen, as in the following tweets: 
 
Example 54 
                   
Example 55 
                   
 
Example 56  
the Saudis are in trouble now...it's ALLAH'S wrath on them for 
what they are doing in Yemen 
The hajj culminates at the end of September. The Saudis have 
killed hundreds of innocent children/women/men in Yemen. 
Revenge? 
Seems Allah is finally taking revenge on Saudis for spoiling his  









Instead of expressing sympathy and compassion towards the stampede event, tweets 
perceive the stampede as a penalty for Saudi war crimes and violations in Yemen. 
Negative depictions of Saudis in association with the stampede also touch upon a 
number of interrelated themes in the FCT, such as the rape case against a Saudi 
diplomat (Section 7.7) and manipulating oil prices (Section 5.2.5). The tweets 
discursively perceive the stampede as “karma” or as "ALLAH'S wrath", rather than an 
accident. Discourse associating the Saudis with the stampede allows for the attribution 
of blame and ridicule, rather than expressing sympathy towards the victims, who were 
mostly non-Saudis. Cholerton (2015) expresses his disagreement while describing the 
reactions of some people in the US to the stampede, stating: 
[T]here are almost certainly many across this nation, and middle America, and 
elsewhere in the West, who secretly feel, and privately express, that the deaths 
of these religious pilgrims represents some sort of comeuppance for Islam. 
After all, it’s their brethren cutting off heads in Iraq and Syria, planning and 
committing atrocities across Europe, destroying the treasures of antiquity, etc., 
etc. Surely it’s some kind of karma?   
It can be assumed that a tragic event, such as the stampede, can be a clue to immersed, 
racist stereotypes and ideologies about Muslims in general, and Saudis in particular, 
in the FCT.  
             Mecca (375:2,730) is also among the top keywords in the five corpora and 
collocates with Saudis in 124 tweets. Mecca represents the geographic location of 
both tragic incidents, added to its religious and spiritual value for Muslims. A close 
concordance analysis of Mecca shows that 356 tweets report both tragic events 





represented as a victim of the Saudis through material processes, "ruined", 
"shredded", "turned into Las Vegas", "changed", "ruled" and "materialised", 
suggesting that the Saudis are exploiting their control to victimise Mecca. For 
example:                  
Example 57 
Example 58 
                   
Example 59  
Saudis have made Mecca into the Las Vegas of religion.  
I'm not going to apologise for the last few tweets I made. The 
Saudis need to stop turning Mecca into fucking Disneyland 
The Saudis have shredded Mecca and many other historical sites.   
Like they had something to hide 
 
           
Going beyond exploiting Hajj and pilgrims, some tweets claim that the Saudis also 
threaten Mecca in two ways: ripping off its religious sacredness and destroying its 
historical sites. For instance, in examples 57 and 58, tweets deploy the metaphors 
"Las Vegas" and "Disneyland" to claim that the Saudis are threatening the religious 
identity and holiness of Mecca by transforming it into a place of entertainment, rather 
than worship. In fact, comparing Mecca to Las Vegas and Disneyland carries negative 
connotations, since Mecca is considered the holiest place in Islam, whereas Las Vegas 
is considered the world’s entertainment capital and known for its casino-associated 
activities, and Disneyland one of the most renowned amusement parks. This depiction 
is highlighted in the media (Al-Alawi and Scwartz, 2013; Rogeberg 2017) to criticise 
the massive expansions which, according to Rogeberg (2017), are claimed to be 
commercialisation and not for prayer and Hajj. Using these metaphors thus sustains a 
radical image of Saudis as one that threatens not only the holiness of Mecca but its 
symbolism for all Muslims.  
            There are still, however, a few tweets that carry positive sentiments towards 
the Saudis, appreciating their efforts at Mecca and shifting the blame for the stampede 





the tweets stress that the Saudis do their best to manage Hajj and that their efforts to 





                   
Example 62  
What Saudis do in Mecca and Medina is amazing actually. If 
people follow guidelines then tragedies wont occur. 
No one can manage hajj better than Saudis. Years of tradition and 
experience. Pro Iranians stay away 
King Salman and Saudis 'compete to serve pilgrims' 
                            
 
These tweets carry positive evaluations and present a resisting discourse which 
defends the Saudis against the stampede accusations. Tweets argue for the substantial 
efforts that the Saudis are making for the Holy places and argue that pilgrims’ 
unawareness and disobedience of the guidelines were the real cause of the stampede 
(example 60). Tweets also criticise the Iranians for detracting from the Saudis’ 
competence to manage Hajj (62 tweets), on their (Saudis') incomparable efforts.  
            The last keyword in this category is crane (240:1541), which is identified as a 
"collapse" (117 tweets), "crash" (19 tweets), "fall" (28 tweets), "accident" (nine 
tweets), "disaster" (nine tweets) and "incident" (six tweets), and referentially 
described as "Mecca" (53 tweets) and "deadly" (28 tweets). Similar to previous 
keywords in this category, examining the association of Saudis with the crane event 
reveals negative stances in tweets which condemn their irresponsibility towards the 
event. The tweets also criticise the Saudis' irrational reasoning regarding the causes of 
the crane collapse, such as being an "act of God" (19 tweets) or the wind (five tweets). 
Blaming "winds" is also used as irony in tweets (example 65) to mock the Saudis’ 






Example 63           
Example 64                        
 
Example 65  
Oh. Dear.  Saudis blame 'act of God' for crane collapse  
It's not the Saudis' fault bro. The crane was an act of God. They're 
doing a good job. They're the masters of organisation. 
Saudis "no surprise" blame winds for the crane disaster that killed 
scores of humans 
 
                 
Some tweets, however, recall the 9/11 attacks (nine tweets), signalling a conspiracy 
behind the incident, as there were no Saudi casualties among the victims. Other tweets 
see the crane collapse as “karma” for the 9/11 attacks and suggesting Godly revenge. 
Like the stampede event, these tweets did not trigger any compassion but, rather, 
induced antagonistic reactions in some tweets towards both the Saudis and the victims 
of the crane collapse, such as in the following examples:    
 
Example 66           
 




Example 69  
 
Example 70  
Yayyyyyyyyyyyy ...... fucking Saudis and others, killed people 
from all over the world..... today karma came...  
Fuck the Saudis, Allah punished them with the crane thing at that  
big ass mosque  #Karma   
guess who were killed by the crane...foreigners, non-Saudis,  
innocents who had nothing to do with 9/11. 
Crane collapse in Mecca...Allah blaming Saudis for indifference 
to Muslim refugees or maybe ISIs sabotage. #conspiracy 
with 17/19 hijackers on 9/11 Saudis...we should have nuked 
Mecca and sent the barbarians a message.... 
         
One of the ways of misrepresenting Saudis in the FCT is through the interrelation of 
themes, i.e. tweets connect two or more themes and associate them negatively with 
the Saudis, such as the 9/11 attacks and the Syrian refugee crisis. The crane collapse, 
which occurred on 11 September 2015, coincided with the 14th anniversary of the 
9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001. According to Faith (2016), when the 
crane collapsed in Mecca, "[s]ome people, including some Americans, saw this event, 
and its timing, as some type of grand karmic justice against Muslims in general and 





refer to the crane collapse as revenge or "karma" for 9/11 and/or for the Saudis’ 
"indifference" towards Syrian refugees. This issue is taken further to assume that the 
crane collapse was planned by the Saudis, given that the victims were "foreigners, 
non-Saudis" (example 68). This assumption proclaims sympathy towards the victims, 
mainly because they were "non-Saudis" and not involved in the 9/11 attacks. 
However, recalling the 9/11 attacks also promotes an alarming discourse (example 70) 
as the tweet triggers an intimidating reaction towards the Saudis. The tweet includes a 
comment on a picture of the crane collapse at Mecca. Using the deontic modality 
"should", the tweet carries a drastic discourse which expresses a past obligation for a 
collective action to "nuke" Mecca as payback for the Saudis’ contribution to the 9/11 
attacks. This example resembles one of the accumulative (serious) effects of media 
discourse. The 9/11 attacks occurred in 2001, prior to the launch of Twitter in 2006, 
and when the crane collapse in Mecca coincided with the 14th anniversary of the 9/11 
attacks, the tweet prompted a past obligation to take revenge on the Saudis 
immediately after the attacks took place. Such a negative ideology vis-à-vis others 
suggesting "that people are deserving of death simply because of who they are, not 
because of anything they’ve done – is what led a bunch of cowardly, murderous 
bastards to carry out the original 9/11 attacks" (Faith, 2016).    
             The keywords analysis in the MECCA EVENTS category, accordingly, 
reveals a negative discourse representation which centres on blame and criticism. 
Saudis are also negatively constructed as incompetent and uncaring. Neither event 
triggered any sympathy or compassion towards the events, but rather evoked a sense 
of mockery in which tweets present the crane collapse as karma for the 9/11 attacks 
and the war on Yemen. In fact, this was tagged in one tweet which expresses 





should only trigger empathy and condolences. In example 71, below, the tweet 
expresses astonishment at other tweets’ reactions that should have been more 
empathetic and supportive towards the crane collapse. Instead, these tweets either 
mock the Saudis for the stampede tragedy, as karma for 9/11, or criticise them for 
blaming Egyptian pilgrims for panicking the crowds:  
 
Example 71 Reading argument over an accident that should incite no emotion  
other than compassion. Karma for 9/11 & Saudis criticizing  
Egyptians! #Mecca 
                 
5.2.3. Saudis and terrorism 
Associating Saudis with terrorism is one of the top recurring themes throughout the 
FCT: Saudis are associated with terrorism in the WAR, RELIGION and OIL 
categories in the FCT. Among the top keywords in this category are the lemmas 
CRUCIFY (501 tweets) and TERROR (660 tweets) in their different forms, such as 
crucifying, crucifixion, terror, terrorists and terrorist. The remaining keywords are 
behead (349 tweets) which is related to crucify, fund (481 tweets) which is linked 
with terror, barbaric (94 tweets) and hijackers (77 tweets). These keywords link 
Saudis with violence and terrorism regarding a) the crucifixion case of Ali Al-Nimr, 
b) funding terrorist groups and c) the 9/11 attacks. 
            The keywords crucify and behead associate mostly the Saudis with the 
crucifixion case against Ali Mohammed Al-Nimr. The keyword crucify (340 tweets) 
relates to the case of Ali Al-Nimr, who is reported to be facing death by crucifixion as 
a protest penalty. This incident, although not officially declared or stated by the Saudi 





Tweets’ reactions towards the Al-Nimr crucifixion are condemnatory, accusing the 
Saudis of insanity and brutality. Al-Nimr is referred to as an "activist" (22 tweets), 
"young" (16 tweets), a "kid" (13 tweets), a "teen" (64 tweets) and a "child" (20 
tweets). which seeks to stress his youth and to criminalise the act. In addition, tweets 
condemn the reasons for crucifying Al-Nimr, which are postulated as trivial and 
unreasonable, such as opposing Saudi opinions and committing crimes when he was a 
teenager. Al-Nimr’s case has also received considerable attention on Twitter; tweets 





Example 73  
 
Example 74      
RT! Saudis will execute and crucify Ali within 24 hours! Help me  
save him!   #AliMohammedAlNimr #FreeNimr 
please retweet Matt, the Saudis have literally sentenced him to 
crucifixion.  
Please try to stop the Saudis from crucifying 17yr old Ali Al Nimr 
for criticizing his government 
                    
            The crucifixion of Al-Nimr also interrelates with other common issues in the 
FCT, such as chairing the UNHRC panel, arms deals and terror and violence, to 




Example 76  
 
Example 77      
Young boy to be crucified...UN Human Rights chair.... 
Saudis....you should be able to connect the dots:) 
Oh cool the Saudis are CRUCIFYING a prisoner how many deals 
do we have with them? 
So ISIS is bad because they behead, crucify and repress women. 
Other than their clothes how are Saudis different? 
 
                        
In the above examples, tweets condemn crucifying Al-Nimr by associating other 





These issues include condemnation of the UNHRC for allowing the Saudis onto the 
Council and Western governments (such as the US and the UK) for doing arms deals 
with the Saudis. Granting the Saudis membership of the Council is not negative in 
itself; however, tweets condemn the Al-Nimr crucifixion to express opposition 
towards and disagreement with the UNHRC decision to allow the Saudis a seat on the 
Council. This association juxtaposes the founding principles of the UNHRC, which 
promote human rights around the world. The tweet in example 75 shows that allowing 
the Saudis into the UNHRC while they attempt to crucify a "young boy" is 
intolerable, pointing to what "seems to be the apogee of political hypocrisy" 
(Mehdiyeva, 2016, p. 6). Also, crucifying Al-Nimr is challenged while doing arms 
deals with the Saudis: the tweet in example 76 uses the involvement deixis “we” to 
mock the US government for dealing with the Saudis despite crucifying "a prisoner". 
In the last example (77), the tweet refers to crucifying Al-Nimr to conflate the Saudis 
with ISIS, arguing that both are similar in beheading and crucifying people and 
oppressing women, and the only difference (the tweet claims) between the Saudis and 
ISIS is in their outfits. 
            Examining the concordance of behead shows that Saudis habitually carry out 
beheadings on people for unjustified reasons, except for nine tweets where beheading 
refers to the Saudis chairing a UNHRC panel. Beheading also echoes similar themes 
to crucifying Al-Nimr, such as questioning the Saudis’ eligibility to be a member of 
the UNHRC and their resemblance to ISIS in beheading people. Additionally, tweets 
argue against Saudis for beheading people who dissent from the government, women 
practising sorcery and drug-dealing. Tweets also perceive beheading as something 
that Saudis are accustomed to, or as a practice in which they outpace ISIS who behead 





79 tweets, and 62 tweets link both keywords to Al-Nimr’s crucifixion. The remaining 







Example 80      
 
 
Example 81      
 
Example 82      
The Saudis still behead women for the crime of sorcery. 
Reminder: this nation sits on the UN Human Rights Council. 
The Saudis have been known to behead people over drug charges  
and Other minor offenses. They are Wahhabis. ...  
Saudis are sick of being compared to ISIS re beheadings so in  
spirit of new #UNhumanrights role will now only crucify  
dissenters. progress..      
last I heard the Saudis had beheaded more people than ISIS. Not  
an ally.           
Ironic given that the Saudis routinely behead and crucify as part 
of their "civilized" society 
 
 
Examining the keyword beheading reveals several interrelated themes that recur in 
the FCT, which contributes to presenting Saudis negatively through the other 
negative-presentation strategy. For example, tweets condemn the beheading penalty to 
criticise electing Saudis to the UNHRC and to associate them with ISIS. Practising 
sorcery or dealing with drugs is prohibited globally and, in Islam, can incur the death 
penalty for the practitioner. Yet, tweets in the FCT shift the emphasis away from 
penalties and blame the Saudis' extreme ideology (being "Wahhabis"), which adopts 
beheading as a punishment to condemn allowing them onto the UNHRC (examples 78 
and 79). Tweets also highlight the beheading penalty by claiming that Saudis behead 
more people than ISIS (example 81). This negative depiction is illustrated through 
images, such as a caricature of people hanged on flagpoles outside the UNHRC 
building with a large, blood-stained sword behind them. This image suggests a violent 
and dangerous stereotype of Saudis which contradicts the founding basis of the 






Figure 5-3: Caricature of Saudis leading the UN on Twitter  
 
                                  
What is alarming is that these depictions of Saudis and beheading may promote and 
sustain a negative stereotype of Saudis outside Twitter. Spreading such negative 
portrayals can contribute to a ‘Saudiophobic’ discourse which can be evoked offline. 
For example:  
 
Example 83  There are 2 Saudis visiting US for school. Will they behead me if 
I say the wrong thing to them!? 
 
The tweet above is a comment on another tweet that criticises the US for its alliance 
with the Saudis, despite their intention to crucify Al-Nimr. The tweet responds with 
the user wondering (seriously or sarcastically) if the two Saudis who will visit his/her 
school are going to behead the tweeter if s/he miscommunicates (says something 





to if they are confronted or opposed by others, suggesting that their reactions and 
attitudes can be violent and intolerant. 
              In addition to crucifying and beheading, Saudis are portrayed as providing 
financial and material support to terror-recognised groups, such as ISIS and AlQaeda, 
or adopting extreme thoughts/ ideology presented by the material process fund. 
Tweets use fund to represent Saudis negatively as active agents in supporting the 
following: ISIS (162 tweets), terrorism (93 tweets), mosques/ terror (33 tweets), 
“radical Muslims” (18 tweets), 9/11 attacks (17 tweets), “Jihadists” (15 tweets), 
“extremists” (14 tweets), AlQaeda (14 tweets) and their “ideology” (five tweets).  
              Associating Saudis with supporting the terror-classified ISIS and AlQaeda 
recurs throughout different topics in the FCT, such as WAR (Yemen and Syria), 
RELIGION and OIL. Yet, it is assumed that the Saudis do not only fund terror 
through backing and supporting ISIS and AlQaeda groups, but also through funding a 
radical and extreme ideology as well as sponsoring mosques in the West, which 
contribute to sustaining terror and breeding terrorists. This issue of radicality and 
extremism is highlighted in studies on the representation of Islam and Muslims in 
Western media (Akbarzadeh & Smith, 2005; Ameli et al., 2007; Baker, 2010; 
Lemmouh, 2008). However, these negative views are reintroduced on Twitter to also 
link Saudis to a fanatical and extreme ideology which is presented as funding 
terrorists as well as mosques which also promote their radical concept of terrorism. 
Adopting this ideology, consequently, evokes a sense of danger that is threatening the 










Example 86     
Example 87      
Saudis fund ISIS/AlQaeda to wage proxy wars for Wahhabi 
domination so if ISIS are our enemy, selling KSA weapons ??? 
Saudis spreading radical ideology, causing mass murder,  
destroying state... 
Irrelevant. The Saudis fund the theology that breeds terrorism 
instead, the Saudis are offering to fund 200 new terrorist 
factories/mosques - ugh! 
 
Associating Saudis with terrorism is depicted in several ways, such as funding ISIS 
and AlQaeda and other radical groups, propagating their (Wahhabi) ideology and 
funding mosques that breed terrorists. The discursive element of "terrorist Saudis" 
entails a central notion: Saudis construct a source of threat that can extend to others. 
This argument is presented in two ways, either Saudis funding terrorists to establish 
"Wahhabi domination" (example 84), which threatens and clashes with the West 
(Ekman, 2015, p. 1987), or Saudis adopt a radical "theology" that promotes mass 
destruction, and that breeds terrorists by funding mosques in Europe (examples 86 
and 87). In fact, the 9/11 attacks dramatically transformed the media discourse of 
terrorism around the world. In the US, media discourse resonated with US political 
“definitions, descriptions, and deliberations on terrorism, generating a ‘politics of 
fear’” (Roy and Ross, 2011, p. 288). According to Salama (2011), the discourse of 
Wahhabi-Saudi Islam rose to an extreme level in the US when the 9/11 attacks drew 
attention to two strict Islamic movements: Wahhabism and Salafiyya. This resulted in 
discursive practices that have "linguistically crystallized via the biased collocations 
that permeate antagonistic texts, which recontextualize the same discourse topic of 
Wahhabi-Saudi Islam. This has eventually led to the emergence of ‘meaningful 
antagonism’ between anti-Wahhabi and proWahhabi discourses since 9/11" (ibid., p. 





             The last keyword in this category is hijackers. This keyword refers to the 9/11 
attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York in 2001, which also corresponds to 
the date of the first tragic event in Mecca (crane collapse). However, only (19) tweets 
mention the crane collapse in relation to the September attacks (see section 4.3). 
Hijackers only collocates with crane in one tweet; this tweet mocks the crane collapse 
as it corresponds to the 14th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. The tweet in example 88 
expresses pleasure at the coincidence of the crane collapse with the 9/11 anniversary, 
rather than sympathy, since the Saudis allegedly funded the 9/11 hijackers. The tweet 
concludes with the phrase "let them all die", which indicates a resentful stance 
towards the Saudis and results in establishing a hate discourse:  
 
Example 88  How fitting that the crane collapses in Mecca on 9/11 since the  
Saudis funded the hijackers. Let them all die. 
 
             Further, tweets refer to the 9/11 attacks and refer to the number of Saudis 
involved in the attacks, either by using quantifying words (most, many, all, majority), 
or by referring to the number of hijackers, which is mentioned differently by tweets 
(e.g. 11, 15, 17, 18, 20), which stresses the Saudis’ responsibility for the attacks. In 
fact, recalling the 9/11 events prompts tweets to represent Saudis adversely: tweets 
oppose the war on Iraq and Afghanistan (24 tweets), as well as the sanctions imposed 
on Iran (10 tweets), because, as alleged in the tweets, none of the citizens of these 
countries was involved in the attacks. Instead, tweets stress the Saudis’ 'sole' 
accountability for the 9/11 attacks. Associating Saudis with hijackers in the FCT 





attacks (example 89 below). Such violent discourse can be an indication of the effects 
of negative media stereotypes of Saudis on online public discourse. For example: 
 
Example 89  One should "never Forget" the find out Truth behind 9/11. Why  
Saudis were not bombed when most Hijackers were Saudis 
      
5.2.4. Sunnis, Wahhabis: Saudis in the religious sphere 
Keywords in the RELIGION category tend to classify Saudis on a rather ‘extreme’ 
scale in relation to their religion, Islam, or their religious identity being Muslim, such 
as Wahhabi and Sunni, which are used as premodifiers with Saudis in the FCT.  
             Islam (330:1,496) is one of the top keywords in the five corpora, along with 
Islamic. However, a search for the lemma ISLAM found other forms, such as 
"Islamism", "Islamist", "Islamification", "Islamization" and "Islamophobia". Tweets 
in the FCT use "Islamism" and "Islamist" to refer to Saudis’ religious identity, which 
is either extremist or used as a disguise, whereas "Islamophobia" refers to how the 
Saudis use the term to defend themselves against any criticism or to cover up 
practising terrorism. "Islamisation" and "Islamification" are used in tweets to warn 
against Saudis plans to spread Islam into Europe through funding mosques in 
Australia (Section 7.3), or by building mosques for refugees in Germany (Section 
5.2.1.2). The significance of Islam as a keyword arises from the fact that Saudi Arabia 
is considered to be the birthplace of Islam and the site of two sacred cities of Mecca 
and Medina (see Section 2.3.5). However, a question that might be raised here is how 





relationship can project positive or negative representations, or both. To answer these 
questions, I utilise concordance analysis to examine Saudis and Islam in context.  
            In fact, Islam collocates with Saudis in 202 tweets: this attribution posits Islam 
as either a victim of the Saudis, in an asymmetrical status (both are associated 
positively or negatively, 43 tweets), in a different status with one being negative and 
the other positive (46 tweets), or finally the relationship of both is neutral, having 




Victim Equal Different Neutral 
Evaluation __ Positively Negatively Positively Negatively 
 
Tweets 
65  40 8 35 11 43 
32% 19.8% 3.9% 17% 5% 21% 
Total 202 
Table 5-2: Collocation of Islam and Saudis in the FCT 
 
In Table 5-2, above, Islam is mostly represented in the tweets as a victim of Saudis in 
material processes that represent Islam as "hijacked" (three tweets), "killed" (four 
tweets), "sold" (two tweets), "ruined" (four tweets), "left" (two tweets) or exported by 
the Saudis. Other tweets (23.7%) present the Saudis and Islam in an equal partnership, 
either positively (e.g. misrepresented by the media) or negatively (e.g. both encourage 
rape). Other tweets (22%) present Saudis and Islam as dissimilar, Islam is presented 
either positively (e.g. Saudis are not the real Islam) or negatively (e.g. presenting 
Islam as responsible for adverse outcomes and not the Saudis), whereas 21 per cent of 





negative connotations. Example tweets for the Saudis-Islam relationship are 








     
Example 93  
Example 94 
 
Example 95     
Saudis have hijacked Islam. Most ppl now think the term Saudi  
Arabia is synonymous with Islam. Saudis Do NOT represent the  
Muslims, get it? 
The Saudis have succeeded in making Islam into a scary doctrine, 
on how Saudis manipulate the world    
Saudis follow Islam and Islam means peace. Ahmadiyya Times: 
India: Saudi diplomat accused of gang-rapes in               
New… Saudis n rape? Nah! They're the real Islam! 
It's not Iranians or Iraqis or Saudis or Hamas or Gazans or  
AlQaeda or ISIS. It's all quite simply ISLAM. 
Reason Saudis won't take them is wrong. Study Hijra other way  
Muslims want to spread Islam. Saudis espouse it.     
 
In these examples, tweets reflect on the association of Saudis with Islam, which is 
presented as an agentless victim (90-91) that is "hijacked" and vandalised, turning 
into a "scary doctrine", by the Saudis. The tweets allege that Saudis have their own 
(corrupt) version of Islam which is deviant and scary, challenging other people who 
assume that the Saudis represent the real Islam. Other tweets, however, depict both 
the Saudis and Islam as vile and threatening; tweets associate the issue of Saudis not 
taking refugees with a conspiracy to spread Islam in Europe, which evokes a sense of 
threat to the West through Islamophobic (Ekman, 2015) and Saudiphobic discourses.   
             The second word in this category is Wahhabi (91:650),9 which is also one of 
the top hundred keywords, along with Wahhabism (122:794); it functions as a 
premodifier of Saudis in the FCT. Other forms of Wahhabi include "Wahhabist", 
"Wahhabis", "Wahhabism" and "Wahhabilism", which denote the different ways in 
 
9 It was taken into consideration the various spelling variations of ‘Wahhabi’ in the corpora, such as 





which tweets associate Saudis with Wahhabi thought (see section 4.2.6 for the origin 
of the term). In fact, "extremist" and "terrorist(s)" are collocates that modify Wahhabi, 
which suggests a negative discourse prosody of (dangerous) strong beliefs and 
violence. Conflating Wahhabi with terrorism is also manifest in tweets as users 
deploy nomination and predicational strategies with which they pre-modify Saudis. 
             Wahhabi collocates with Saudis in 55 tweets, 15 tweets are in complex 
phrases with negative modifiers, such as "terror spreading", "extremist" and 
"terrorists", which carry a negative discourse prosody of criminality and suggest an 
approach that is not only Islamic but a rather dangerous extremist one. The following 








     





M East is not the whole world of Muslims as M East is in Turmoil   
bcos of Wahhabi Saudis who are arming and funding Terror for  
USA 
Someone tell me why we should not hate those who preach that 
we are subhuman, the Wahhabi Saudis? 
No mistake. *surgical strike* to kill one man that #Wahhabi  
extremist Saudis wanted dead. Too bad about the others           
The Wahhabi/terror spreading Saudis should face a military  
 option in my view…. 
Seriously wondering if some in west are working 2 keep war 
going to keep selling weapons to Wahhabi Islamist Saudis 
              
Modifying Saudis with Wahhabi is negative in all occurrences of the term. For 
instance, in the first tweet, the user refers to the Middle East as being in chaos because 
of Wahhabi Saudis who support and fund USA terror. However, in examples 98, 99 
and 100, Wahhabi is further attached to other modifiers, such as "Islamist", "terror 
spreading", "extremist" and "Sunni". Although Islamist and Sunni are not negative in 
their own sense, the context in which they collocate with Saudis is a negative one. 





whereby the collocation of Wahhabi with other modifiers implies a discourse of 
intolerance, such as the phrase "why we should not hate”. Other tweets urge serious 
action against the Saudis, such as the phrase "should face a military option".  
             Another keyword in the religion category is Sunni; tweets use the term to 
either refer to Saudis being Sunnis who follow the Sunni doctrine (opposite to the 
Shiites), or to refer to other groups which embrace the Sunni doctrine. In the latter 
case, this includes either negative references to social groups, such as "Sunni 
extremists", or neutral connotations, such as "Sunni nations/ Muslims". The 
association of Sunni (157:957) with Saudis triggers negative representations, except in 
two tweets. This negative depiction is manifested through the premodification of 
Sunni in complex phrases, such as "Sunni Wahhabi", "Wahhabist Sunnis", "Sunni 
Islamists", "Sunni flagbearers" and "Sunni fanatic", all of which place Saudis on a 
scale of an extreme form of Islam. In addition, when Sunni co-occurs with Saudis 
(82:155), it serves to promote two main points, to condemn the Saudis for joining the 






   
 
 
Exactly It is ironical that UN made Sunni fanatic Saudis as 
Human rights chief UN has lost its credibility long ago  
Really? What about the Sunni flag bearer Saudis? 
According to Dunn (2001), negative constructions of Muslims, such as "fanatics", 
have been widely circulated in Western media, along with "fundamentalists", 
"intolerant" and "militants", and these constructions have "had centuries of 





maintain "durability" through repetition, and that "[in] a sedimentary-like process the 
reinscription of social constructions (Muslims as fanatical...) can come to be widely 
accepted as unproblematic, and as a natural given" (p. 292). Given that Saudis are also 
constructed as "fanatical", "extremists" and "terror spreading" in tweets can be linked 
to their negative 'repeated' constructions in the media. These negative stereotypes are 
consequently reintroduced on Twitter.                     
               However, among 82 tweets which negatively conflate Saudis with Sunni, 
there is one tweet that carries a positive representation. This is a Saudi tweet, referring 
to a collaged image and encapsulating different photos of Saudi scouts and officers 











The tweet comments on this image by asserting the reality of the Saudi identity as 
authentic Muslim and Sunni (helpful and compassionate to others). The tweet uses 
images from the Hajj season with Saudi officers and scouts helping elderly pilgrims 
and children and organising the flow of pilgrims while performing their rituals. The 
tweet uses these collaged images to postulate a true image of Saudis (in parentheses) 
and refer to their religious identity as Muslim and Sunnis to stress their reality as 
compassionate and kind. This tweet, through interdiscursivity, represents Saudis 
positively through these images and highlights their religious identity as Muslim and 
Sunni to argue against negative portrayals associated with both terms. This tweet 
forms a counter-discourse (Causse, 2006) which defies existing negative depictions of 
Saudis regarding the stampede.   
             As for agency, a transitivity analysis reveals that Sunnis (plural form) are 
assigned passive roles and represented as victims of the Saudis in 20 tweets. In this 
case, tweets seem to recognise Sunnis as a different group who are being exploited by 
the Saudis. This includes material processes (11 tweets) such as "radicalised", "laid 
back", "criticize" and "fight", which suggests that there are other Sunni groups who 




   
                Its war on Sunnis by Wahhabi Saudis. 
                Shame on Saudis too for radicalizing the Sunnis! 
                                           
In these examples, tweets present Sunnis as a different group who are being exploited 
by Saudis, though both belong to nominally the same doctrine. In this respect, Sunnis 
are represented as an ‘other’ (victimised) group, whereas the Saudis are a negative 





5.2.5. Rich but filthy: Saudis and oil 
Another topic highlighted in the FCT relates Saudis to oil; oil is among the top 
hundred keywords (836:4,032), and a collocate of Saudis (374:534). Oil represents a 
historical bond with Saudis, since Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s largest oil 
reservoirs, possessing 18 per cent of the world’s oil (OPEC, 2019). 
           Examining the concordance of oil shows that tweets focus on two main points: 
how the possession of oil empowers Saudis, and their manipulation of oil prices 
which is often referred to as a "war of oil prices". Further concordance analysis of oil 
revealed some consistent collocates of Saudis, such as "prices" (178 tweets), "war" 
(51 tweets), "market" (47 tweets), "winning" (47 tweets), "shale" (44 tweets), 
"money" (31 tweets), "cheap" (24 tweets) and "want" (23 tweets).  
             The first point which connects oil with Saudis concerns their exploitation of 
oil to maintain their power: tweets assume that oil allows Saudis to control the West 
and support ISIS and AlQaeda. For instance, tweets argue that possessing oil entitles 
Saudis to maintain their violent actions and provides them with immunity (by the 







     
 
Saudis will enslave them & abuse them they will have no rights it 
is Totalitarian regime accepted by WEST b/c of oil  
Saudis behead = oh no we didn't see that. Where's all the cheap 
oil at? 
why is the US / Canada allied with the fundamentalist Salafist  
Saudis, when they are so unapologetically oppressive? Oil alone? 
 
In these examples, the tweets present Saudis negatively by associating them with 





Saudis "enslave" and "abuse" Syrian refugees and deprive them of their rights (if they 
take them in), as well as behead people unlawfully. However, Saudis are not 
condemned or charged by the West because they have oil. Tweets deploy negative 
predicates, such as "Totalitarian regime", "fundamentalist Salafist" or 
"unapologetically oppressive", as a negative other-presentation strategy (van Dijk, 
1999) to highlight the negative qualities of Saudis and, consequently, represent them 
as a vile, other group who exploit oil to act against others.  
            Gaining power with oil is also linked to terrorism, through backing ISIS (20 
tweets) and AlQaeda (two tweets). In this respect, Saudis are represented as funding 
and supporting both ISIS and AlQaeda without being condemned or held responsible 
due to their possession of oil. Oil, as perceived in the tweets, confers power and 
immunity on the Saudis at the expense of others’ security and safety through funding 







     
 
No one seems to care that the Saudis fund ISIS and AlQaeda  
because oil and the arms industry are more important  
Read between the lines. It's the Saudis who are bankrolling ISIS.  
You know, our oil rich chums - mustn't cross them!   
Saudi also arms ISIS & Al Qaeda & is fuelling war in Syria. Our 
oil dollars help fund these groups          
 
Possessing oil is another way that tweets use to associate Saudis with terrorism and 
supporting terrorist groups. This issue posits Saudis as a source of insecurity and 
danger stemming from their financial support of terrorist groups and postulates 
Saudis’ possession of oil as hazardous and threatening. Tweets also suggest a 





supporting ISIS and AlQaeda, arms deals and "fuelling" the war in Syria, which are 
ignored by the West because of oil.          
             The second point which connects Saudis with oil is the manipulation of oil 
prices (180 tweets) – conflating oil prices with Saudis centres mostly on their control 
over "oil prices" and how this serves to maintain (in some cases reduce) their power 
and control. Lowering the price of oil is also labelled as a war launched by the Saudis: 
out of 75 tweets about the oil war, 27 refer to "war on oil prices". Other tweets (42) 
include "winning" as a material process in which Saudis are active agents and winners 
of the oil battle. Saudis are also depicted as "winning" (42 tweets) and "expanding" (4 
tweets) their war on "shale oil price(s)" and represented as active agents in 52 tweets. 
This manipulation of oil prices is manifested through material processes, such as 
"cutting, "tweak", "jawbone", "drop", "drive down" and "lower", which signify 






     
Example 114 
 
Saudis Expand Oil Price War -  #GoogleAlerts 
The Saudis are winning their war on shale oil, though at a 
massive cost to their foreign reserves.  
Saudis tweak crude prices lower in a move that could set up a  
shaky week for crude and refined products in the U.S. 
The Saudis were supposedly retaliating against the Russkis by  
flooding the market w/ oil 2 drive the price down 
 
 
Controlling oil prices is portrayed by tweets as threatening, such as describing it as a 
"war" (examples 111 and 112). Lowering the price of oil is deemed by tweets to be 
deliberate and cunning, as it will lead to affecting crude oil and other production 
companies in the US and other countries (example 113). In example 114, however, 





Russians by offering oil in excessive amounts to lower oil prices. Using a water 
metaphor, "flooding", as in examples 52 and 53, involves an evaluative strategy with 
a topos of threat and danger (Hart, 2008), which depict Saudis as a manipulative out-
group.    
             However, in representing Saudis with oil, tweets also deploy nomination 
strategies which dehumanise them, serving a negative discourse prosody of 
insignificance and unworthiness. Tweets use negative terms to link Saudis negatively 
with oil possession, such as referring to Saudis as "those pigs", "fracking", 
"backward", "pig-ignorant", "stupid", "the despicable". In addition, other 
predicational strategies depict Saudis as insignificant and only having value because 
of oil, such as "nomads", "Bedouins" (bedwins), as well as lacking human rights and 











Why, why won't the world boycott the despicable Saudis? All for  
oil? 
We wouldn't give these backward, pig-ignorant Saudis house 
room if they didn't have oil. 
I disagree. Yemenis have always been Yemenis. Saudis were  
nomads and bedouins b4 oil. Hold on am trying to find u  
something  
Human rights protection depends on those who promote human 
rights, Saudis have nothing to offer except oil, terrorism 
 
 
In these examples, tweets deploy discursive strategies to present Saudis in association 
with oil. These strategies include nomination strategies which represent Saudis in 
terms of intolerance, such as "despicable", and barbarism, such as "backward", "pig-
ignorant", and predication strategies to link them with primitivity, such as "nomads" 
and "bedouins". Although "nomads" and "bedouins" are not negative in their 





tweet in example 117 argues against another tweet which compares Saudis to 
Yemenis. The tweet asserts that Yemenis have a long history in civilisation, whereas 
the Saudis were nomads until they discovered oil, and thus presents Saudis as 
‘nouveau riche’. In example 118, the tweet condemns allowing the Saudis into the 
UNHRC and claims that they do not endorse human rights, but instead offer oil and 
terrorism. The tweet here recontextualises this issue through disqualifying the Saudis 
for an absence of human rights and connecting them with terrorism to oppose 
allowing the Saudis into the UNHRC.  
5.3. Summary and Discussion 
The aim of this chapter was to answer RQ-1 How are Saudis represented across the 
five corpora? This chapter has also focused on discussing the main keywords that are 
common in the FCT, using keywords and concordance analyses. These keywords 
have been categorised into themes adapted from the main categories in Chapter 4.  
             The dominant themes about Saudis in the FCT that resulted from keyword 
and concordance analyses are highly interrelated, resulting in a hegemonic, blunt 
Saudiphobic discourse on Twitter which revolves around one central topic: Saudis are 
a threat. This interrelation of themes in the FCT serves two objectives. First, tweets 
reinstate existing negative stereotypes of Saudis through associating past events, such 
as their involvement in the 9/11 attacks. Second, tweets warn against (foreseen) 
threats to Western societies, such as allowing the Saudis into the UNHRC, and their 
plans to build mosques for refugees in Europe, which are alleged to breed terrorists. 
More specifically, tweets depict Saudis as follows: 
• Terrorists: adopting a radical ideology, funding terrorism, terrorist groups and 





• Violent: crucifying and beheading people, sexually abusing women, 
committing war crimes against innocents 
• Sexist: oppressing women and treating other Muslim groups with racist 
attitudes 
            These negative depictions did not originate in a political or societal vacuum: 
many of these depictions are echoed in existing Western media representations of 
Muslims. Törnberga & Törnberga (2016) state that “Muslims are frequently 
represented as fundamentalist, terrorist, sexist, militant, undemocratic, violent and 
fanatical” (p. 140). In studies on the representation of Islam and Muslims in the press 
after the 11th of September attacks, "Islamist", "terrorist", "extremist" and "fanatic" 
were found to collocate with Muslims (Hussain & Sherif, 2014; Massey & Tatla, 
2016; Moore et al., 2008). Similarly, in associating Islam with Saudis in the FCT, 
these extremist terms are reintroduced on Twitter, echoing perhaps a similar, 
xenophobic discourse about Saudis as Muslims and as embracers of Islam, pointing to 
“what the press sees as a problem: radical Islam” (McEnery et al., 2015, p. 245). The 
term "fanatic", for instance, exists across the corpora in different forms: "fanatics", 
"fanatical" and "fanaticism". Tweets use these terms, along with "Sunni", "Wahhabi" 
and "extremist", to connect Saudis to extreme (dangerous) beliefs which are alarming 
and threatening to Western societies (Ekman, 2015).  
            Similarly, representing refugees and immigrants as a problem for the West has 
been highlighted in media research (Baker et al., 2008; Baker & McEnery, 2005; 
Gabrielatos & Baker, 2008; KhosraviNik, 2009, 2010b; Moore et al., 2008). Refugees 
and immigrants are represented as problematic and a national threat/ danger to the 
West (KhosraviNik, 2009; Pickering, 2008). Tweets’ perceptions of refugees seem to 





represented as problematic and threatening to the West when associated with 
mosques. Saudis are represented as a source of threat via their alleged plans to build 
mosques for Syrian refugees in Europe. This issue is seen as an alarming act by tweets 
which assume that these mosques can be production places (factories) to breed 
terrorists.  
            I would, hence, argue for a cumulative effect of (mass) media promoting a 
Saudiphobic discourse and negative stereotypes of Saudis on Twitter since, and 
perhaps prior to, the 9/11 attacks in 2001, for the following reasons: 
• Negative reporting of the Saudis’ role in the wars in Yemen and Syria   
• Stressing the Saudis’ responsibility for the 9/11 attacks  
• Associating the Saudis with the refugee crisis, which is already problematic 
in media studies 
These negative stereotypes of Saudis in the media can be attributed to earlier 
Orientalist representations of Arabs and Muslims which focused on othering the Arab 
world (Altwaiji, 2014). According to Abdulhadi, Alsultany, and Naber (2011), 
various forms of anti-Muslim and anti-Arab (historical) racism:  
[A]re constituted by a racialized, Orientalist mind-set that constructs Arabs 
and Muslims as enemies of the “West.” Such [a] mind-set is but a continuation 
of centuries of Orientalism, or what Edward Said defines as the assumption of 
a “basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate 
theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts concerning 
the Orient, its people, customs, ‘mind,’ destiny, and so on” that facilitate 





imaginary … Christian concepts of culture or civilization exclude Islam (and 
other religious beliefs) and enable the construction of Arabs and Muslims as 
backward, barbaric, misogynist, sexually savage, and sexually repressive. (p. 
xxiii)  
These negative stereotypes have found their way into mainstream media that 
normalise a prototypical imagery of Arabs and Muslims as evil terrorists, sometimes 
driven by political and personal agendas. Moviemakers, for instance, are willing to 
perpetuate hate and “continue to indict Arabs on movie screens for as long as unjust 
images are tolerated” (Shaheen, 2003, p. 189). Consequently, media consumers are 
likely to be exposed to recurring negative stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims (as well 
as others), which can ultimately shape their conception and ideologies of others, and 
eventually their acceptance and tolerance of others. 
            What is alarming is that promoting such xenophobic discourse and adverse 
stereotypes can lead to fuelling Saudiphobia and racism against Saudis (as in 
examples 88, 97, 99). As Ekman (2015) states, Islamophobic discourse can lead to 
“street politics and the use of violence … The politics of fear manufactured by [online 
Islamophobic discourse] is reflected in the increasing use of violence against 
European Muslims” (p. 1998). In fact, this negative typology of Saudis and Muslims 
in the media can incite offline violent attitudes and hate crimes. As mentioned earlier, 
in Chapter 1, several hate and religious-motivated crimes have been committed 
against Saudis in Europe, America and Australia. For instance, the murder of the 
Saudi student Nahid Almanea in 2014 in Colchester, Essex was reported by the 
British police to be a possible religious hate crime. Duggan (2014) quotes the police, 
stating that Nahid’s “distinctive clothing is a key line of inquiry and contributed to the 





and promoting negative stereotypes in media outlets can result in aggressive and 
serious actions being applied against the negatively-presented group (see section 
2.4.4.2), such as in the following tweet which resents the Saudis’ plan to build 
mosques for refugees instead of taking them in, threatening ultimately to "burn them 





Saudis are offering to build 200 mosques in Germany.  No 
wonder they're not taking refugees.  If it were up to me i'd burn 
them all down 
 
           In fact, media involvement in the representations of Saudis on Twitter is 
expressed by a tweet in which the tweeter’s prejudiced stance against Saudis is 
prompted not by what the s/he has experienced, but rather by what has been presented 
through the media: 
 
         Example 120    









Chapter 6. The discursive strategies used in representing Saudis in the FCT 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to answer RQ-3 What discursive strategies are employed by tweets 
in the representation of Saudis? by exploring the collocates of Saudis in the FCT. To 
do this, I utilised the same tool used for Keywords, i.e. WordSmith. However, 
WordSmith generated thousands of collocates (6,677), most of which were function 
words so numerous and varied in their patterns, and cotext dependent, that, 
individually, each could present thousands of potential avenues of investigation. 
Understanding and analysing collocates well requires extensive analysis of their 
concordance lines so that their context and cotext can be taken into careful 
consideration. Thus, to undertake a manageable and systematic analysis, only the top 
20 lexical collocates are investigated. 
           The analysis includes lexical patterns that tend to collocate with Saudis, as 
opposed to keywords that are prominent due to comparisons between the five corpora. 
However, some of these collocates have already been discussed in the previous 
chapter (e.g. Yemen, terrorist, bomb), as they were part of the top keyword categories 
in the FCT. Also, the collocates list included different forms of the same lemma, such 
as bomb, bombing, bombed, bombs, which were examined during the keywords 
analysis stage. However, upon further inspection of these words through collocation, I 
found out that they associated similar themes generated through keywords analysis 
and consequently triangulated the findings in Chapter 5. Hence, and to avoid 
repetition, only words not addressed in the previous chapter are examined here.  
            Collocates are calculated within a span of ±5 left and right of the node, as 





likelihood (LL) and Mutual Information (MI) measures are also used in assessing the 
strength of the collocates (see Section 3.4.4). The resulting collocates are examined 
and then categorised based on their cotext meanings. These collocates are represented 
in Table 6-1, below:10   
 






Mental think, know, love, hate  
Material helping, get, make, treat 
Relational are 
Attributive predicates  friends, allies, rich, wealthy 
Modality  should, can, must 
Quantifiers  many, some, most 
Other  women 
Table 6-1: Top 20 lexical collocates of Saudis in the FCT 
 
Examining Table 6-1 shows that the process and attributive predicate categories 
contain the highest numbers of collocates of Saudis. These processes refer to 
collocates involving transitivity, such as verbs, in which Saudis are assigned 
grammatical roles (as participants), such as mental, e.g. think, love, material, e.g. get, 
helping, and relational processes, e.g. are. The attributive predicates category contains 
collocates that are either attributive, occurring to the left of the node (e.g. wealthy 
Saudis), or predicative, occurring to the right after a copula verb (e.g. Saudis are rich). 
Addressing these collocates is carried out in two ways: first, colligation analysis 
(Section 6.2) can be helpful particularly in the investigation of the roles that Saudis 
 





tend to play as social actors. Second, collocations, in which the remaining three 
categories, Modality, Quantifiers, and Other, which include lexical collocates with 
Saudis, are analysed in detail in Section 6.3.   
6.2. Lexical colligation: Transitivity and verb processes 
One way to address RQ-3 is by examining the grammatical features in which tweets 
represent Saudis as participants. Through colligation, the parts of speech in which 
Saudis are assigned grammatical roles are investigated; this facilitates locating how 
Saudis are represented through different grammatical patterns using transitivity 
analysis. Transitivity can also offer important insights into the different ways in which 
tweets represent Saudis, as well as the grammatical roles in which they act as 
participants. One of the grammatical categories is verb processes in which Saudis 
function as the objects of verbs: these include the following processes: mental, such as 
think, know, love, hate, and material, such as support, helping, give. Saudis also 
function in subject positions, in relational processes, such as (be) are, and material 
processes, such as get, make, treat. In relational processes, the verb are functions as 
either an auxiliary (or equative) expressing verb processes, e.g. "Saudis are killing", 
or an attributive process, e.g. "Saudis are barbaric". The following subsections 
conduct a transitivity analysis of verb processes (sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2) and 
predicative adjectives (Section 6.2.3).  
6.2.1. Saudis as objects in verb processes 
In mental processes where Saudis are the object of a process (verb), tweets deploy 
their senses to represent or reflect upon Saudis, exemplified by the cognitive 
processes think (252 tweets) and know (280 tweets), as well as the emotive hate (96 





discursive strategy of perspectivisation, a strategy which, according to Wodak 
(2009a), allows “speakers [to] express their involvement in the discourse, and position 
their point of view in the reporting, description, narration or quotation of relevant 
events or utterances” (p. 42). Using think and know enables users to position 
themselves in relation to Saudis’ performance. It can also reveal the type of 
knowledge and/or appraisal that tweets share or intend to share with others about 
Saudis. Whereas hate and love are emotive processes used to express emotions and 
strong sentiments (see Figure 6-1).  
 
 
                                                            
Figure 6-1: Concordance of think, know, love, hate 
 
 
              The processes of both think (252:3.25)11 and know (280:3.43) are significant 
as they present users' opinions and estimated knowledge and, consequently, the 
representation of Saudis in the FCT. Tweets use the verb think with Saudis mainly to 
discuss the themes of war, terror and violence (60 tweets), and immorality and 
corruption (183 tweets), whereas nine tweets carry positive meanings. The sensors in 
 
11 The collocation value is represented by the notation (frequency: MI score) and will henceforth be 





mental processes are personal pronouns, such as “I” (113 tweets), “we” (25 tweets) 
and “you” (59 tweets), the latter suggesting a conversational thread. By using the 
process think, tweets deploy the strategy of perspectivisation which is realised by 
deixis (I, we, you), as it positions the users' point of view through the expression of 
involvement, e.g. “I think Saudis are barbaric”, “you think Saudis are Wahhabi”. 
Other tweets also express others’ involvement by quoting other social actors, such as 
“HMG thinking Saudis are allies” and “Bernie Sanders thinks the Saudis should kill 
more”.  
            Similarly, tweets use the process know to link Saudis to war, violence and 
terrorism (71 tweets), and immorality and corruption (209 tweets). Through the 
process think, tweets also deploy a strategy of perspectivisation realised by the deixis 
of involvement "I" (90 tweets), e.g. "I know Saudis are not innocent", and “you” (50 
tweets), e.g. "you know the Saudis are never guilty", as well as the passive voice 
"Saudis are known" (20 tweets), e.g. "Saudis are known to be medieval". The resulting 




















hijacked Islam, benefit from war 
(Yemen), did it (Yemen war), not 
taking Syrian refugees, can’t win 
Syrian war, brutally attacking Yemen, 
kill innocents, kill more people, 
holding international probe (Yemen 
war) 
 






supporting Wahhabism/Salafism, like 
ISIS, Wahhabis cult, promote ISIS, 
carryout barbarism, despicably 
barbaric, financing 200 mosques in 
Germany, alliance with ISIS, adopting 
terrorist refugees, barbaric, danger to 
Islam, uphold human rights, cause Hajj 
problem 
fund ISIS/AlQaeda, paid/trained Bin 
Laden, death to us all, fund terror 
groups, racist to their own kind, funding 
9/11, choppers, mistreating their maids, 
fund rebels, medieval beasts, Islamising 
Europe, mistreat foreign workers, not 
counselling rape victims, inhumane 







most evil people on earth, allies, 
bribing (arm deals), too lazy to lift 
cranes, lying about refugees, behead 
UN, owning UNHRC, owning Twitter 
stake, inhuman, diplomatic immune 
 
never guilty, overwhelmed with burning 
issues, cryptic Jews, don’t revere white 
people, compulsive liars, paid their way 
to Human Rights panel, ignorant, not 
caring, dealing in blood money 
Table 6-2: Predicative attributes of Saudis with the collocates think and know 
   
In Table 6-2 above, the predicative strategies triggered by the verbs think and know 
are mostly negative. Both verbs associate Saudis with issues of war (e.g. killing 
innocents and targeting civilians), terrorism and violence (e.g. promoting ISIS, 
funding 9/11, Islamising Europe, barbaric) and immorality and corruption (e.g. 









When I think Saudis I will remember all the days and nights they  
brutally attacked Yemens people this year destroying everything.! 
Everyone knows Saudis fund ISIS. So why Muslim-hatred 
instead, cause no one can criticize Saudis, not even media.  
I think the Saudis are the most evil people on earth. I'm pretty 
sure they knew about, financed, and helped plan 9/11. 






Through the mental processes of both think and know, tweets reflect on the ways in 
which they perceive Saudis according to some pre-existing or acquired knowledge. In 
other words, tweets use think and know to assert certain information or qualities that 
Saudis are alleged to possess, such as "brutally" destroying Yemen, funding ISIS, 
being the evilest people on earth, planning 9/11 and being non-deserving of any 
sympathy. Tweets deploy an ‘other’ negative presentation, which reinforces negative 
stances and perceptions of Saudis. In example 121, for instance, the tweet stresses the 
Saudis' brutality in Yemen as a 'constant' portrayal in the user's opinion. In example 
122, the tweet blames the Saudis for initiating hatred towards Muslims. It also affirms 
global knowledge that Saudis fund ISIS to argue that Saudis should be the subject of 
hatred, not Muslims. The tweet here constructs Muslims as a separate group who 
suffer hate crimes initiated by the Saudis. It also depicts Saudis as a vile and powerful 
group, protected against any criticism, even from the media. In the last example (124), 
the tweet argues that any further knowledge of the Saudis triggers only 
‘unsympathetic’ feelings towards them. Such negative perceptions can be alarming if 
they are acted on or practised offline. Patton, Pyrooz, Decker, Frey, and Leonard 
(2019) state that profound "evidence suggests that social media can exacerbate 
tensions among [users] that ultimately lead to violence" (p. 205). According to Awan 
(2014, p. 134), if online cyberhate and Islamophobic discourse are promoted and not 
confronted in social media, they can "lead to an escalation of online abuse and the 
normalization of such behavior, including physical attacks". For the victims of anti-
Muslim hostility, it is "often difficult to isolate the online threats from the 
intimidation, violence and abuse that they suffer offline" (Awan & Zempi, 2016, p. 1). 
             There are a few tweets, however, which carry positive sentiments, nine with 





destabilising the region (example 125) and exploiting pilgrims’ money (example 126), 





     
 
she definitely knows the Saudis play an important role in keeping  
the region safe. 
it's for the holy mosque expansion. Do u seriously think that 
Saudis are doing this for the money?! Be fair once, for god sake 
 
Using both the mental processes in the examples above serves to fortify positive 
stances towards Saudis by challenging the negative perspectives of other tweets. 
However, the overall collocation of think and know with Saudis tends to have a 
negative discourse prosody, linking their knowledge and perception of Saudis to 
similar negative depictions recurring in Chapter 5. What tweeters think (96%) and 
know (97%) about Saudis mainly portrays them adversely, echoing themes of war 
crimes, terrorism support and abuse of wealth and power.  
             The emotive processes love and hate carry similar representations of think and 
know. Both verbs concern the expression of emotions and strong sentiments, and 
although both processes present juxtaposed sentiments and feelings, when collocating 
Saudis, both processes exhibit similar sentiments, i.e. extreme negative feelings 
towards Saudis. Examining the concordance of love (136:3.64) shows that tweets do 
not only express sentiments which they like about Saudis (19 tweets), but also use 
love to postulate negative stances (57 tweets). When used in a positive sense, tweets 
express love towards Saudis themselves or to some external qualities they possess, 
such as their accent and their blogs. In fact, these are to Arab tweets, mainly from 








     
 
What is your impression on Saudis? — I love their accent!! And            
they're the nicest people, love them!...  
I really love Saudis' blogs on Tumblr 
 
Alternatively, 75 per cent of the tweets tend to use love to refer to Saudis negatively, 
by disapproving and questioning others’ love for them and countering their (Saudis’) 
terrorism, violence, Al-Nimr crucifixion, wealth and oil. Love, in this sense, is ironic 
and is used by tweets to mock either aligning with the Saudis or turning a blind eye to 









OK, I'm appalled: where is the outcry? Oh yeah, we love the 
Saudis – they have oil. 
Love the Saudis."@BostonGlobe: Saudi national who attended   
college in Indiana allegedly used lewd pictures to blackmail 
Danvers teenager 
leftist liberals love Saudis. Obama bows down to them. I don't 
have a problem wiping them out. 
       
In example 129, the tweet uses love in a sarcastic manner to intertextually associate 
Saudis with the crucifixion of Al-Nimr. The tweet mocks the US government for its 
silence over the crucifixion of Al-Nimr, as in "where is the outcry", and uses the 
process of love mockingly. Love serves to support the tweet’s negative stance, which 
also links Saudis with oil. The tweet uses the deictic "we" to stress collective 
involvement and position the user's negative viewpoint vis-à-vis Saudis, which entails 
an ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ discourse (van Dijk, 1997). The tweet negatively associates 
Saudis with the US through the process of love to condemn the US’ silence over 
crucifying Al-Nimr, thus rendering the current context of love material and false, 





to an incident reported by the Boston Globe12 account about a Saudi student alleged to 
have blackmailed a teenager through sexual pictures. The tweet implements irony 
through the process of love which is challenged in relation to the reported incident. 
However, condemning love for Saudis can also trigger resentful discourse, as in 
example 131. The tweet condemns "leftist liberals" (as well as Obama) for loving the 
Saudis and reacts accordingly with a bigoted utterance which expresses a willingness, 
"I don’t have a problem", to destroy the Saudis, "wiping them out". This tweet is an 
example of an online negative-other presentation, promoting hate discourse and 
negative stereotypes of Saudis on Twitter.     
            Love also carries negative discourse prosody which suggests conspiracy and 
wickedness of those who love the Saudis. In this respect, tweets use deictic "you" and 
"they" to refer to other social actors to show distance and involvement, constructing 
both others and the Saudis as separate, yet similar, groups. More specifically, using 
deixis with the process of love contribute towards what van Dijk calls negative-other 
presentation (1997, p. 36). Tweets challenge others’ love (e.g. the Bush family’s) for 
the Saudis to emphasise and highlight some negative qualities about them, such as 






you love Saudis...beheading, stoning, whiplashing is very 
sensible... 
I think Americas had enough of the Bush family...weird how they 
love the Saudis but all others a threat? 
 
 





In example (132), the tweet addresses another user using the second person pronoun 
"you", highlighting a discrepancy and constructing this user as another deviant group. 
Loving the Saudis is also attested to by the tweet as something to be rejected and 
unacceptable, supported by predicative attributes that link Saudis to terror and 
violence, such as "beheading", "stoning" and "whiplashing". Similarly, in example 
133, the tweet condemns the relationship of the Bush family with the Saudis. The 
tweet uses the personal pronoun "I" and the mental process think as a 
perspectivisation strategy, which enables the user to express involvement and point of 
view. The tweet refers to both America and the Bush family as two separate entities, 
representing America as being affected by the Bush family, e.g. "had enough of"’. 
The Bush family is, thus, represented as an out-group which puts America at risk, 
supported by the tweet’s claim "weird how they love the Saudis". The tweet 
condemns the Bush family for demonising others while loving the Saudis who 
constitute a real threat to national security. In both examples, tweets construct Saudis 
and those who love them as an out-group through a negative-other presentation 
strategy, which emphasises what is negative about the Saudis to criticise those who 
love them.  
             The last mental (emotive) process is hate (73:3.69), via which tweets link 
their sentiments regarding Saudis being rich, the Hajj stampede, the war in Yemen, 
violence and hating Saudis for no reason. Expressing hate is delivered through deictic 
"I" (34 tweets), "we" (two tweets) and "you" (four tweets), or through other social 
actors, such as "Iran", "Africans" and "Shia". For example:    









this is a regular event. Ugh I hate the Saudis so much I get mad 
just talking about it           
Iran and the Shia have always hated the Saudis for some reasons. 
I need to add to my bio: I hate Saudis.          
 
 
             Examining the context of hate shows that tweets use this collocate to express 
feelings of dislike and resentment aroused by tweets reporting on the victims of the 
stampede, the war in Yemen, or expressing hatred towards Saudis for unspecified 
reasons. There are tweets, however, in which hating Saudis is exaggerated through an 
intensification strategy, using intensifying words such as "fucking", and expressions 






I fucking hate Saudis...why don't they just stay in their damn  
country...                                          
I fucking hate stupid Saudis so much it actually hurts .. 
Both tweets above use the process of hate to express hatred for Saudis, which is also 
amplified by the intensifier "fucking". These tweets are not part of any conversational 
threads, replies or comments, suggesting perhaps a racist discourse based on 
unacceptance and rejection. Using both perspectivisation and intensification strategies 
enables tweets to position Saudis as a deviant, hateful and intolerable group. In fact, 
according to Oboler (2014), hate content can go viral in aggregate with social media 
platforms, which can lead to not merely spreading hate but also virtually normalising 
it. Expressing hate for Saudis on Twitter can also be expressed in everyday life, and 
this can result in “problems of intimidation, exclusion, and ultimately violence 





             As with the material process of GIVE (142:3.34), Saudis are depicted as the 
primary recipients/ beneficiaries of these actions. Examining the concordance of GIVE 
shows negative presentations of Saudis that associate them with war, terror and 
corruption. For instance, tweets oppose giving Saudis a free pass in the Yemen war, 
and unlawfully giving them a UNHRC seat. As recipients of the process, Saudis are 
represented as beneficiaries who are given: a "(free) pass" in Yemen, "a face", 
"credit", an "HR chair", a "greenlight", "sovereign immunity" and a "blank check". 
These attributes are linked to recurrent themes in the FCT, such as the war in Yemen, 
the 9/11 attacks and joining the UNHRC, which render their meaning negative. Saudis 
are also assigned negative roles as beneficiaries: tweets suggest that they are aided by 
other social actors (the US, for instance) to ignore rules and act recklessly. Tweets 
condemn giving Saudis a "pass" in the war in Yemen, the weapons with which they 
kill Yemenis and bomb weddings, immunity against lawsuits by 9/11 victims’ 









The courts gave the Saudis sovereign immunity a couple days 
ago, regarding 9-11.          
What were the UN thinking, giving the Saudis the chair of a 
human rights panel?                                                                     
We wouldn't give these backward, pig-ignorant Saudis house 
room they didn't have oil. 
 
The process GIVE also entails negative depictions of Saudis through the interrelation 
of themes already highlighted in the FCT. For example, tweets condemn the US 
courts for rejecting lawsuits by victims’ families of the 9/11 attacks, using the phrase 
"sovereign immunity”, which implies a conspiracy and deception between the US 





UNHRC for giving the Saudis a seat on the Council, implying contempt and rejection. 
In example 140, the tweet uses deictic "we" to collectively express involvement and 
discreet responsibility for "allowing Saudis house room", a reference to the US’ 
alliance with the Saudis. This expression indicates a bigoted and racist discourse 
towards the Saudis, supported by nomination strategies which refer to Saudis as 
"backward" and "pig-ignorant", i.e. extremely ignorant and uneducated, only 
possessing oil. This negative depiction is detected in Western media representations 
of Muslims, who are presented as "‘liar[s]’, ‘ignorant[s]’ and ‘arrogant[s]’", which 
manifest stereotypes "that exemplify [a] negative attitude towards Islam and 
Muslims" (Yusha’u, 2015, p. 184). 
6.2.2. Saudis as subjects in verb processes  
In addition to functioning as objects/beneficiaries in verb processes, Saudis are also 
represented as agents (actors) in the following processes: relational, e.g. are; material, 
e.g. get, make, treat; and Mental, e.g. think. Examining how Saudis function as agents 
in different verb processes can facilitate locating the discursive strategies that tweets 
tend to associate with the Saudis in the FCT. The verb be, represented by the 
indicative plural form are, can function in two different processes: as a helping verb 
with the present participle in a material process, and as linking verb preceding a 
subject complement in a relational process (see Section 6.2.2).  
           The function word are ranks among the top keywords and is one of the 
strongest collocates of Saudis (3,255:3.65) in the FCT. Though function 
(grammatical) words are sometimes overlooked in corpus analysis, Pearce (2014) 





[O]ffer insights into the representation of ideology … political meanings and 
values which might not have been accessible if … only the apparently 
semantically “richer” lexical words had been considered. The fact that much 
CDA work is concerned with exploring aspects of discourse which are not 
immediately obvious to the casual reader (thus rendering their effects more 
powerful ideologically) means that function words must be worth 
considering in corpus-assisted critical discourse analysis. (p. 24)  
One of the most commonly recurring patterns with are is the cluster “Saudis are” 
(2,020 tweets). This pattern is significant as it functions in both material and relational 
processes: in material processes, tweets refer to actions carried out by Saudis, e.g. 
"Saudis are killing", whereas in relational processes, they assign them certain 
attributes or qualities, such as "Saudis are awful". Hence, the "Saudis are" cluster can 
locate some significant patterns that serve to unveil some of the discursive strategies 
which tweets deploy in representing Saudis (Figure 6-2). 
 
 






In material processes, Saudis are represented as active agents, indicated by the frame 
"Saudis are", and verbs in the present continuous form, which indicate ongoing or 
unfinished actions. Saudis are depicted as being involved in continuous actions related 
to recurring themes in the FCT, such as the war in Yemen (153 tweets) and in Syria 
(53 tweets), terrorism (80 tweets), joining the UNHRC (82 tweets), oil (72 tweets), 
Hajj stampede (44 tweets), refugee crisis (32 tweets), crucifying Al-Nimr (32 tweets) 
and corruption (22 tweets). These processes also reinforce a blunt racist discourse and 
brutal images of Saudis in the FCT, such as inhumanity, cruelty and wickedness. 
Table 6-3, below, presents examples of verbs with the 'Saudis are v-ing' frame.  
 
 Topic  Processes (v-ing) 
 
War in Yemen  
destroying, targeting, bombing, killing, inflicting, 
annihilating, starving, raiding, torching, butchering, doing, 
wiping out, copping, pushing 
War in Syria bombing, fighting, supplying, shooting, funding, paying 
Terrorism  supporting, funding, terrorising, bankrolling, offering, 
sponsoring, sending, backing, financing  
Al-Nimr crucifixion  crucifying, going to, planning, getting ready to, executing  
Assigned to UNHRC running, heading, chairing, leading 
Refugee crisis taking, refusing, hosting, lying, offering, ignoring 
Violence  doing, pulling, demanding, doing, trembling, throwing, 
turning, going to, shielding, causing 
Hajj stampede blaming, doing, bulldozing, denying, facing, trying  
Oil winning, driving, dumping, keeping, panicking, flooding 
Table 6-3: Verb processes with the frame Saudis are v-ing  
 
Table 6-3 above shows examples of verb processes that collocate Saudis with the 
“Saudis are -ing” frame. In fact, the lexical choices, verb tenses and active (agentive) 
roles that Saudis occupy contribute towards establishing another adverse portrayal 
echoed by common themes in the FCT. For instance, the contribution of Saudis in the 





destroys infrastructure in Yemen, added to (blind) airstrikes which cause deaths 
among women and children. Allocating agency to Saudis also amplifies the severity 
of their role as one that is deliberate, ruthless and destructive, given that the victims of 
these material processes are not powerful objects but innocent people, such as women 
and children. Similarly, the war in Syria conveys a threatening image of Saudis that 
links them to supporting terrorism and terrorist groups, as well as backing several 
proxy wars in Syria. In fact, constructing Saudis as a threatening source is highlighted 
through a problematised issue, i.e. the refugee crisis. Tweets claim that the Saudis did 
not take in any refugees and at the same time offered to build mosques for them in 
Germany (see Section 5.2.1.2). This issue is speculated by tweets as alarming and 
threatening, since, as tweets claim, building mosques means harbouring the 
"Wahhabi", which will transform refugees into terrorists. In fact, linking refugees 
with terrorism is spotted in several studies in which the media present them as 
invaders and an intimidating other who threatens national security (Hynie, 2018; 
KhosraviNik, 2010b; Laney, Lenette, Kellett, Smedley, & Karan, 2016; Parker, 2015). 
On Twitter, however, Saudis are depicted not only as foreseeing the alleged threats 
caused by Syrian refugees, but also as contributors sustaining this threat by funding 
mosques and sponsoring terrorism, such as the 9/11 attacks (examples 141–145). This 
also contributes towards promoting a Saudiphobic discourse in which Saudis are also 









where is the Peace Day in Yemen while Saudis are killing ppl 
every day and night 
On top of that Saudis are offering to build mosques. Plan to 
Islamize Germany at faster rate. 
So the Saudis are going to crucify some kid for dissent on his  









The Saudis are cracking down at home while spreading and 
funding terrorism abroad. 
I heard that Saudis are blaming African pilgrimages for the deaths  
in Mecca. When will idiotic Africans learn that Arabs don't GAF  
about YOU 
 
Highlighting negative presentations of Saudis on Twitter is mainly achieved through 
two strategies: the association of irrelevant issues or the interrelation of different 
themes. This means that tweets tend to either refer to Saudis while replying or 
commenting on other tweets which do not mention them, or misrepresent Saudis by 
associating them with negative themes. For instance, in example 141, the tweet replies 
to another tweet that tagged the International Day of Peace to describe a peaceful day 
in Mogadishu (Somalia). The tweet then comments on the Saudis’ role in Yemen and 
asserts that Yemen cannot celebrate Peace Day as the Saudis "are killing" people 
daily. Similarly, in example 142, the tweet replies to another tweet claiming that 
Syrian refugees are all men, there are no women among them, assuming an upcoming 
threat to Europe. The tweet in example 142 comments by referring to the Saudis' 
plans to build mosques for refugees in Europe and claims that they plan ultimately to 
"Islamize" Germany. This tweet uses both strategies, first linking the Saudis to the 
refugees issue, and second demonising the Saudis by claiming that they plan to 
“Islamize” Germany, thus employing a topos of threat. Other associated issues also 
include linking the crucifixion of Al-Nimr with giving the Saudis a seat on the 
UNHRC (example 143), associating a local crime in Saudi Arabia with the Saudis 
“spreading and funding” terrorism to other countries (example 144), and linking the 
stampede event with the racist attitudes of Saudis and Arabs against Africans 





            The remaining collocates, get, make and treat, are material processes in which 
Saudis are also presented as active agents. Tweets use the process get (90:3.24) to link 
Saudis negatively to recurring issues in the FCT, such as illegitimately giving them a 
UNHRC seat (39 tweets), the war in Yemen (23 tweets), terrorism (12 tweets), 
beheading/ flogging people (10 tweets), arms and weapons (six tweets). Tweets, for 
instance, assume that Saudis get a free pass to act as they want in Yemen, i.e. 
committing crimes against Yemenis. They also condemn giving the Saudis a seat on 
the UNHRC and selling them arms and weapons. The process get also links Saudis 
with supporting terrorist groups, e.g. ISIS, and getting away with the 9/11 attacks. 
Similarly, the material process make (55:12.9) is used by tweets to represent Saudis in 
negative terms, such as exploiting pilgrims’ money (23 tweets), disregarding their 
safety, going for nuclear energy (13 tweets) without being sanctioned and acting 
negatively towards others (18 tweets), such as interfering in the Middle East and 
misusing the sponsorship system. However, only one tweet with make carries a 
positive sense. The last material process which collocates with Saudis is treat 
(54:3.87): tweets use the verb treat to represent Saudis negatively regarding their 
attitude towards other social actors, such as pilgrims, Muslims, dead (bodies), Indians 
and women. Examining the concordance lines for treat shows that tweets deploy 
predicational strategies that serve to characterise Saudis as racist, scornful and 
heartless in 28 tweets. Most of all, these material processes are used to communicate 











Positive Negative Neutral 
Freq % Freq % Freq % 
get 0 0 89 98.9% 1 1% 
make 1 1.8% 44 80% 10 18% 
treat 4 6.6% 50 93.3% 0 0 
Table 6-4: Collocation of Saudis with get, make, treat   
 
When get, make and treat collocate with Saudis, these processes communicate 
negative depictions which account for 91.9% of the total frequency of three processes, 
while 5.5% accounts for neutral meanings. However, among the total occurrences of 
these three collocates, only five tweets (2.5%) carry positive connotations with make 
and treat (e.g. examples 149 and 150), which present Saudis with a positive attitude 












America's Allies. Truly disgusting, but the Saudis get away with  
everything, including 9/11 
Saudis make $8.5B from hajj; 700 dead is collateral damage, just   
like their support of Terrorists since 1970s.                                
Last country where apartheid still in practice. Saudis treat foreign  
workers like shit.           
"females have no rights in Saudi"   We can’t drive. But the king is  
altering that. Bitch, Saudis treat us like QUEENS. 
Saudis make best possible arrangements for pilgrims. Allah, the  
Almighty knows who is behind the incident. 
 
 
When these material processes collocate with Saudis, they are reinforced with 
discursive strategies, as well as interrelated themes, that amplify negative portrayals 
of Saudis in the FCT, such as linking the rape case of a Saudi prince to the 9/11 
attacks, exploiting Hajj money with supporting terrorism, and the Saudis’ role in 





groups. However, the two positive tweets are defensive acts, one from a Saudi female, 
in which they defend the Saudis against two issues. The first issue concerns women’s 
rights and driving: the tweet defends the Saudis against claims of denying women 
their rights. The tweet asserts that banning Saudi women from driving will be revoked 
by the King and uses a positive-other presentation to present the Saudis, describing 
their treatment of women as "QUEENS". The second issue concerns the Hajj 
stampede: the tweet defends the Saudis against blame for the stampede by stressing 
their efforts to accommodate the pilgrims. The tweet also deploys a positive-other 
presentation to represent the Saudis, acknowledging their efforts in Hajj and 
suggesting that the stampede was instigated by someone else.         
             Extensive concordance analysis of these three collocates shows that 
positioning Saudis as active agents results in a manifest categorisation of two distinct 
groups: on the one hand, the Saudis are an empowered and vile group who inflict 
danger on others and, on the other hand, they are represented as disempowered and 
victimised. Assigning Saudis agency is not only empowering but rather serious and 
alarming. This, in fact, is supported by predication strategies (Table 6-5, below) 
which contribute to sustaining an 'Us' versus 'Them' discourse delivered via a 
negative-other presentation strategy (van Dijk, 1997) which emphasises how the 
other’s “nature is dangerous or incompatible with “our” cherished local values” 
















enslave, treat others (shit, worse than dogs, inhumanely, trash, 
subhuman, garbage, worse than pigs, animals, dirt, rats), get a pass 
in violating HR, eternal orphans, known to all, horribly, worse than 
Israelis, plain disgusting, enemy, disrespectful & hateful, third 
class, very badly, enemy, get away with everything,  
Positive  treat like queens, make best Hajj arrangements  
Table 6-5: Predication strategies with material processes get, make, treat  
 
 
            So far, discursive strategies have been examined in which Saudis are 
represented as subjects and objects realised through a system of transitivity and verb 
processes. In addition, Saudis are also represented through predicative adjectives 
presented by the relational process are and realised by the frame Saudis are, which is 
discussed in the following section.   
6.2.3. Predicative attributes   
The predicative adjectives following the relational process are form part of what 
functional grammar refers to as relational or attributive processes, in addition to its 
function as a helping verb (or auxiliary) which expresses other processes of 
transitivity (Section 6.2.1). These attributives processes are represented by adjectives 
which ascribe Saudis certain qualities or attributes, represented by the frame Saudis 
are+adjective (1,611 tweets). In fact, according to Oktar (2001, p. 326), a relational 
process represents “acts of classification and judgement … interpreted as a typical 
sign of power ideology which expresses the activities and goals of a social group 
against others”. This ideology, she adds, foregrounds the struggle or difference 





            Examining the concordance lines shows a predication pattern which involves 
the use of the determiner "a" with the "Saudis are" cluster in 30 tweets. Using the 
determiner “a” serves to collectivise Saudis and generalise certain features or qualities 
about them. This pattern results in predicative adjectives which ascribe Saudis 
negative qualities related to terrorism, the war in Yemen, the Hajj stampede, domestic 
violence and the refugee crisis. Hence, using the determiner “a” is significant in 
identifying some of the discursive strategies that tweets deploy in representing Saudis. 
















The Saudis are a barbaric, medieval nation who should be 
figuring out how to defeat ISIS rather than copying them    
Very sad and awful ...... Saudis are a black spot in the name of  
humanity. #shameless 
Saudis are a breeding base of Jews terrorist soldiers - Salafi, Sufi  
freemasons 
My goodness. Saudis are a brutal bunch. So entitled to treating  
 everyone else like shit!  
Saudi Arabia is taking-in no refugees WHY???   Saudis are a  
 murderous two-faced greedy bunch of desert rats - wealthy scum 
/ trash!!! 
The Saudis are a despicable and perfidious enemy of the West  
you Saudis are a joke 
    
In the examples above, tweets use the "Saudis are a" pattern to describe Saudis as a 
single attribute, which is either negative in its own, e.g. "black spot", "disgrace", 
"joke", inferior or less significant, e.g. "bunch" or "lot", or modified by negative 
complex adjectives, e.g. "barbaric", "medieval nation", "despicable and perfidious 
enemy", which all suggest a racist and bigoted discourse. In example 151, for 
instance, the tweet describes Saudis in a complex adjective phrase "barbaric" and 
"medieval nation", as it mocks their support for ISIS instead of defeating them. In 





fabricated case of a hand-chopped-off maid (section 7.7). The tweet responds by 
condemning Saudis and describes them in negative predicates, such as "a brutal 
bunch" and "treating (others) like shit". Example 155 posits a hostile attitude and the 
adverse reaction of the tweet: the tweet questions why Saudi Arabia is not taking in 
any Syrian refugees and uses "WHY" in CAPS, which indicates annoyance and 
contempt. This issue triggers a repulsive reaction in the tweet, as it describes Saudis 
with negative, complex attributes, such as "murderous", "two-faced", "greedy", 
"bunch of desert rats", "wealthy", "scum" and "trash". Saudis are also depicted as 
"despicable and perfidious" and an "enemy of the West" (example 156), which also 
constructs the Saudis as a vile enemy threatening the West. The image of an enemy 
has also been attributed to Muslims and Arabs in Western media, especially films, 
which depicts them as "bloodthirsty savages, obstacles to progress, predators on [the] 
peaceful ‘West’, and [they] are portrayed as enemy “hostiles” of the U.S. and the 
West" (Ameli et al., 2007, p. 95). Using the determiner "a" thus serves to collectivise 
Saudis as a deviant-other group, while the negative predicative adjectives contribute 
towards sustaining a negative-other presentation through emphasising information 
that is negative about them (Oktar, 2001, p. 319), contributing towards a Saudisphobic 
discourse in the FCT.  
            Other patterns emerging with the "Saudis are" cluster include the use of 
intensifiers "so" (24 tweets), "too" (15 tweets) and "fucking" (12 tweets) with 
predicative adjectives (either negative or used negatively). In fact, tweets use 
intensifiers to amplify the meaning of these predicative attributes to represent Saudis 
negatively, such as "so annoying", "so evil", "so cruel" and "too busy bombing/ 
hammering", as well as "fucking horny", "fucking rapists" and "fucking disgusting". 





as supporting terror, the war in Yemen, the refugee crisis, and alleged immunity and 








ok folks there is no fireworks tonight, the Saudis are so happy for 
us that they fire missiles and bombs, too much celebration though              
yeah those Muslims should help Syrian refugees but Saudis are 
too busy giving money to ISIS and Al-Qaida, right???  
typical Saudis are fucking disgusting I hate you all 
 
Using intensifiers is also accompanied by metaphor, such as in example 157, in which 
the tweet claims that Saudis are extensively bombing Yemen through airstrikes. The 
tweet uses the metaphor "fireworks" and "too much celebration" to describe the 
immensity and severity of the airstrikes. The function of metaphor in this context is to 
delegitimise (Lawton, 2013) the Saudis’ role in Yemen, as well as victimising the 
Yemenis. The tweet also uses the intensifier "so" with the predicate "happy" to 
portray the Saudis’ extreme dislike and hostility for the Yemeni people. Combining 
these strategies (intensification, metaphor and predication) serves to elevate the 
illocutionary force of the tweet, presents the Saudis as a brutal enemy and, 
consequently, constructs them as violent out-group. In example 158, the tweet 
condemns the Saudis for not taking in Syrian refugees while giving money to ISIS 
and AlQaeda and uses the intensifier "too busy", which indicates strong commitment 
and allegiance. The tweet in example 159 expresses resentment towards and hatred 
for Saudis by claiming that they are typically "disgusting" and, for this reason, the 






            In addition, tweets use the frame “Saudis are” with predicative adjectives that 
describe the Saudis according to their religion (32 tweets), such as “Muslims”, 
“Sunnis” and “Wahhabis”. Yet, this association links Saudis to an extreme form of 
religion represented by the predicative attributes “fanatics”, “Jihadis” and 
“extremists”. Tweets assume that Saudis embrace an extreme form of Islam that is 
either deviant from it, e.g. “not taking refugees” or “bombing Yemen”, or one that 










Correction: Saudis are Wahhabi-Islam, same ideology of ALL 
Terror orgs, they also fund Terror openly since 1970s.  Iran backs 
Shiite groups. The Saudis are Sunni. ISIS are Sunnis. So  
who is funding them captain obvious? 
Saudis are fanatic Muslims. Offering to build mosques instead of  
houses is sick insult to Germany and Muslim migrants. 
well that's because the Saudis are jihadist loving war mongering 
idiots– that theatre has changed forever with Russia and Iran 
 
                                      
In the examples above, tweets present Saudis negatively by associating them with a 
deviant form of Islam, one that funds terrorists, e.g. "Wahhabi", "Sunni", and that is 
contradictory and antithetical, e.g. "fanatic". This association, in fact, brings forth 
similar stereotypes of Muslims (and Islam) in the Western media (Akbarzadeh & 
Smith, 2005; Ameli et al., 2007; Baker, 2010; Dunn, 2001) where “Muslims are often 
represented and perceived as fundamentalists, extremists and terrorists. Accordingly, 
these labels seem to be an inherent part of the perception of Muslims” (Lemmouh, 
2008, p. 226). Similarly, Saudis in the FCT are depicted not only as embracing an 
extreme form of Islam, but also adopting a theology that is alarming and threatening, 
represented by the predicates "terrorists", "fanatics" and "Jihadists", which are used in 





as terrorists “fighting a ‘holy war’ or ‘jihad’ against Western culture and values” 
(Akbarzadeh & Smith, 2005, p. 21).       
           In addition, tweets represent Saudis by using dehumanising predictive 
attributes which associate them with diseases and animals through a discursive 
strategy of metaphors. This strategy and collocating predicates are discussed in the 
following section.     
6.2.3. Metaphors and the representation of Saudis  
In addition to predication strategies, tweets also use another strategy with the cluster 
"Saudis are", one which involves the use of metaphors. According to Lakoff & 
Johnson (1980), metaphors can shape human experience and form realities, 
particularly social realities. Khan & Nawaz also state that using metaphors in political 
discourse can not only "embellish the discourse, but also perform discursive 
functions” (2015b, p. 50). However, when exploited in discourse, “the dominant 
nonchalant attitude to the meaning value of metaphors allows speakers to express and 
insinuate even the most extreme views under the guise of ‘subjectively’ coloured 
figurative speech” (Musolff, 2012, p. 303). In other words, people use metaphors 
when they think they can conceal or exaggerate a message or viewpoint and embed it 
in discourse. These embedded viewpoints can be detected through the kinds of 
metaphors used by tweets while tweeting about Saudis in the FCT.  
            In fact, these metaphors are used to construct some dark and undesirable 
images of Saudis which dehumanise them, by comparing them to either animals or 
diseases. Other metaphors link Saudis with deception and immorality (sexual), which 












Thank you. Houthi's whole purpose was to fight off Al Qeada in  
Yemen. The Saudis are a cancer. 
The Saudis are a vile cancerous tumour. The world knows it, and 
it's high time they were force-fed their own tincture. 
Saudis are a plague 
 
 
The tweet in example 164 refers to the ongoing war in Yemen, it defends the militant 
group "Houthis" and justifies their role in Yemen as they are merely fighting 
AlQaeda. However, the tweet then concludes by stating that "Saudis are a cancer", 
which describes their role in Yemen as merely destructive. Cancer is a “group of more 
than 100 distinct diseases characterized by the uncontrolled growth of abnormal cells 
in the body” (Costa, 2019). Comparing Saudis to "cancer", therefore, paints an image 
of an uncontrolled, destructive force which in itself is deviant from normal human 
beings. Although cancer is curable in some cases, the tweet in example 165 uses the 
phrase "cancerous tumour" to emphasise the malignant nature of cancer which can 
spread into neighbouring tissues, i.e. countries, individuals. The tweet proclaims that 
the world acknowledges this claim, and adds a threatening act, using the idiomatic 
expression "force-fed their own tincture", which denotes the tweet’s urgency to take 
serious action against the Saudis. The last example (166) represents another adverse 
metaphorical expression, a "plague" metaphor, which refers to diseases that resulted 
in some fatal epidemics in history and were responsible for the death of one-third of 
the population of Europe in the 14th century (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2018). The 
tweet replies to a Russian news account which tweets about a Saudi woman posting a 
video of her husband as he was sexually abusing a maid. The tweet responds by 





it to a single case (the man in the video). The plague metaphor also sustains a similar 
image of a tumorous cancer, as both correlate Saudis with epidemics that evoke a 
sense of contamination and disgust, and whose impairment extends to others.   
             In addition to diseases, Saudis are also portrayed through dehumanising 
metaphors, such as animals (22 tweets). These metaphors include comparing Saudis 
to "pigs", "donkeys", "monkeys", "fucking horny dogs", "holy cows" and "animals on 
two legs". Although these types of animals are not classified as disliked, they are still 








Saudis are animals, donkeys and terrorists. no kindness for 
beings. no women’s right          
Saudis are pigs. Complaining about Russia attacking AlQaeda 
when they're in Yemen supporting AlQaeda and the government 
Saudis are still monkeys and savages... they have not evolved as  
human beings as yet... 
 
In these examples, tweets use animal metaphoric expressions to stress the 
dehumanised and degraded nature of Saudis when associating them with the Nepalese 
woman’s rape case and the war in Yemen. In example 167, for instance, the tweet 
uses multiple predicates, including the two metaphors "animals" and "donkeys", to 
represent Saudis adversely in relation to terrorism (e.g. terrorists) and cruelty, and the 
oppression of people and women, in response to a tweet about the rape case. In 
example 168, the tweet uses the metaphor "pigs" to criticise the Saudis’ role in the 
war in Yemen and condemn their support for AlQaeda. Whereas in the last example 
(169), the tweet describes Saudis as "monkeys" and "savages" and, using the adverb 
"still", stresses their (persistent) inhuman nature and contends that they have not yet 





Saudis to animals deprives them of human traits like civility, intelligence and morality 
and ascribes flaws to them to deprive the Saudis of human virtues. According to 
Demjén and Hardaker (2016), animal metaphors are viewed as “more dehumanising/ 
degrading, and therefore more offensive, if they equate rather than compare the target 
with an animal” (p. 357). van Dijk (1995) asserts that “[r]acist, sexist and other 
inegalitarian ideologies … may typically be expressed, not only by derogating lexical 
items … but also by demeaning metaphors that belittle, marginalize or dehumanize 
the others. Thus, Nazi propaganda associated Jews, communists and other ethnic and 
social minorities with dirty animals (rats, cockroaches)” (p. 29). According to Steuter 
and Wills (2010), there is a consistent pattern of dehumanising metaphors that 
dominates Western media’s depictions of Muslims post the 9/11 attacks, and that 
newspaper headlines have: 
[I]nfluentially compressed narratives replicating and recycling key metaphors 
that systematically figure the enemy as animal, vermin, or metastatic disease. 
These dehumanizing media representations, which have historically prefigured 
abuse, oppression, and even genocide, are being circulated as uncritically 
through newspaper media headlines as Bush’s war framing was initially and... 
now requires the same critical dismantling. (p. 152) 
Equating Saudis with dehumanised metaphors and relating them to terrorism reflects a 
bigoted and racist discourse and poses a warning regarding the propagation of such 
negative stereotypes on Twitter. 
           Tweets also use immoral (sexual) metaphors to link Saudis and others (such as 
the West) with corruption. These include the following metaphoric phrases: "in bed 





tweets). Using sexual metaphors associates Saudis with others (such as the West and 







The West is in bed with Saudis all the way up to and over our 
eyeballs. Lots of sins forgiven for the love of oil and landmass 
Bit better than prostituting political favours to Saudis for millions  
given to an HRC money laundering Foundation 
Sadly, true, the western leaders prostitute themselves for Saudis 
as long those pigs have OIL! 
            
The tweet in example 170 uses the metaphor "in bed with" to describe the relationship 
between the West and Saudis in reply to a tweet about the silence of the media over 
the stampede in Mecca. Using this metaphor is reinforced by an idiomatic expression 
"up to and over our eyeballs", which signals the intensity of this relationship. The 
tweet then condemns the West’s relations with the Saudis that led to this silence and 
asserts that the West forgives the "sins" of Saudis for the sake of oil and landmass. 
The second example (171) deploys another (coarse) sexual metaphor which involves 
“prostitution”: the tweet replies to another tweet that mocks US Republicans for 
business failure. The tweet then responds by defending the Republicans and criticising 
the Democrats’ relationship with the Saudis, which is described as ‘prostitution’. The 
tweet compares the deals that US officials offer to the Saudis to a prostitute who sells 
her body for money (referring to the money they received to support the Saudis 
having a UNHRC seat). In the last example (172), the tweet deploys two metaphors: 
sexual, such as "prostitute themselves", and animal, such as "those pigs". Using both 
metaphors serves to elevate the illocutionary force of the tweet and present the Saudis 
in an offensive and degraded image. According to Riabova and Riabov (2015), the 
prostitution metaphor is "traditionally used to signify political inconstancy, 





             Using sexual metaphors, along with others, thus reinforces negative portrayals 
of Saudis and contributes towards sustaining a hostile and racist discourse about 
Saudis in the FCT. van Dijk asserts that metaphors are used in discourse to highlight 
negative information about the disfavoured group and that using a distinct type of 
metaphor “may enhance the negative opinion we have about Others” (1999, p. 148). 
In fact, metaphors like “plague, cancer, pollution and wild animals are familiar 
notions to evoke a boundary threat to an ingroup” and, given their flexibility to fit in 
different contexts, they allow for both amplifying the racism of an 'Us' versus 'Them' 
discourse as well as patterns of incongruity and contradictions (van Teeffelen, 1994, 
p. 385).    
6.2.4. Friends or foes: The collocates allies and friends 
As shown in Table 6-7, tweets use lexical collocates to represent Saudis by 
associating them with recurring issues and themes identified earlier by the top 
common keywords in the FCT (Section 4.2), such as the wars in Yemen and Syria, 
terrorism, the Hajj stampede and the refugee crisis. These issues are reintroduced 
through the collocates allies and friends.  
            Tweets use the collocates both friends (203:3.63) and allies (221:3.65) to refer 
to the Saudis' relationship with Western governments, especially the US. In fact, 
representing Saudis as friends and allies constitutes negative portrayals of them. 
Tweets condemn aligning with and befriending the Saudis, given their (Saudis’) 
affiliation with the following issues: terrorism (such as ISIS and 9/11), the wars in 
Yemen and Syria, not accepting Syrian refugees, and crucifying Al-Nimr. Referring 

















our, bad, Bush's, best, 
good, great 
secret, good, USA's bestest, terrorists, busy 
crucifying, full of wisdom, such great 
people, behead more people, arm ISIS, 
sponsor 9/11, horrible, bombing Yemen, 




our, glorious, great, key, 
lovely, beloved, so 
called, close, such great 
 
terrifying, awful, manipulators, fund terror, 
corrupt, oppress women, starving Yemenis, 
bombing wedding, awkward, fund 
Islamists terrorists, racist, murdering, 
maniacs   
Table 6-6: Nomination and predication strategies with the collocates friends and allies 
 
In Table 6-6, above, tweets use the collocates both friends and allies to represent 
Saudis negatively. Saudis are referred to as "our friends" (31 tweets) and "good 
friends" (19 tweets), an irony that is directed towards political members and 
representatives for their relationships with the Saudis. Befriending Saudis is 
challenged by tweets against issues of supporting terrorism, such as funding ISIS, 
planning the 9/11 attacks, and crucifying and beheading people (specifically Al-
Nimr). Tweets also use the adjectives "best", "good" and "great" as modifiers of 
friends to ironically mock governments for having Saudis as friends. These 
nomination strategies are further supported by predicational strategies which highlight 
similar issues, such as describing the Saudis as "terrorists", "horrible", sponsoring the 
9/11 attacks, bombing Yemen, and oppressing women. Similarly, allies is also used to 





"our" (58 tweets), as well as "glorious", "great" and "key", allies, which are used 
ironically to mock any alliance with the Saudis. Tweets’ opposition to having the 
Saudis as allies is also delivered through predicative strategies which present Saudis 
in an adverse way, such as associating them with funding terror (ISIS), oppressing 







our "friends" the Saudis are horrible. Women cannot drive, they  
punish via barbaric methods AND ISIS finance bakers  
US allies & parents of AlQaeda & ISIS murder 27 in Yemen.  
Well done Saudis.  Hope Russians start bombing you too 
why are Saudis our allies, they fund terror and oppress women 
 
 
In example 173, the tweet refers to Saudis as "our "friends"", using quotation marks 
around friends, which condemns having them as friends and implies disagreement and 
opposition. The tweet uses the predicative attribute "horrible", followed by a number 
of issues that are often held against the Saudis in the FCT, such as banning women 
from driving, punishing people through "barbaric methods" and financially backing 
ISIS. In example 174, however, the tweet comments on an online article in the New 
York Times which reported on an airstrike by the Saudi-led coalition that killed 
dozens of Yemenis attending a wedding. The tweet comments by referring to Saudis 
negatively, using nomination strategies, such as "US allies" and "parents of AlQaeda 
& ISIS"; this indicates condemnation and criticism of the US alliance with the Saudis, 
which is supported by associating the Saudis with parenting AlQaeda and ISIS. The 
tweet also uses the expression "well done" to sarcastically denounce killing civilians 
in Yemen and, consequently, wishes bad karma on the Saudis for this criminality, i.e. 
they should be bombed by the Russians as in Syria. In the last example (175), the 





describing Saudis as "our allies". The tweet supports this negative stance by 
associating the Saudis with negative predicates, such as "fund terror" and "oppress 
women", which posit Saudis as a violent and intimidating ally. 
           Despite their positive meanings, the collocates friends and allies are used both 
negatively and sarcastically to represent Saudis as a threatening 'friend' and 'ally'. 
Using the modifier "our", tweets position users as being at risk and warn against a 
threat to national security, due to the harm inflicted by the Saudis, by presenting 
Saudis as a vile ‘Other’, reinforced through stressing their negative attributes (e.g. 
terrorists, horrible). Hence, “the resulting disharmony between the victimizer and the 
victim can boost in turn the process of [legitimising violent actions]” (Tekaya, 2016, 
p. 168). The recurrence of such negative presentations can result in intimidating 
feelings (example 188) and can inflame a discourse of hatred and intolerance that may 
stimulate negative responses against Saudis offline.     
6.2.5. The collocates rich and wealthy  
Associating Saudis with negative issues is also delivered through the collocates rich 
and wealthy. Rich (111:3.63) collocates with Saudis in 101 tweets, 50 of them deploy 
nomination strategies in which rich modifies Saudis as a simple and complex 
modifier, e.g. "filthy rich", "cash rich", "mega rich". Other modifiers signal similar 
meanings, like "oil rich", "very rich", which suggest a semantic preference for the 
concept of extreme wealth. Attributing this concept to Saudis is, in fact, negative. 
Tweets associate rich with Saudis in terms of questioning their ability to organise Hajj 
safely (46 tweets), funding terrorists (38 tweets) and not taking in refugees (17 










I doubt that. No one wants to upset the rich Saudis do they              
I think not! #SyrianCrisis The filthy rich Saudis contribution to 
the poor refugees is to build them mosques!              
Lets face it, he was granted bail so he could evade justice. The 
law doesn't apply to rich Saudis. Remember Bin Laden family on 
9/11 
            
In these examples, tweets use the collocate rich to present Saudis negatively in terms 
of alleged inhumane treatment towards the pilgrims and demands to reclaim the 
pilgrimage from the Saudis' patronage (example 176). Another tweet (example 178) 
condemns the Saudis for not taking in any refugees but instead building mosques for 
them in Germany, whereas in the last example (179), the tweet refers to a news story 
about a Saudi prince who was cleared by a US court in a rape case to generalise a 
claim about Saudis. The tweet contends that the Saudis are protected by the law 
against any crime. Through intertextuality, the tweet links this incident with the 9/11 
attacks and claims that Bin Laden’s family was similarly not charged for the attacks 
but rather allowed to leave the US freely.  
            The negative concept of being rich is also delivered through an argumentation 
strategy. This includes deploying (fallacious) arguments which are seek to either post 






Filthy rich Saudis who have toilets made of gold in their palaces 
have no respect for ordinary Muslim haji's lives! 
Saudi diplomat left the country. Nobody's bothered because they 
are rich. Saudis can get away with anything. Living charmed life!         
              
In the first example (180), the tweet associates the alleged stacking of dead pilgrims' 





the tweet, Saudis are extremely rich, but they do not respect the lives of Muslim 
pilgrims because these Muslims are not equally rich. The tweet deploys a nomination 
strategy to set a boundary between the Saudis and other Muslims based on the concept 
of wealth, by referring to Saudis as "filthy rich" and Muslim pilgrims as "ordinary". 
To support this claim, the tweet also depicts Saudis negatively through a fallacy 
which sustains the idea that they are extremely rich and disrespectful towards others, 
using the phrase "have toilets made of gold in their palaces". Also, in example 181, 
the tweet posits another fallacy which claims that Saudis have immunity from 
prosecution, indicated by the phrase "get away with anything" because they are rich. 
This relates to a rape case against a Saudi diplomat in India who was reported to have 
got away with it (see section 7.7). In fact, Slade (1981) states that researching the 
media image of the Arabs as a threat to the US showed remarkable effects on the 
public consciousness of Arabs. It also revealed that "the Saudis are termed "rich" by 
70 per cent" and that very few people assumed Saudis are friendly. However, 
according to Slade, "it is not the perception of wealth that causes low opinion, but 
rather the understanding that Arabs are "hostile" or "mistreaters of women" (p. 151). 
           Wealthy (31:4.07) is another lexical collocate of Saudis in the FCT, another 
term equivalent to rich. Saudis are also referred to as "super-wealthy", "obscenely 
wealthy" and "powerful wealthy", which all suggest a sense of extreme wealth. Like 
rich, representing Saudis as wealthy draws negative portrayals, since the context is 
negative in all 84 tweets. Allocating wealth to Saudis corresponds to rich in terms of 
supporting terrorists (22 tweets) and mismanaging Hajj (four tweets). However, 
regarding Syrian refugees, Saudis are claimed to be sexually abusing young Syrian 





recognise that terrorists exist among them (refugees are described as "wolves" in 






Obscenely wealthy Saudis blame dirt-poor Africans for the  
#HajjStampede  
Wealthy Saudis sexually abuse young #Syrian girls: Report  
Wealthy Saudis KNOW better than to take the wolves in refugees'  
clothing! 
         
In these examples, the association of wealth with the Saudis portrays them as a 
negative, vile out-group who victimise and abuse less powerful groups. Besides 
blaming African pilgrims for the Hajj stampede and sexually abusing Syrian girls, 
tweets also highlight the issue of the Syrian refugees. The tweet in example (184), 
recontextualises the refugee issue, using the idiomatic expression "wolves in refugees 
clothes", to warn against the disguised danger of these refugees who threaten Europe. 
This issue reinstates a negative discourse that is often linked with refugees in the 
media, which depict them as threatening and dangerous to the West (Abid, 2015; 
Baker & McEnery, 2005; Gabrielatos, 2008; Gabrielatos & Baker, 2008; Hart, 2008; 
Parnell, 2016; Törmä, 2017). Saudis are assumed to reject Syrian refugees despite 
their ability to host them, owing to their recognition of the hazard posed by these 
refugees.  
             Consequently, the semantic preference for both richness and wealth suggests 
a negative discourse prosody of immorality and violence. Possessing wealth can also 
provide Saudis with immunity to evade legal prosecution. When collocating Saudis in 
the FCT, the collocates both rich and wealthy pertain to Shaheen’s four basic myths 
about Arabs in television shows, which stereotype them as “fabulously wealthy, they 





and they revel in acts of terrorism” (1984, p. 4). Both collocates promote negative 
portrayals and manifest cynical stereotyping and prejudices about Saudis on Twitter. 
Conflating rich and wealthy with Saudis can “construct an arbitrary image of an 
‘enemy within the walls’ … the terrorists who ‘live among “Us” and ‘are 
wealthy’”(Boukala, 2016, p. 264). The concept that Saudis are wealthy can "only 
intensify the perception that they are a threat" (Slade, 1981, p. 148).     
6.3. Lexical collocation   
The colligation analysis so far has provided fruitful insights into some of the 
discursive strategies deployed by tweets while representing Saudis. However, 
examining the lexical collocates of Saudis can also be another way to explore the 
discursive strategies employed by tweets in the FCT. These collocates are extracted 



















Table 6-7: Consistent collocates of Saudis in the FCT 
 
The categories in Table 6-7 include collocates signalling modality, such as should, 
can, must, collocates functioning as quantifiers, such as many, some, most, and the 
Other category, which includes the collocate women, which refers to women generally 





categories are examined thoroughly in the following subsections using collocation and 
concordance analyses.  
6.3.1. Nomination strategies with quantifiers many, some, most 
Among the lexical collocates of Saudis in the FCT is the use of quantifiers as a 
nomination strategy to refer to Saudis, such as many (77:3.89), some (83:3.89) and 
most (50:3.90). These quantifying collocates are used to quantify Saudis with negative 
attributes, actions and affiliations, such as terrorism, inhumane behaviour and 
immorality. Results of a concordance analysis of these quantifiers are summarised in 
Table 6-8, below: 
 



































Table 6-8: Quantifying collocates with Saudis in the FCT  
   
In Table 6-8, tweets deploy ‘vague quantifiers’, such as many, some and most, to 
refrain from (over)generalising (van Dijk, 2002) some negative representations of 
Saudis in the FCT. However, these quantifying collocates still represent Saudis 
mainly regarding some recurring issues in the FCT, such as terrorism, inhumane 
attitude and immorality. In Table 6-8, the number of tweets allocating Saudis with 





which indicate numerosity, such as many and most, Saudis are assigned negative 
predicates (54 out of 127 tweets) related to terrorism, such as "supporting ISIS" and 
"on 9/11 planes", immorality, such as "have sex slaves" and "animals on two legs", 
and absurdity, such as "narrow-minded" and "stuck in the 50s". Fewer tweets, though, 
relate positive (three tweets) or neutral (70) predicates with Saudis. However, with 
some, which indicates a smaller quantity, Saudis are associated with negative and 
neutral predicates in almost equal numbers of tweets, although positive predicates 
indicated by the three quantifiers are equally low. Tweets use some to relate Saudis to 
terrorism, such as "celebrate 9/11" and "engage in terrorism", immorality, such as 
"nefarious purposes", and "savages", "ungrateful" and a “rotten mentality". Positive 
quantification with some relates Saudis to desirable predicates, such as being good 
neighbours, supporting their wives, being cute and funny. Figure 6-3, below, 
illustrates example tweets of these three quantifying collocates:     
 
 
Figure 6-3: Concordance of the quantifying collocates many, some, most 
 
Tweets use the quantifying collocates many and most to suggest that a high number/ 





tweets, such as terrorism and immorality. These vague quantifying collocates are used 
not only to avoid generalising negative attributes of Saudis but also as a “discursive 
strategy of vagueness [which contributes] to a macro-strategy of positive self-
presentation” (Mohammadi, 2009, p. 141) and negative-other presentation.  
6.3.2. Modality with should, can and must 
Other lexical collocates of Saudis in the FCT also include the use of modal verbs: 
should (197:3.48), can (135:3.41) and must (127:3.31). The question that arises here 
is what function does modality serve in the discourse about Saudis in the FCT? To 
answer this question, a distinction needs to be made between the three types of 
modality that prevail in the FCT: 
1. Epistemic modality, which includes the Possibility and Certainty modalities 
and refers to tweets’ perception and opinions of Saudis, e.g. "Saudis can be 
harsh", "Saudis must be desperate" and "Saudis should be panicking". 
2. Deontic modality, which includes Obligation modality, and refers to moral and 
religious obligations that Saudis should accomplish, e.g. "Saudis should 
apologise for deadly Hajj stampede" and "Saudis must take in refugees". It 
also includes the Necessity modality in which tweets demand certain actions 
against Saudis, e.g. "Saudis should be bombed off", "Saudis must pay dearly". 
3. Dynamic modality, in which tweets refer to Saudis’ ability or disposition to 
act in favour of or against others, e.g. "Saudis can accommodate millions of 
people" and "Saudis can buy and change the world".  
The results of a concordance analysis based on these categories are summarised in 


















Table 6-9: Epistemic, Deontic and Dynamic modalities in the FCT  
 
In the FCT, modal verbs and their negations are used to highlight religious and moral 
obligations and necessities that Saudis have to respond to, such as apologising for the 
Hajj stampede and securing pilgrims’ lives, as well as their obligation to accept Syrian 
refugees arising from their Islamic and neighbourhood bonds. In Table 6-9, above, 
Deontic modality occurs more frequently in the FCT than Epistemic and Dynamic 
modalities; more specifically, Necessity is more frequent than Obligation modality. 
Tweets use modality to refer to certain duties and requirements that Saudis should 
accomplish to ensure others’ safety and well-being, such as pilgrims and Syrian 
refugees. Whereas Obligation modality links Saudis to the stampede (166 tweets), for 
which they are obliged to "apologise" and "answer for" the carelessness and 
mismanagement of Hajj that led to it. Other tweets (21) concern Syrian refugees: 
tweets require the Saudis to take in refugees instead of building mosques for them in 
Europe. However, some tweets include the use of necessity, should and must, to 
express certain negative actions to be applied to or taken against Saudis, such as suing 
them over the stampede and banning them from the UNHRC over human rights 










































































Saudis should be banned, most regressive state for women 
May all of them #RIP but the Saudis must be prosecuted!!! 
#justice   
The Saudis should be bombed off the face of this earth 
 
In these examples, tweets use necessity with should and must to demand punishing the 
Saudis for oppressing women (example 185) and for the dead pilgrims in the Hajj 
stampede (example 186). However, in example 187, tweet uses Necessity modality, 
should, to demand a threatening act against the Saudis, i.e. "bombing them off the 
face of this earth". Using modal should and must in combination with the passive 
tense (be banned, be prosecuted, be bombed) expresses not only the tweets’ negative 
stances towards the Saudis but also “the obligation of the unspoken agent” (Yin & 
Wang, 2010, p. 391) and the commitment of others towards taking serious action 
against the Saudis, as in example (187), which can lead to practising violence and 
promoting Saudiphobia. Using modality also promotes an 'Us' versus 'Them' 
discourse, which presents them as a negative, threatening other.  
             Epistemic modality, however, refers to the degree of a speaker’s commitment 
to the truth of the proposition contained in an utterance (Bybee & Fleischman, 1995, 
p. 4). Tweets use Epistemic modality to express their realisation or assessment of the 
validity of some negative propositions (Arrese, 2009) about Saudis, such as ability, 
"can buy and change the world", or qualities, "Saudis can be harsh". In fact, using 
Epistemic modality carries evaluative stances: tweets use epistemic modals not only 
to express negative knowledge or perceptions about Saudis, but also to mediate 
interpersonal meanings. These modals communicate tweets’ covert concerns and 
intimidation resulting from allegations regarding Saudis’ manipulation and violent 










Saudis can buy and change The world leaders opinions but they 
can't buy and change the opinions of the whole mankind. 
Saudis must be sad on destruction of IS as they had created it with   
great efforts and investment 
The #Saudis can be harsh at times. 
               
 
In these examples, tweets use the modal collocates can and must to attest to their 
assessment of Saudis being corrupt, such as manipulating political leaders (example 
188), creating and financing ISIS (example 189) or being violent and repulsive 
(example 190). In fact, according to Vâlcea (2016, p. 93), “modality stands out as a 
major criterion in the encryption and decryption of the message beyond words”. In the 
FCT, Epistemic modality is glossed to indicate a sense of threat and intimidation, 
which, in turn, reinforces the notion that Saudis represent a negative-other group 
whose presence is alarming and threatening.  
            Finally, there is Dynamic modality, which refers to either ability, such as 
"Saudis can take all of the them", possibility, such as "Saudis can be trusted" or 
certainty, such as "Saudis can’t be Muslims". In fact, Dynamic modality is used in 
some tweets (59) to portray Saudis’ ability to be alarming and threatening. Tweets use 
can to highlight Saudis’ ability to act brutally against others. In fact, using can in this 
context does not only indicate ability, but also tweets’ certainty that Saudis are 







These are the words of a true Husseini. Saudis can carry on   
murdering people. The world is seeing it!  
unfortunately the biggest genocidal terrorist states Israel and 
Saudis can get away with anything while others punished for 
nothing   





Through the modal collocate can and nomination (example 191) and predicative 
(example 192) strategies, tweets assert their negative evaluation of Saudis being 
terrorists with immunity. In fact, using modality collocates in the FCT with its 
different types is useful as it is an important part of how tweets identify Saudis and 
ascribe them agency in relation to terror, violence and corruption.  
6.3.3. Saudis and women 
The last lexical collocate of Saudis in the FCT is women (84:3.68). This collocational 
relation reveals aspects of the representation of Saudis in the discourse related to 
women. Examining concordance lines shows that the kind of association existing 
between Saudis and women centres mainly on what they (Saudis) do or think about 
both Saudi and non-Saudi women, as illustrated in Figure 6-4, below. More 
specifically, it associates Saudis with either committing acts relative to war and 
violence, or their (negative) attitude towards women (both Saudis and non-Saudis).  
 
 







Generally, tweets depict Saudis as doing the following to women: 
• war crimes: "butchering", "murder", "bombing", "kill", "slaughtering"  
• violence (sex abuse/trade, Sharia law): "treat like shit/dogs", "rape", "hate", 
"being cruel ", "torture", "abuse', "behead', "stoning", "flog" 
• oppression/abuse (including dress-code enforcement): "oppress", "keep as 
second-class citizens', "ban from jobs", "subjugate', "limiting/deciding what 
women wear"  
          
However, women are passivised in all the tweets and are assigned patient roles as 
victims, while Saudis are assigned (negative) roles as active agents (see Table 6-10, 
below). 
 
Women collocating with Saudis Role Frequency 
Sexual violence, sex trade Victims/patients 26 
Breaking Sharia law: sorcery/witchcraft ≈ ≈ 16 
War crimes ≈ ≈ 13 
Violent attitude ≈ ≈ 12 
Dress-code enforcement ≈ ≈ 8 
Oppression  ≈ ≈ 9 
                             Total                                                                                         84 
Table 6-10: Women’s roles in collocation with Saudis 
 
Women are represented as passivised victims and assigned the roles of patients in 
material processes, whereas Saudis are active agents. In terms of violence, Saudis are 





and rape. They are also depicted as practising cruelty on women, such as "treat like 
shit/dogs". Even when applying Sharia Law, which prohibits sorcery and adultery, 
Saudis are condemned for practising it. Tweets do not refer to Sharia Law itself, but 
rather focus on how Saudis practise it against women, shifting the emphasis onto the 
punisher not the punishment. Saudis are also accused of oppressing women, such as 
banning them from jobs and imposing certain dress codes and covering their faces. 
The latter, although being a part of their religious identity, tweets condemn enforcing 
dress codes, such as modest clothing, as it is against women’s will and freedom, 
implying women’s rejection and submission. In fact, studies of the representation of 
Arab and Muslim women in Western media have confirmed such findings, 
highlighting issues of violence, suppression, victimisation and discrimination by 
Muslim and Arab men against women (Al-Hejin, 2012, 2015; Eltantawy, 2007; Falah 
& Nagel, 2005; Manley, 2009; Mishra, 2007a; Mustafa-Awad & Kirner-Ludwig, 
2017; Tissot, 2011; Wilkins, 1995; Zempi, 2016). Similar depictions of Saudis are 
also echoed on Twitter: tweets portray Saudis as cruel and oppressive towards 








Saudis treat their own women like shit, no point in hoping that 
they would cooperate in giving justice to Nepali women. 
The Saudis still behead women for the crime of sorcery. 
Reminder: this nation sits on the UN Human Rights Council. 
the Niqab is NOT religious!  It's an oppressive symbol invented 
by the Saudis to keep women 2nd class citizens. 
 
 
These tweets depict women as agentless, oppressed and victimised by Saudis, either 
through physical abuse, such as "treat … like shit" and "behead … for the crime of 
sorcery", or through enforcing certain dress codes, such as "niqab". In example 193, 





condemn their inhumane and violent treatment of women. In example 194, the tweet 
associates the Saudis with beheading women for sorcery (reported in an article in The 
Herald Sun online newspaper linked to the tweet) to condemn and criticise allowing 
Saudis onto the UNHRC. In the last example (195), the tweet criticises the Saudis for 
imposing "niqab" on Saudi women and asserts that it is not a part of religion but 
rather a symbol of male patriarchy and oppression that is created by the Saudis to 
trivialise women. The tweet’s stance identifies "niqab" not as a “traditional Islamic 
dress code for women” but ,on the contrary, as “significant evidence of [their] 
oppression” (Yasmeen, 2013, p. 256)   
             Saudis are also depicted as committing war crimes, specifically in Yemen, 
against women and children. Tweets condemn how Saudis (with ISIS in two tweets) 
target women deliberately with bombs and blind airstrikes. This includes material 
processes like "killing" and "bombing", further promoted through using verbs like 







#Saudis and #ISIS team up to kill women and children in 
#Yemen.  
The Saudis has no moral right to talk about innocent people while  
they are butchering women and children's in Poor country Yemen. 
 
 
           When they associate Saudis with women, tweets deploy nomination and 
predication strategies which promote further negative representations. These 
strategies include referring to Saudis in the following terms: "Wahhabi", "typical", 
"barbaric murderous", "sex maniac", "heartless", "fucking", "disgusting", "arrogant'. 
Similarly, predication strategies seem to coincide with a nomination strategy, echoing 





ascribe to Saudis the following negative qualities: hating women, abusers, war 
criminals, matching ISIS in dealing with women, denying women freedom (such as 
enforcing certain dress codes and denying women jobs) and lacking morality. These 
all promote additional hostile stereotypes that augment the overall negative portrayal 
of Saudis in the FCT. In fact, these negative depictions of Saudis as regards women 
resonate with similar findings in media studies which associate Muslim men 
negatively with women: according to Al-Hejin (2015), research on Western media 
“corroborates a misconception observed by a number of scholars that all that is 
negative or hostile in the Muslim ‘Other’ is perpetrated by men, while women are 
merely passive victims moving with the tide” (p. 12).  
            The collocation analysis of women with Saudis is generally negative: women 
is not restricted to Saudi women only, it also includes women from other social 
groups, such as domestic maids and refugees. Saudis are depicted as violent, 
oppressive and slavers. Women, on the other hand, are represented as victims, 
agentless, oppressed and abused. Issues of dress-code enforcement and banning them 
from jobs are also highlighted and condemned in tweets. These negative depictions 
echo similar findings in Western media studies which depict Saudi women as 
“oppressed, deficient, subordinate, submissive, and non-agentive women who 
unquestioningly accept patriarchy and domination” (Alharbi, 2015, p. iv). 
6.4. Summary and discussion 
This chapter has addressed RQ-2 What discursive strategies are employed by tweets 
in the representation of Saudis? by focusing on collocation features that are 
associated with Saudis in the FCT. The focus is on the lexical collocates of Saudis 





discursive strategies utilised in representing Saudis, I use the collocation and 
concordance analyses offered by WordSmith. 
             RQ2 was addressed from two angles. The first was to analyse colligation and 
transitivity patterns which focus on the roles that are assigned to Saudis as objects and 
subjects in verb processes: this facilitates identifying the grammatical roles that tweets 
assign to Saudis. The second angle was to analyse the most frequent lexical collocates 
with Saudis. Both analyses proved useful in locating some discursive strategies that 
tweets deployed, as well as aspects of Saudis’ representation in the FCT. 
             Results from the colligation analysis triangulated the findings from the 
keyword analysis in Chapter 5. Themes highlighted by the keyword analysis were 
reinforced through colligation and collocation analyses, such as war, terrorism and 
corruption, and also found to be highly interrelated. The discursive strategies 
deployed by tweets in representing Saudis do not only echo similar findings in 
Chapter 5, but also reinforce the negative stereotypical presentations of Saudis on 
Twitter.     
             The analysis of colligational patterns showed negative evaluations in the form 
of transitivity roles assigned to Saudis. Saudis are portrayed as active agents in 869 
tweets (60%) and represented negatively in 1,406 (97.5%), while only 36 tweets 
(2.4%) associate with Saudis positively. These results are supported by nomination 
and predicative strategies which also reinforce similar negative depictions, such as 
associating Saudis with extremism and terrorism where Saudis are presented as 
radical Muslims who pose a national threat to the West. Similar to representing 
Muslims in Western media, Saudis are represented as "fanatics" who aim at a 
religious war, targeting Western countries, values and democracy (Arif & Ahmad, 





versus 'Them' discourse which presents Saudis as a threatening and dangerous out-
group.  
            The colligation analysis proved helpful in identifying another discursive 
strategy, i.e. metaphor (identified by the frame "Saudis are") which revealed adverse 
portrayals of Saudis on Twitter, such as dehumanising and sexual metaphors, which 
resulted in evoking a racist, prejudicial discourse (examples 167,168 and 1695). In 
fact, metaphor has become a key notion in racism studies as many metaphors rely on 
Western dichotomies of 'Us' versus 'Them' in which race is the ultimate outcome (van 
Teeffelen, 1994). This sort of positioning of 'Us' versus 'Them' becomes fertile ground 
for creating and establishing stereotypical and hostile attitudes, as a consequence of 
which hatred becomes an acceptable reality (Arcimaviciene & Baglama, 2018).  
            The collocation of Saudis with women also disclosed nomination and 
predication strategies which represented them negatively. Nomination strategies 
include referring to Saudis as "Wahhabi", "barbaric murderous", "sex maniac", 
"heartless", "fucking", "disgusting' and "arrogant". Similarly, predication strategies 
echoe similar depictions of violence and immorality. Tweets use different predication 
strategies to ascribe Saudis with negative qualities, such as abusers, hating women, 
war criminals, matching ISIS in dealing with women, denying women freedom (such 
as dress-code enforcement and banning them from jobs) and lacking morality. In fact, 
these negative depictions echo similar findings in Western media studies which depict 
Saudi women as “oppressed, deficient, subordinate, submissive, and non-agentive 
women who unquestioningly accept patriarchy and domination” (Alharbi, 2015, p. 
iv). Using both discursive strategies promotes additional hostile representations that 





            Concurrently, the xenophobic discourse on Twitter resulted in adverse 
depictions and misconceptions that incited extended violent (examples 165, 186 and 
187) and racist attitudes (examples 134, 135 and 137) of tweets against Saudis. What 
is alarming is that such discourse prompts Saudiphobia and intolerance, which may be 
practised in reality. This can fuel violence and hate crimes, such as online 
Islamophobia discourse which, according to Ekman, targets people associated with 
Islam, thereby stirring “street politics and the use of violence” (2015, p. 1998). The 
immersed negative stereotypes of Saudis in the media can have a significant influence 
on how others perceive them on Twitter and, consequently, be carried out or practised 
offline.  















Chapter 7. Exploration of differences among the corpora 
7.1. Introduction   
In this chapter, I discuss the differences between the five corpora to answer RQ-3 (To 
what extent are Saudis represented differently by tweets in Australia, Canada, GB, the 
USA and the rest of the world corpora?). To do this, I compare each corpus with the 
other four corpora together. I also incorporate keywords and concordance analyses, as 
well as discursive strategies, intertextuality and interdiscursivity analyses, to 
scrutinise the findings. The analysis yields two types of differences among the 
corpora: keywords unique to each corpus and keywords unique to some corpora more 
than others. The first sections start with keywords that are unique to each corpus, 
starting with the smallest corpus (AUSC) and ending with the largest (RWC). The last 
sections tackle keywords which are common to some corpora but not others.   
7.2. Keywords unique to each corpus 
To investigate differences in the representation of Saudis among the five corpora, 
each corpus will be compared against the other corpora together. In this respect, the 
AUSC is compared with the CAC, the GBC, the USC and the RWC grouped together 
in order to arrive at a keywords list unique to the AUSC. A further step is undertaken 
to validate the results, which involves comparing two sets of corpora together, and the 
resulting keywords lists are then compared. It should be noted that the comparison is 
restricted to the top 200 keywords in each corpus. The resulting unique keywords for 


























(14), tips (7) 
 
Harper (111), #cdnpoli 
(86), Canada (57), 
wheat/board (32), 
#BarbaricCultural-
Practices (14), niqab 
(16), #MunkDebate 
(11), Trudeau (6), 
Duceppe (7), vehicles 
(13), Canadian (18) 
 
Cameron (79), 












Table 7-1: Keywords unique to each corpus  
 
Table 7.1, above, lists the keywords that are unique to each corpus when compared to 
the other corpora. It does, however, exclude keywords that are already common 
among the five corpora; an initial investigation of some of these keywords13 shows 
that their significance is due to differences in corpus sizes. Unique keywords, 
however, are not unique in the sense that they never occur in any of the other corpora, 
but they are unique to the top 200 keywords in each of the five corpora, and thereby 
“a good indicator of topics and concepts that a particular [corpus] is concerned with” 
(Baker et al., 2013). The AUSC has three keywords unique to it, one of which is a 
hashtag, whereas the CAC has the highest number of unique keywords, including 
three hashtags. The GBC also includes a high number of unique keywords, including 
one hashtag, while the USC has a single hashtag only and, finally, the RWC contains 
three unique keywords. The question arising here is whether these differences among 
the corpora signal different themes and consequently project different representations 
 
13 I decided on the random selection of ten common keywords to investigate whether their significance 
is due to differences in corpus size and whether this significance yields new themes or topics that are 





of Saudis. To answer this question, I utilise concordance analysis to examine these 
unique keywords.  
7.3. Keywords unique to the AUSC 
The three keywords unique to the AUSC are Australia (29), #auspol (28) and tips (7), 
with Australia and #auspol being among the top 100 keywords in the AUSC. 
Concordance analysis of these keywords shows that tweets centre around the 
following issues:  
▪ Saudis posing a threat to Australia (through Islamisation)  
▪ Saudis being given a UNHRC seat despite their terrorism/violence  
▪ Both Australia and the Saudis having similar human rights records        
    
            Tweets use the keyword Australia to refer to Saudis’ role in the Islamisation 
or “Islamification” (four tweets) of Australia through funding and building mosques 
and conspiring with Australian politicians to promote "Jihadism". This issue has 
already been highlighted in Chapter 5, where Saudis are alleged to be Islamising 








This mosque is being funded by the Saudis, all part of the plan to  
#islamification Australia      
The deal cut by Aussie politicians, Bankers with the Saudis to 
Islamise Australia by birthrate jihadism.          
Absolute insanity for Australia to align itself with the UN. Saudis  
funding the spread of Islam throughout the West.   
                    
Constructing the Saudis as a threat to Australia (and the West as well) is stressed by 





issues are associated with two common themes in the FCT: arms deals and allowing 
the Saudis onto the UNHRC. For instance, in example 198, the tweet points to a 
mosque in Australia and condemns the Saudis for funding it. The tweet then claims 
that Saudis, through funding mosques, plan at the "Islamification" of Australia. It also 
tags "Islamification" in a hashtag to highlight and circulate what may be considered a 
threatening act by the Saudis. The “Islamification” of Australia is also highlighted 
through associating some common themes in the FCT, such as arms deals between 
Saudis and Australian politicians and bankers (example 199), which are perceived by 
the tweet as Saudi plans to “Islamise” Australia, hence echoing a sense of threat and 
intimidation. The tweet hints at the Saudis’ sponsorship and promotion of terrorism, 
represented by the phrase “by birthrate Jihadism”, which, according to Western 
academics, carries a negative sense of extreme violence and struggle (BBC News, 
2014). In fact, warning against Saudis sponsoring an “Islamification” process is 
extended by the tweet in example 200 to threaten the West as well. The tweet 
criticises Australia for joining the UNHRC since the Saudis are already a member of 
the Council. The UNHRC is ultimately represented as illegitimate and sceptical, as it 
allows the Saudis membership, and they are alleged by the tweet to fund the spread of 
Islam in the West. This claim prompts the tweet to warn against the Saudis as a 
threatening source, not only to Australia but to the Western world as well.   
            #Auspol is a hashtag launched in 2015 and refers to trending political topics in 
Australia. According to Bogle (2016), #auspol (a short term for Australian politics) is 
one of the most trending hashtags in Australia and the third globally. It has also been 
used to tag all recent and controversial issues and debated topics in Australia. 
However, what is of importance here is the ways in which this hashtag correlates to 





hashtags. A concordance analysis reveals that tweets use the hashtag #auspol to 
condemn allowing the Saudis onto the UNHRC: tweets oppose this since the Saudis 
have a long history of beheading people and their human rights record is much worse 
than that of ISIS. For example: 




Saudi elected head UN Human Rights panel Saudis worst HR   
record More beheadings than ISIS #auspol  Example 220     
The Saudis are ISIS with solid gold toilets @cybermogul #Auspol 
 
Both tweets comment on a tweet by The Independent twitter account reporting the 
furious reactions following the news of Saudi Arabia chairing a UNHRC panel (see 
Figure 7-1 below). 
 
 
Figure 7-1: Tweet by The Independent about Saudis chairing a UNHR panel 
 
The tweet in example 201 responds by criticising the Saudis’ human rights record, 
which is described as the “worst”. It then claims that the Saudis behead more people 





however, uses the hashtag auspol, as it responds to The Independent tweet and uses a 
metaphoric expression that analogises Saudis with ISIS in terms of their criminal 
behaviour, except that the Saudis are different in being rich and owning “solid gold 
toilets”. Both tweets warn against allowing the Saudis to head the UNHRC panel by 
linking them directly to terroristic behaviour and comparing them to ISIS. Both tweets 
also recontextualise The Independent tweet, which also embeds a weblink to the 
article’s webpage, about the rage over electing the Saudis to head the UNHRC panel 
and linking them to terrorism by comparing them with ISIS. This is also achieved 
through using the hashtag #Auspol, which is basically devoted to tagging 
controversial and political Australian issues. This hashtag is used by tweets to 
disseminate negative representations of Saudis to the wider (Australian) public and 
gain the solidarity of corresponding views.       
             A concordance analysis of tips (seven tweets) reveals that tweets address two 
key issues: criticising the Australia human rights records and its political members' 
relationships with the Saudis. Tweets assume that Saudis share a similar human rights 
record with the Australians and refer to this resemblance as a means of “swapping 
torture tips”. They also condemn allowing the Saudis a seat on the UNHRC, despite 
their plans to “behead” Al-Nimr for what they assume are irrational reasons, as in the 
following tweets:  






How about Australia close its Concentration Camps before 
swapping tips on 'How to Torture' with the Saudis...???            
Asbestos is planning on swapping torture tips with the Saudis 
who behead more people than any other country...  
Do America's key allies, the Saudis, take tips from ISIS on 






Tweets use tips basically to highlight the asylum-seekers issue in Australia, which has 
provoked broad concerns and debates about the mandatory detention of asylum 
seekers that correlates to Australian national policy (Newman, Proctor, & Dudley, 
2013). Associating Saudis with tips results in further negative discourse about them: 
tweets assume that the relationships with Saudis can only incur further hardship for 
the already distressed detainees. This issue is exaggerated by the tweet in example 
203 which urges the closure of “Concentration Camps”14 before their condition 
becomes worse, presented by the phrase “swapping tips on 'How to Torture' with the 
Saudis”. The tweet here mocks Australia’s detention camps, which may become 
worse if the Australians align with the Saudis, who will impose further hardships on 
these “Camps” that are already condemned and criticised. In example 204, the tweet 
criticises the Foreign Minister (FM), Julie Bishop, for defending Australia’s human 
rights at the UNHRC in a plea for a seat on the council. To mock current Australian 
human rights issues, the tweet claims that the FM (referred to as “asbestos”) plans on 
“swapping torture tips” with Saudis who are to be on a UNHRC panel. The tweet 
suggests that both Australia and the Saudis share similar human rights records and, 
with both joining the UNHRC, the Saudis can perpetuate Australian human rights 
problems, given their history of beheading people. The last example (205) correlates 
tips with the crucifixion case of Ali Al-Nimr; the tweet mocks the Saudis (described 
as “America’s key allies”) for crucifying Al-Nimr. The keyword tips associates 
Saudis with ISIS, as both crucifying and beheading people. These depictions, in fact, 
echo similar representations to those brought up in Chapter 5. Tweets in the AUSC 
seems to express similar views to those expressed in the FCT, such as associating 
 
14 Anthony Levin defines a concentration camp thus: “the concentration camp enables the nation-state 
to expunge unwanted or threatening social elements from the body politic. In the case of contemporary 






Saudis with terror and corruption, introduced not only through the unique keywords 
but also through hashtags that are mainly devoted to Australian politics. 
7.4. Keywords unique to the CAC 
The Canadian corpus has the highest number of unique keywords. These include the 
names of political figures, including Harper, Trudeau, Duceppe; hashtags, including 
cdnpoli, BarbaricCulturalPractices, MunkDebate; keywords related to politics, 
including wheat/board, vehicles, niqab; and the keywords Canada and Canadian. The 
following paragraph presents brief background information about these keywords.     
              October 2015 signalled Canadian elections for Parliament and, during this 
period, tweets mainly focused on three main political figures: the prime minister S. 
Harper, the Liberal party leader J. Trudeau, and the former Opposition Party Leader 
G. Duceppe. These members are criticised by tweets for selling arms (vehicles) and 
wheat board to the Saudis. Hashtags were also generated in correspondence to the 
elections, such as #cdnpoli, which is short for Canadian politics, and 
#BarbaricCuturalPractices, which is a hashtag created on Twitter following the 
Conservative Party’s proposal to launch a ‘tip line’ for Canadian citizens to report any 
barbaric cultural practices performed on Canadian lands. However, this service was 
later criticised by tweets for its racist and discriminatory purposes, such as banning 
niqab in Canada. Finally, #MunkDebate is a hashtag referring to a debate programme 
launched in 2008, and considered to be “Canada’s first-ever federal election debate 
devoted to foreign policy issues” (Kindornay, 2015). 
            The question posed here then is how Saudis are associated with and 
represented in these Canadian-specific issues and hashtags, and whether this 





these unique keywords discloses negative discourse and adverse portrayals that 
associate Saudis with one or more of the following issues: terrorism (e.g. affiliating 
with ISIS and the war in Yemen), human rights violations (e.g. crucifying Al-Nimr 
and oppressing women, and manipulating Canadian Parliament members (e.g. arms 
deals and selling the wheat board). These issues are interrelated, i.e. a single keyword 
can coexist throughout different issues. For instance, arms relates Saudis to secret 
deals with government members (PM Harper as an example) and to terror, such as 
killing Yemenis, which is carried out with arms and weapons sold to the Saudis by the 
Canadian government. Tweets also use the hashtag #BarbaicCulturalPractices to tag 
the issues of banning niqab, selling arms to the Saudis and ignoring Saudis' 
oppression of women. Tweets condemn these issues and argue that they exemplify the 
‘real’ barbaric practices of Conservative Party members.  
             The first issue that Canadian tweets associate with Saudis is terrorism and 
supporting ISIS (14 tweets). This issue pertains to Harper, Duceppe and Trudeau, who 
are represented as being involved in selling weapons and arms (armoured vehicles) to 
the Saudis. This issue is also tagged in the hashtags #cdnpoli and 
#BarbaricCulturalPractices. Tweets also condemn selling arms to Saudis and claim 
that they will fund and support ISIS with these weapons to kill Yemenis. For instance: 







According to R Fisk, Saudis are providing materiel to ISIS – 
Harper sells arms to the former and bombs the latter - and the 
winner is ...            
#BarbaricCulturalPractices Harper giving weapons to Saudis to 
kill innocent civilians in Yemen.  
yes, everyone knows Saudis fund ISIS. Your war on Terror is a 
sham! All stories. You send arms to Saudis, dirty. #cdnpoli 





Tweets use Canadian-specific hashtags to present Saudis negatively by condemning 
selling arms to them for two reasons; first, Saudis are alleged to arm and fund ISIS; 
and second, Saudis use these weapons to kill civilians in Yemen. Selling arms also 
triggers the tweet’s concerns over the validity of the war on terror (example 208), 
which is described as a “sham”. The tweet proposes a conspiracy between the Saudis 
and PM Harper, who provides them with arms, though, the tweet claims, it is well-
known to everyone that the Saudis fund ISIS.  
             The second issue that relates to Saudis in the CAC is violations of human 
rights, especially the case of crucifying Ali Al-Nimr (10 tweets) and oppressing 
women (seven). Tweets criticise MPs for selling arms to the Saudis despite, allegedly, 
being supporters of ISIS and crucifying Al-Nimr. Women’s rights are also challenged 
by Canadian tweets which suggest that Saudis oppress women and deny them their 
rights and freedom. Tweets refer to women as passive victims being “oppressed”, 
“suppressed”, “subjugated” and “forced” by the Saudis to follow specific dress codes, 








#MunkDebate Nothing about the 15b in arms to the ISIS 
supporting, head chopping Saudis and the boy who will soon die?  
#BarbaricCulturalPractices Harper and Tories selling weapons to  
help Saudis oppress women! Women forced to dress 'modestly'! 
Why help defend?            
why are Saudis our allies, they fund Terror and oppress women:    
#cdnpoli 
 
Tweets in the CAC use hashtags not only to address national (Canadian) issues but 
also to present Saudis adversely through the interrelation of some of the current 





oppressing women. These issues are challenged by tweets against selling arms and 
aligning with the Saudis. Even when the hashtags are devoted to Canadian elections, 
(e.g. #MunkDebate) or Canadian national security (e.g. #BarbaricCulturalPractices), 
they involve the Saudis by condemning selling arms and wheat to them. 
Consequently, tweets represent Saudis as a national concern and a critical issue that 
should be addressed during Canada’s elections.  
             The last issue that connects Saudis to the CAC’s unique keywords is the 
manipulation of Canada’s MPs through selling weapons and arms deals (43 tweets) 
and selling the wheat board (33) to the Saudis. Tweets criticise the Canadian 
government (MPs) for doing arms deals with the Saudis, these being described as 
“big”, “massive”, “billion worth”, “ridiculous” and “in-secret”. Similarly, selling arms 
to the Saudis is also opposed in parallel with selling the wheat board: tweets reject 
trading the Canadian wheat board for arms deals with the Saudis. Wheat is pre-
modified with the possessive pronoun “our”, which stresses the polarisation of us 
(Canadians) against them (Saudis). Selling wheat is portrayed as challenging the 
tweets’ identity, which will be at stake by the MPs if they give the wheat board to the 
Saudis. And although the Saudis are assigned a passive role (beneficiaries) in the 
process of selling wheat and arms, they are represented as empowered since they can 
exploit Canadian MPs. Selling arms and the wheat board, in turn, suggests that the 







First, #Saudis buy #CWB co, now buy arms in mega deal w/o  
transparency. What else has Harper done??  #cdnpoli             
Harper sold our wheat Board to the Saudis for this arms deal.  
Stripping Canadians off their identity. He must lose on Oct 19            
So Kenney lying again about Saudis, who are ok to sell arms and  






Tweets condemn PM Harper and the politician Kenney for selling the Saudis both 
arms and wheat, as well as other undisclosed issues. These issues are deemed 
unlawful, alarming and executed without “transparency”, suggesting secrecy and 
corruption. In example 213, the tweet accuses PM Harper of selling the wheat for 
arms deals with Saudis and presents this act as a threat to Canadian “identity”. The 
tweet suggests that Canadian identity is at risk of being stripped off by the Saudis if 
they buy the wheat board, implying a sense of threat and contempt, and, consequently, 
constructs the Saudis as a source threatening Canadians’ identity and safety. This 
negative stance triggers a tweet to demand that PM Harper lose the federal elections.   
             Selling wheat to the Saudis is posited as alarming and treacherous. In fact, 
wheat is represented as being given to the Saudis (11 tweets), which indicates that 
Canadians’ MPs have sacrificed Canadian wheat for the Saudis. This also triggers 
some concerns in tweets about wheat prices, which will be under the control of the 
Saudis, as in example 223 below:  
 
Example 215 Hey Harper: Canada Wheat Board price controls are in the hands 




The tweet addresses PM Harper and reasserts concerns that the Saudis will control the 
wheat prices, and emphasises the risks of giving their wheat away through repeating 
the anaphoric pronoun “them”. Using the pronoun “them” presents the Saudis as a 
negative and threatening other and highlights the discourse of a (threatened) ‘us’ 





              Further, the three Canadian-specific hashtags are used by tweets to 
recontextualise and highlight other issues. For instance, #BarbaricCulturaPractices is 
recontextualised and used as a hashtag on Twitter only to mock the Conservative 
Party’s contradictory attitudes towards some issues like niqab. Tweets use this 
hashtag to interdiscursively introduce other topics, such as condemning the decision 
of banning niqab in Canada while making arms deals with the Saudis, who impose it 
on women. The hashtag #cdnpoli, which is devoted to Canadian politics, is also 
recontextualised by tweets to represent Saudis negatively; tweets condemn the 
Canadian MPs alliance with the Saudis to highlight other issues, such as their support 
for terrorism (ISIS) and their oppression of women. 
             Additionally, these unique keywords disclose some discursive strategies with 
which tweets in the CAC represent Saudis. For instance, tweets deploy nomination 
strategies which refer to Saudis in relation to terrorism, such as “terrorist spawning”, 
and to violence, such as “human rights violators”. In addition, tweets also employ 
predicational strategies which also serve to ascribe negative qualities to Saudis related 
to terrorism and violence, such as “beheading”, “crucifying”, “stoning”, backing ISIS 
and AlQaeda, oppressing women by imposing niqab and modest clothing, and 
practising slavery. Saudis are also represented as “tyrants” and ironically portrayed as 
“ally”, “pals” and “good guys” to mock MPs’ alliances/relationships with them. 
Hashtags in the CAC serve to promote additional negative stances held by Canadian 
tweets against Saudis. Within these hashtags, tweets employ nomination strategies to 























Pre-middle ages, war criminals, barbaric, 
business partners, despotic, warmongering, 
Wahhabi, champion torturers, beheaders  
Table 7-2: Nomination strategies used to refer to Saudis in the CAC hashtags 
        
Examining Table 7-2, above, shows that tweets use adverse terms to refer to Saudis 
that are mainly related to terror and violence. Since hashtags are meant to promote 
and share specific topics, employing these negative strategies to refer to Saudis in 
Canadian-specific hashtags suggests that tweets intend to reconnect with the larger 
public to address their concerns about Parliament members during the election period. 
Tweets tend to tag Saudis with such adverse portraits in reaction to ongoing debates 
(TV debate series for instance), which highlight certain issues such as arms deals and 
selling the wheat board, that Canadian tweets reject and view as alarming. Selling 
wheat is an example that is regarded as jeopardy by the PM Harper: tweets condemn 
selling wheat to the Saudis as they assume it threatens their Canadian identity. Tweets 
also presuppose that the Saudis will control the wheat prices, and this is foreseen as 
another upcoming hazard for Canadians.  
             In sum, the issues and themes that recur through the unique keywords in the 
CAC suggest a hegemonic ‘negative’ discourse that affiliates with the dominating 
discourse in the FCT (see Chapter 5).      
7.5. Keywords unique to the GBC 
Looking back at Table 6-1, the keywords unique to the GBC are Cameron, UK, MOJ, 





Cameron was the Prime Minister of the UK from 2010 to 2016, J. Corbyn was the 
leader of the Labour and Opposition Party from 2015 to 2020, and Tories stands for 
Conservative Party members. The MOJ is short for the UK Ministry of Justice, 
whereas #newsNight is a hashtag referring to a BBC2 TV programme, broadcast on 
weeknights, which identifies its goal as being “to explain the complexities of the 
modern world … and hold the powerful to account” (Newsnight, 2018). It also has a 
Twitter account with over 5,000 followers.  
             Tweets including PM Cameron (79 tweets) mainly tackle two points: 
condemning his deals with the Saudis (65 tweets) and contrasting his attitude against 
Corbyn’s, who is favoured and praised for his stance opposing dealing with the 
Saudis, especially in terms of the crucifixion of Al-Nimr (14 tweets). Tweets criticise 
Cameron for doing arms deals with the Saudis, using terms like “sells”, “standing up 
to”, “supports”, “loves cosying”, “helps” and “being bribed by the Saudis”. These 
deals, as tweets suggest, only contribute to supporting terror, such as backing ISIS or 
killing Yemenis. Tweets also contrast Cameron’s relationship with the Saudis with the 
stance of Corbyn, who holds an opposing position, especially in terms of the 
crucifixion of Ali Al-Nimr. Example tweets are as follows: 







SORRY but David_Cameron calling Jeremy Corbin a 
TERRORIST sympathiser is a bit rich as Cameron supports ISIS 
funding Saudis!??               
And @david_cameron is selling the bombs for the #Saudis to 
bomb #Yemen every night for 6 months...  
Fantastic speech Corbyn. Can you imagine Cameron standing up 







Tweets paint a negative image of Saudis by associating them with arming ISIS, 
bombing Yemen and crucifying Al-Nimr. Tweets in the examples above express their 
resentment at PM Cameron for aligning with the Saudis, who pose a threat to the UK 
since they fund ISIS (example 216). Cameron’s relationship with the Saudis is also 
challenged as regards two other recurring issues in the FCT, the non-stop bombing of 
Yemen (example 217) and “sadistically crucifying & beheading” Al-Nimr (example 
218). These issues pertain to the strategy of a negative-other presentation (van Dijk, 
1999), which emphasises that the Saudis are a threat to British people, and highlights 
the Saudis’ negative qualities to criticise Cameron’s (illegitimate) relations with them. 
This strategy is also used to praise Corbyn for taking an opposing (negative) view of 
both the Saudis and Cameron, who does not stand against them, especially regarding 
the crucifixion of Al-Nimr.   
             The keyword UK is mentioned in 111 tweets, collectivized in 70 tweets, 
whereas the remaining 41 tweets refer to the UK as a geographic location. In the 
former case, tweets use the UK as a collectivised term to refer to the UK’s 
government and its representatives. This includes referring to arms deals, supporting 
the Saudis having a UNHRC seat and how Saudis “undermine” UK law. However, 
UK as a place is used either to refer to UK-made weapons, military training and 
supporting the Saudis in their wars against civilians (especially in Yemen), or to refer 
to the threats that Saudis are supposedly posing to the UK, such as spreading their 
ideology, funding mosques and gradually owning British lands. The crucifixion case 
of Al-Nimr also triggers tweets’ concerns over the Saudis’ plans to spread their 










Saudis Aided by UK military for training and weapons supply!     
UK made 'secret pact' with Saudi Arabia for human rights council  
place… this is a joke the UK is owned by the Saudis  




In examples 219 and 220, tweets express their resentment at the UK government for 
both the military training for and “weapons supply” to the Saudis, as it led to the 
deaths of Yemeni civilians in an airstrike on a wedding. However, tweets’ 
condemnation of helping the Saudis gain a UNHRC seat and Al-Nimr’s crucifixion 
(example 221) triggers their concerns about UK national security. The tweet in 
example 221 assumes that the Saudis pose a threat to the UK if they are allowed onto 
the UNHRC, by controlling it, such as “UK is owned by the Saudis”. Whereas in 
example 229, the tweet supposes that the Saudis threatens the UK, through the 
expression “funding their ideology”, which claims that the Saudis will spread a 
beheading ideology in the UK if Corbyn does not stop the Saudis from crucifying Al-
Nimr.         
             The last unique keyword is the hashtag #newsnight (14 tweets): tweets with 
this hashtag criticise the UK government (MPs) for selling arms to the Saudis, 
supporting them joining the UNHRC and condemning the Saudis for manipulating 
MPs to defend the Saudis. Additionally, tweets condemn Saudi-UK relations by 
commending the Newsnight presenter Emily Maitlis for standing up against what they 
describe as a hypocritical attitude of Saudis in the UNHRC. For example: 






Why is #newsnight not talking about Cameron being bribed by 
the Saudis with arms deal to get them on the UN human right… 
I wonder how much the Saudis will pay #kawczynskimp for 





Example 224 Go @maitlis. Going in for the kill on the outrageous hypocrisy of 
the Saudis on human rights #Newsnight       
Involving the Saudis in political, UK-specific hashtags is an indication of how tweets 
deploy hashtags to disseminate negative stances and attitudes about Saudis. The 
#newsnight hashtag is linked with some of the common themes in the FCT to stress 
one main issue, that the Saudis constitute a hazard to the UK. This issue is also 
highlighted through the interrelation of themes, such as in example 222, in which the 
tweet criticises the Newsnight programme for not discussing how the Saudis “bribed” 
Cameron via an “arms deal” to get a UNHRC seat. Tweets also use the keyword 
#newsnight to condemn UK MPs, such as Daniel Kawczynski, claiming that they are 
bribed by the Saudis to defend them (example 223). Tweets also praise the Newsnight 
presenter, Emily Maitlis, for her resentful attitude towards the Saudis in an interview 
with the Saudi ambassador to the UN (example 224).    
             Tweeting about Saudis while tagging the #newsnight programme also reveals 
how intertextuality and interdiscursivity are used through hashtags to portray the 
Saudis and highlight certain negative aspects of their representations. Tweets deploy 
the #newsnight hashtag to address issues of corruption that link UK MPs with the 
Saudis, such as bribery and hypocrisy. Tweets also recontextualise the hashtag to 
address other topics, such as the manipulation of MPs to help the Saudis gain a 
UNHRC seat, thereby constructing further negative portrayals of Saudis in association 
with UK politicians.   
             Using both transitivity and discursive strategies analyses also reveals how 
these unique keywords can be helpful in unravelling aspects of the representation of 





material processes, are covertly empowered and represented as controlling and 
penetrating the UK’s legal system, such as “US/UK suck up to Saudis”, “UK cosying 
up with Saudis”, “UK bullied by Saudis” and “Saudis coerced UK gov”. This 
depiction entails a discourse of corruption and plotting and promotes further negative 
portrayals of Saudis, such as constructing them as a national threat and international 
terrorists. However, when the UK is collectivised, it is assigned an active role as an 
agent in material processes (29 tweets) including “support”, “made”, “give”, “back” 
and “selling”: these processes trigger acts of condemnation towards the UK’s role in 
promoting the Saudis’ violence and presuppose an alarming and threatening (Saudi) 
danger that may be inflicted on the UK and its people.  
             Tweets, using unique keywords, also employ nomination and predicational 
strategies via which they refer to Saudis and ascribe specific characteristics to them. 
Tweets use the same strategies while tweeting about deals in which some UK 
government members (MPs) are involved with the Saudis. These are listed in Table 7-









   
 
Nomination   
 
terror-funding, ISIS funding, 
fucking, terror exporters, 
child-beheading, criminal, 
barbaric, abusive,   
 
hideous, shady, back-
room, squalid, secret, 
dodgy, bloody, backhand, 
backdoor, alleged, 





murderous, tyrants, less 




execute gays, biggest 
funders/supporters of Hamas 
 
 
disgraceful, erroneously   





 As seen in Table 7-3, above, tweets use nomination strategies to refer to Saudis and 
their deals with some UK government members. Saudis are mostly represented in 
terms of terror and terrorism support, such as “terror-funding” and “ISIS funding”, or 
of violence, such as “abusive”. These strategies promote both themes of terror and 
violence which seem to be persistent qualities attributed to Saudis across the corpora. 
The deals are also described as indecent, filthy and dark (e.g. “dodgy”, “hideous”, 
“shady”), indicating a negative discourse prosody of corruption and conspiracy.  
7.6. Keywords unique to the USC 
The USC has only one unique keyword: the hashtag #GopDebate. The term refers to 
one of the two main political parties in the USA, which are the Democratic Party and 
the Republican Party (the latter is also referred to as the Grand Old Party or ‘GOP’). 
The hashtag basically tags a debate show for Republican Party members to choose the 
top ten presidential nominees. Tweets post their feedback on the debate tagging the 
programme in their tweets. The question then is how these tweets connect Saudis to 
#GopDebate, and how they are represented within this hashtag.  
             Using concordance analysis, the #GopDebate occurs in 21 tweets. Examining 
each tweet shows that tweets refer to Saudis with reflection on the topics being 
debated by GOP members and the tag #GopDebate in their tweets. More specifically, 
three candidates are in focus: Jeb Bush, the 43rd Governor of Florida, Lindsey 
Graham, a Senator from South Carolina, and Rand Paul, a Senator from Kentucky. 
Tweets associate these figures with the Saudis, mainly in terms of the 9/11 attacks and 
the war in Yemen.  
             Tweets condemn US relations with the Saudis despite the latter being 





of supporting the Saudis, either by befriending them, concealing their involvement in 









@JebBush Your family's BFFs are Saudis. 15 of the 19 terrorists  
named on 9/11 were Saudis. #HeKeptUsSafe #GOPDebate  
Uh @LindseyGrahamSC tripping right now next 9/11 coming 
from Syria?  Common Son #GOPDebate last one came from 
Saudis    




Tweets in the USC use the hashtag #GOPDebate to criticise US politicians for (still) 
aligning with the Saudis despite their responsibility for the 9/11 attacks. By 
associating the Saudis with the 9/11 attacks, tweets suggest that the Saudis are a 
source of threat to the US and, consequently, question the credibility of candidates 
who align with them. For instance, in examples 225 and 226, both tweets address the 
9/11 attacks to counter Jeb Bush and Lindsey Graham, who are among the 
presidential candidates in the GOP debate show. Both tweets recontextualise the 9/11 
event to critically reminds both candidates of the Saudis’ role in those attacks. In 
example 225, the tweet mocks Bush for his family’s close relationship with the Saudis 
using the acronym ‘BFFs’, which means that they and the Saudis are ‘best friends for 
sure/forever sincere’. It then refers to the 9/11 attacks, stressing the number of Saudis 
among the attackers, and linking this event to the Bush family’s relationship with the 
Saudis. Associating the Saudis with 9/11 carries both a sense of mockery and fear 
since, despite their responsibility for the attacks, the Bush family still maintain 
relations with the Saudis, and this is postulated as alarming and threatening to the US. 
This sense of threat is further highlighted by using a hashtag generated as irony of J. 





Bush, saying “he kept us safe” (Preovolos, 2015). This statement was tagged on 
Twitter to mock Bush’s presidential campaign. In example 226, however, the sense of 
danger is highlighted by the tweet, which disapproves of Lindsey Graham statement 
during the debate and warns against another 9/11 style attack coming from Syria if the 
US does not intervene and stop ISIS. The tweet describes Lindsey’s statement as a 
foolish act and mocks him by saying that the original 9/11 was caused by the Saudis, 
who constitute a real threat, and not ISIS—constructing the Saudis as a threat is also 
linked to the US-led invasion of Iraq following the 9/11 attacks as a part of the war-
on-terror coalition. The tweet in example 227 points to the illegitimacy of the war on 
Iraq and states that the Iraqis are not a threat to the US, rather it was the Saudis who 
were responsible for the attacks. The tweet claims that the Saudis represent the real 
threat, given that Bin Laden, the planner of the attacks, was a Saudi. Tagging the GOP 
debate programme, the tweet addresses the Republican candidates and hints at their 
alliance with the Saudis, despite their responsibility for the 9/11 attacks, suggesting a 
conspiracy and corruption, as well as putting US national security at stake. 
             On the other hand, tweets express their congruence with presidential 
candidate Rand Paul, who holds a strict and negative stance towards the Saudis, and 
praise him for standing up against them regarding their terrorism support and the 
Syrian refugee crisis. For instance: 







Example 247    Rand Paul the only candidate to call out Saudis on 
their terrorism financing, arguably more taboo in the US than 
abortion. Bravo.  #GOPDebate  
Yes! Go Rand Paul on Saudi Arabia! #GOPDebate force Saudis 







Tweets also use the #GOPDebate hashtag to acclaim those politicians who hold a 
negative stance vis-à-vis the Saudis. In the USC, the only candidate who is acclaimed 
by tweets for his stance against the Saudis is Rand Paul. In example 228, the tweet 
admires Paul for being the only candidate who stands up to the Saudis and criticises 
them openly for supporting terrorism. It also claims that criticising the Saudis is an act 
of bravery by Paul since, it claims, no one can talk about this issue that is considered 
“more taboo in the US than abortion”. In this context, the tweet warns against the 
Saudis by presenting them in a powerful position and condemns US politicians who 
turn a blind eye to their terroristic affiliations. Similarly, in example 229, the tweet 
aligns itself with Paul as he attacks the Saudis on the GOP debate show. It also urges 
him to “force” the Saudis to accept Syrian refugees and stabilise the Middle East. In 
this respect, the tweet perceives the Syrian refugees as a problem elevated by the 
Saudis who do not receive any of them. It also assumes that the Saudis play a role in 
destabilising the Middle East and urges that action be taken against them in order to 
restore peace in the region.      
             In fact, the discourse surrounding the Saudis in the USC is homogenous with 
the discourse in the FCT: this is indicated by the hashtag #GopDebate that is deployed 
by tweets to promote other tweets’ endorsement of the existing ‘negative’ discourse 
about Saudis in the USC.  
7.7. Keywords unique to the RWC 
The unique keywords in the RWC are Hajis, India and Indian. The term Hajis (42 
tweets) is the plural form of Haji, which is taken from Hajj and refers to someone 
who has successfully performed Hajj or pilgrimage in Mecca. This term is mainly 





keyword to highlight two main points: blaming the Saudis for the casualties in the 
stampede at Mecca and how they treated the deceased “Hajis’” (pilgrims’) bodies. In 
the case of the former, tweets emphasise the Saudis’ responsibility for the death of 
pilgrims in the stampede, which could have been avoided if the numbers of pilgrims 
had been controlled, and blame the Saudis’ reckless behaviour and greed for money. 
This issue triggers tweets to proclaim Saudis’ incapability to handle Hajj and ensure 
pilgrims’ safety. For example: 







Saudis proved twice this year they are incapable of managing Hajj 
and ensuring safety of Hajis.  
Reduce number of Hajjaj, maybe? #MinaStampede 
Shame on you for hiding facts about #mina tragedy where 
innocent #hajis were killed by reckless #saudis              
Saudis treat Hajj as theme park, pull in as many tourists as 
possible, if anything goes wrong, blame the Hajis 
 
Using the keyword Hajis triggers tweets to react to the stampede event by blaming the 
Saudis for the tragic event. Tweets not only assign Saudis the responsibility for the 
stampede but also accuse them of mismanagement and being incapable of handling 
the Hajj event and maintaining pilgrims’ safety. Saudis are referred to as reckless and 
accused of hiding the facts about the stampede (example 230) and being incapable of 
managing Hajj (example 231). Saudis are also accused of exploiting the Hajj season. 
The tweet in example 232 compares it to a “theme park”: this comparison positions 
the Saudis in an adverse light as it offends the sacredness of the holy season and its 
guests. Saudis are presented as exploiting the pilgrims’ money without ensuring their 
safety and, at the same time, blaming these pilgrims if something goes wrong, 
suggesting that the Saudis pose a threat to the pilgrims and so they should be 





            As with handling the bodies of dead pilgrims, tweets represent Hajis as 
victims of the Saudis who are reported as treating the deceased pilgrims with 
disrespect, such as treating the dead bodies like a “pile of shit”, “pulled by JCB”, 
“stacked in heaps”, “dump bodies without informing relatives” and “hiding actual 
number of the deceased pilgrims”. Hajis are referentially described as “poor”, 
“Muslim”, “martyred”, “innocent” and “deceased”, which draws further sympathy 
towards the dead pilgrims and criminalises the Saudis. For instance:       






Saudis are Planning to Dump all dead bodies of Hajis without 
informing their relatives  
Thousands of African troops crossed into Yemen to die for Saudis  
while their dead Hajis treated like piles of shit.                
Have u seen the pics of how they stacked the deceased Hajis in 
heaps. Saudis have failed on many fronts. 
 
Tweets in the examples above proclaim that the Saudis treated the dead pilgrims 
terribly (by burying them without notifying their families). Using the words “dump” 
and “stacked” while handling the dead bodies carries negative semantic prosody since 
“dump” refers to unwanted ‘worthless’ things and “stack” refers to inanimate objects. 
These tweets indicate that the Saudis were disrespectful towards the dead bodies on 
the one hand, and to their families on the other. The tweet in example 234 associates 
this issue with the war in Yemen, arguing against the Saudis for the disrespectful 
manner with which they treated the bodies of African pilgrims while thousands of 
African soldiers are being killed in Yemen while defending the Saudis in their war. 
This negative presentation of the Saudis goes beyond treating the pilgrims’ dead 
bodies inhumanely and also suggests that their attitude towards (living) pilgrims can 





             Examining both keywords India (142 tweets) and Indian (90 tweets) suggests 
that tweets were originating from India or from Indian tweeters.15 This may be due to 
the themes that dominate the tweets of both keywords, which are summarised in the 
following points: 
• A domestic Indian maid whose hands were chopped off by a Saudi 
employee 
• Saudis protected by Indian police (in the case of a Nepalese rape victim) 
• Saudis raping Indian women 
• Indian workers treated like slaves by Saudis 
The first issue seems to trigger the other following points. The story that spread in the 
media was about a domestic Indian maid working for a Saudi citizen who tried to 
escape from a second-floor apartment window using a long cloth. The maid fell down 
onto a sharp electric box that immediately amputated her arm (AlHaidar, 2015). 
However, this story was fabricated, accusing the Saudi sponsor of deliberately 
chopping off her arm, as well as abuse and harassment. This incident triggered several 
hostile reactions on Twitter and raised other issues, such as accusing the Saudis of 
immoral behaviour towards Indian maids (including rape), an inhumane attitude 
towards Indian workers and corruption of the Indian police who covered for the 
Saudis. The latter is associated with the case of the rape of a Nepalese woman, in 
which a Saudi diplomat in India was involved (Section 5.4.1). The Indian police are 
accused of manipulating the case and allowing the diplomat to escape. For instance: 
 
 
15 This was achieved by tracking the geolocations of 20 random tweets through identifying their 
latitude/ longitude. Among these, 16 tweets originated from India. Besides, India is among the top ten 












Its unacceptable to us, but for Saudis such ghastly acts appear  
to be Normal and Quite Acceptable if it’s done against Indians! 
Saudi diplomat left the country. Nobody's bothered because they 
are rich. Saudis can get away with anything. Living charmed life! 
I've been hearing a lot of stories about the #saudis raping or rather   
mauling (Indian) women since a long time. 
Saudis having been for long ill treating Indian workers, raping  
Indian maids and now even chopping their hand off 
  
 
In example 236, the tweet replies to an Indian breaking news account that posted a 
picture of the Indian maid in hospital after her hand was amputated (see Figure 7-1, 




Figure 7-1: Image of the Indian maid in hospital after her hand was amputated, as posted on Twitter 
 
The tweet reacts to this image by voicing rejection and contempt towards this 
incident. It quotes the word “unacceptable” and uses the plural pronoun “us” to 





with such horrific acts and only practise them on Indians, and consider it acceptable 
and normal. The tweet’s response suggests the racist and aggressive behaviour of 
Saudis against others, especially Indians. However, in example 237, the tweet refers 
to the rape case against a Saudi diplomat who it is claimed fled the country with the 
assistance of the Indian police. It then posits an argument claiming that Saudis can 
escape this case and any other such issue because they are “rich”. The tweet 
eventually concludes by stating that Saudis live a “charmed life!”, suggesting their 
indifference, cruelty and selfishness towards others. Both tweets recontextualise the 
two events of the amputated-arm maid and the Nepalese rape case to represent all 
Saudis negatively. For instance, the tweet in example 238 replies to an Indian account 
that includes an image and a weblink to an article referring to the maid’s case. 
However, this account also recontextualises the event into a fabricated text accusing 
the employer of deliberately chopping off the maid’s arm. The tweet’s reply also 
recontextualises the event to accuse the Saudis collectively of violence and suggests 
that they often commit these acts and considers them part of their routine, especially 
against Indians. Similarly, the tweet in example 239 recontextualises the rape case 
against the Saudi diplomat to claim that Saudis are empowered by their wealth to act 
against others without any accountability.  
            A further discursive strategies analysis shows that tweets in the RWC deploy 
nomination strategies to refer to Saudis in adverse ways, such as “fucking” and 
“shameless”, and predicational strategies that reflect how they depict Saudis, such as 
“savages”, “dictators”, “disgusting” and “rape terrorists”. In fact, the unique keywords 
in the RWC indicate a negative discourse that is homogenous with the other four 






7.8. Keywords more common to some corpora than others 
This section discusses the keywords that are more common in some corpora than 
others. This is achieved through manually comparing the keyword lists of each corpus 
with the remaining corpora individually, and any keywords among common to two or 
more corpora are grouped together. Each keyword is then examined in context using 
extensive concordance analysis. The resulting common keywords are discussed in the 
following sections.  
7.8.1. The RWC and the USC: Saudis and women driving  
Both the RWC and the USC share the word drive* which collocates women in 23 
tweets; the collocation of drive* and women is associated with the issue of Saudi 
women driving ban. Although the government announced a lifting of the ban in 2015, 
Saudi women were only allowed to drive in 2018, so these tweets were during the 
period of the ban. The first tweet tackling the issue of Saudi women driving dates 
back to August 2010 and was posted by an anonymous account in an interrogative 
form (see Figure 6-1). This time it corresponded with the month of Ramadan and, 
ironically, the tweet posited ‘a Ramadan’ riddle, asking the Saudis about the reasons 
why women cannot drive and whether it is a law that applies only to Saudi Arabia. 







Figure 7-2: First tweet mentioning the ban on Saudi women driving 
 
             What concerns the present research is the ways in which Saudis are associated 
with the Saudi women driving issue and how tweets employ this issue to represent 
Saudis. To do this, I rely on concordance analysis to investigate the correlation 
between the two. In fact, tweets in the RWC (19 tweets) link Saudis negatively with 
the ban on women driving, recalling assumptions of oppression, contradiction, 
terrorism and violence. Saudis, in light of this issue, are presented as either hating 
women, avoiding Sunnah, oppressing women, “horrible” or “primitives”. The issue of 
preventing women driving also prompted tweets to condemn the Saudis chairing the 
UNHRC, increasing oil demand, using barbaric methods for punishment and 









Our "friends" the Saudis r horrible. Women cannot drive, they  
punish via barbaric methods AND ISIS finance backers              
why do u Saudis hate women?why cant women drive or walk 
alone in the streets? Y is it a male dominated country 
the Saudis will chair the un human rights commission ...are 






Women being banned from driving is problematised by tweets in the RWC which 
associate it with some of the issues co-occurring with Saudis in the FCT, such as 
beheading people, backing ISIS and allowing them onto the UNHRC. Banning 
women from driving entails further negative depictions of Saudis, such as describing 
them as “horrible”, hating women and violating human rights. Saudi women are thus 
presented as agentless, abused and subjugated by Saudi men and forced to live in “a 
male-dominated country” (example 241). Tweets use the issue of women being 
banned from driving to oppose aligning with the Saudis and condemn allowing them 
onto the UNHRC (example 242). These negative qualities resemble a negative-other 
presentation strategy in which tweets in the RWC link Saudis with some of the 
common topics in the FCT, along with the issue of Saudi women driving, to present 
them as a vile and negative outgroup. This strategy also poses the Saudis as a 
threatening source in terms of having them as allies and a member of the UNHRC.   
           In the USC, however, there are four tweets addressing the driving ban, three of 
these highlight the driving ban issue by associating it with negative issues with the 
Saudis in the FCT, such as crucifying dissidents and beheading women for sorcery, as 
well as posting sarcastic images of how Saudi women will eventually drive their cars 
after being banned for such a long time. For example:  








Dissidents are crucified and/or beheaded in Saudi Arabia, women  
are banned from driving. Tell me why Saudis gave $$$ to Clinton  
Foundation?               
And women are not allowed to drive. And this                                 
http://nbcnews.com/id/4836244/ns/world_news/t/saudis-forced-   
confront-issue-wife-abuse/#.VgjeYY9Viko                                
 
Tweets refer to the Saudi women driving ban in the USC to raise some conflicting 





only banned from driving but are also subjected to oppression and violence. The tweet 
in example 243 proclaims that these issues are neglected by US Democrats, such as 
Clinton, because the Saudis are reported to fund her organisation and election 
campaign. In example 244, the tweet quotes another user who opposes approving of 
the Saudis having membership of the UNHRC, though they still behead women for 
sorcery and practising witchcraft. The tweet comments on an NBCnews article in 
2004 about a Saudi female presenter who was subject to domestic violence, being 
beaten by her husband. The tweet suggests that banning women from driving is not 
the only issue that Saudi women suffer from, as it also hints at other issues of violence 
that Saudi women endure. Both tweets also recontextualise the driving ban to 
highlight other negative issues associated with the Saudis to present them negatively.  
           Even when tweets report that the Saudis will be allowing women to drive, this 
is tweeted ironically (through images and GIFs); tweets claim that the Saudis. when 
they allow women to drive, will enforce conditions that hinder their driving, as in 







Figure 7-3: A tweet’s response to allowing Saudi women to drive  
 
In Figure 7-3, above, the tweet reacts to the news that Saudis will be allowing women 
to drive, and states that this decision is applied with “a few conditions”. These 
conditions are represented multimodally, in a moving image ‘GIF’ which depicts a 
presumably Saudi woman dressed and fully covered in black, driving her car and 
breaking the garage gate and fence while reversing. The car is also totally covered by 
a black cloth, which sarcastically refers to the strict rules the tweet claims the Saudis 
are going to impose on women driving. From an intertextuality and interdiscursivity 
perspective, the tweet also recontextualises the Saudis’ decision to allow women to 
drive into a sarcastic one. Although not expressed in words, the tweet uses a moving 
image (GIF) to recontextualise the few conditions which Saudis are going to impose 
on women driving into ironic ones, presuming that these rules will obstruct their 
freedom and safety.       
             However, there is a tweet which seemingly represents Saudis in a positive 





a magazine account (The Economist) and which also provides a link to an online 
article on its website about the decision to allow Saudi women to vote in local 
elections for the first time. Apparently, this tweet preceded the decision to allow 
women to drive in Saudi Arabia. For example:  
 
 
Figure 7-4: The only positive tweet about Saudi women driving 
 
 In Figure 7-4, above, the tweet comments on The Economist tweet, which refers to 
the news about Saudi women being allowed to vote for the first time. The tweet then 
expresses its pleasure with the tweet through the phrase “Awesome news!” and 
stresses that educating Saudis abroad has reflected positively on their attitude towards 
women, which resulted in allowing them to vote. The tweet also encourages the 
Saudis to continue with their ‘positive’ attitude towards women by allowing them to 
drive. The tweet implies criticism of the Saudis, as it claims that this decision was 
made only because Saudis have been educated abroad. It implicitly suggests that 





to foreign education that Saudis are now more enlightened and able to deal positively 
with women.  
7.8.2. The CAC, USC and RWC: ISIL and the Islamic State 
Other keywords in common between the CAC, the USC and the RWC are ISIL (60 
tweets) and Islamic State (23 tweets). Both keywords are used synonymously to refer 
to what is recently known as the Islamic State (IS) or ISIS: these different terms do, in 
fact, have different meanings linked to the geographic expansion of the group. The 
group, recognised as Jihadists militants, first identified itself as ISIL, then as ISIS, 
which is abbreviated in Arabic as Daesh, and finally as the Islamic State (IS) since 
June 2014 (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). However, what is of interest is how 
tweets associate Saudis with these keywords and whether using these different words 
for the same group can entail different presentations of Saudis in the corpora. To 
answer these questions, each keyword is examined using extensive concordance 
analysis.  
             ISIL is an acronym standing for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. The 
Levant is used to refer to Greater Syria, which traditionally includes Palestine, 
Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait and Jordan. By using this term, Laub and Masters (2015) state 
that the group has expanded its ambitions as “its fighters have crossed into 
neighbouring Syria to challenge both the Assad regime and secular and Islamist 
opposition groups there” (p. 1). The keyword ISIL occurs in 59 tweets, dispersed 
across the three corpora as follows: six tweets in the CAC, six in the USC, and 47 in 
the RWC. IS, however, is mentioned in only one tweet in the CAC, seven in the USC, 





paragraphs to highlight, in particular, how tweets correlate ISIL with Saudis in each 
corpus.   
             In the CAC, examining the concordance lines of ISIL shows that tweets tend 
to postulate Saudis as backing ISIL or questioning their intention to fight them. More 
specifically, tweets oppose the Canadian government making arms deals with Saudis, 
implicitly referring to their ISIL support. The Islamic State keyword, however, occurs 
in only one tweet, which refers to the Saudis’ financial support for ISIL to condemn 
the arms deals made by PM Harper with the Saudis. In this respect, ISIL is used 
synonymously with ISIS. For instance: 







Unbelievable hypocrisy.  Next time you hear Harper [whine] 
about ISIL, think about the deal he made with the Saudis,... 
Wahhabi Saudis are bankrolling Sunni Islamic State terrorists in 
Iraq and Syria. As Harper sells arms to Saudis 
     
Tweets use both the ISIL and Islamic State keywords to highlight one of the recurring 
issues in the CAC (and the FCT): selling arms to the Saudis. Selling arms is used in 
tweets as a means to criticise the PM, Harper, and MPs for selling arms and weapons 
to the Saudis, who are alleged to arm and fund ISIL/Islamic State. In example 245, 
however, the tweet responds to a weblink in an article from The Huffington Post 
(Canadian edition), which harshly criticises the Conservative Party for selling arms to 
the Saudis and calling them “allies”. The writer also refers to issues of human rights, 
beheadings, the war in Yemen and the 9/11 attacks to condemn Canada’s relationship 
with the Saudis. The tweet recontextualises the article to condemn PM Harper’s 
relationship with the Saudis by linking them to funding and arming ISIL. Meanwhile, 
in example 246, this tweet claims that the Saudis are “bankrolling” the Islamic State 





arms to the Saudis. This association serves to criminalise the Saudis and condemn PM 
Harper for maintaining dealing with them despite the Saudis conspicuously 
sponsoring the Islamic State. The tweet uses a nomination strategy to refer to Saudis 
as “Wahhabi” and the Islamic State as “Sunni”, and it also refers to its followers as 
“terrorists” to highlight their mutual religious doctrine. 
              In the USC, however, tweets use ISIL synonymously with ISIS: both terms 
also suggest that the Saudis (in collaboration with the West) created ISIL. These 
tweets also condemn the contradiction of the Republican Party, which claim to fight 
ISIL while selling weapons to the Saudis who fund them, thus associating the Saudis 
with terrorism and constructing them as a source of threat. For example: 








Example 268    No one should be fooled by US claims they are 
well and truly fighting ISIL, this is a joke coz #US and #Saudis 
are the real #ISIS supporters 
lets bomb ISIL but welcome and sell arms to the barbaric  
Saudis. Makes sense. Why doesn't the west cut of any country 
which supports ISIL 
                
Tweets claim that the declarations made by the US government, represented by the 
Republican Party, to fight ISIL are false and deceptive. The tweet in example 247, for 
instance, warns against the US’s misleading claims to fight ISIL while they align with 
the Saudis and sell them weapons. It also questions the reliability of the war against 
ISIS, which is led by both the US and Saudis, while the Saudis support ISIS covertly. 
The tweet uses both terms, ISIL and ISIS, alternately as neither seems to entail any 
semantic variation, and also tags ISIS, the US and the Saudis in hashtags to circulate 
certain claims to the wider public. Using both terms (ISIL, ISIS) suggests that the 
tweet is aware of the resemblance between the terms while recognising the 





government for fighting ISIL while they sell arms to the “barbaric” Saudis. It implies 
a conspiracy between the US and the Saudis who pretend to fight ISIL while secretly 
supporting them. The tweet’s negative stance against the Saudis urges the West to 
boycott the Saudis and any other country that supports ISIL.        
             Similar to ISIL, tweets in the USC associate Islamic State with the Saudis 
mainly in terms of their financial and moral support for the group (seven tweets). 
Tweets condemn the Saudis either for backing the Islamic State financially (two 
tweets) or approving their ideology (five tweets), using words like “support”, “fund”, 
“sympathise”, “preach” and “agree”. For example: 







poll of Saudis shows 92% agree that Islamic State (ISIS) 
conforms to the values of Islam and Islamic law. 
Saudis bigger threat 2 US 15 Saudis bombed NY towers ISIL 
financed by Saudis Wahabism religion of ISIL why not call out 
the Saudis 
 
The tweet in example 249 refers to a poll which claims that 92 per cent of Saudis 
agree with the idea that the Islamic State (also referred to as ISIS in parentheses) 
endorses the teachings of Islam, yet the tweet does not provide the source of this poll. 
The tweet, using the claimed poll’s results, suggests that the vast majority of Saudis 
affiliate with the Islamic State and conform to corresponding religious values. The 
high percentage of this ‘poll’ (92%) serves to categorise the majority of Saudis as 
affiliating with the terroristic behaviour of the Islamic State and thereby warns against 
the majority of the Saudis as a similar, threatening source. However, in example 250, 
the tweet bluntly declares that the Saudis constitute a “bigger threat” to the US. 





religious affiliation, the tweet urges that action be taken against the Saudis by holding 
them responsible for their negative actions. 
              Finally, in the RWC, examining the concordance lines shows that tweets 
associate Saudis with ISIL in 47 tweets, two tweets use ISIS and “Daesh” 
synonymously with ISIL. Tweets postulate that the Saudis support ISIL ‘financially’, 
using words like fund (four tweets), back (three tweets), support (three tweets), arm 
(four tweets), supply (three tweets), create (two tweets), finance (two tweets), provide 
and give. Relating ISIL to the Saudis also associates some of the recurring issues 
around them, such as joining the UNHRC, the crucifixion of Al-Nimr, the 9/11 
attacks and the Syrian refugee crisis (see Chapter 6 for details). Tweets also posit 
Saudis as having equal status with ISIL (five tweets) in terms of embracing Wahhabi 






Like #ISIL #Saudis are destroying all civilizations in the region.   
#Wahhabis are manifestly enemies of cultures.               
Go to the source of the problem - the Saudis - Saudi Arabia funds 
the ISIL; the Saudis should help the innocent civilians- 
 
Presenting Saudis adversely is achieved through other negative-presentation strategies 
(van Dijk, 1999), such as ascribing them similar negative qualities as ISIL. These 
qualities include destroying historical places in Yemen (example 251) and escalating 
the Syrian refugee crisis in Europe (example 252). This negative other-presentation 
strategy not only misrepresents Saudis by associating them with ISIL but also 
highlights other alarming issues, such as the refugee crisis. This issue is already 





perceived as the key player and initiator of this problem that is threatening the 
security and culture of the West (see Section 5.2.1.2).          
             Similarly, the Islamic State in the RWC occurs in 15 tweets, 13 tweets 
associate the Saudis with the Islamic State in terms of support and congruity, and two 
tweets see IS as a threat to the Saudis. In case of the former, tweets perceive the 
Saudis as funding and supporting the Islamic State and aligning with their beliefs and 
concepts, in terms and phrases such as “supporting”, “fund”, “create” and “believe 
Islamic State to be manifesting real Islam”, while in the latter case, tweets postulate 
the Islamic State as a source of threat to the Saudis. In this respect, the Saudis are not 
presented as targeted victims, rather it is pilgrims who will be targeted by the Islamic 
State. For example: 










Worth under #breaking #news  The #IS/#Islamic State is facing 
a cash crunch in the #Caliphate. #Saudis run out of $$?  
Saudis are  supporting the Islamic State                
they could be facing an internal uprising from Saudis who believe   
the Islamic State to be manifesting authentic Islam. 
Saudis fear ISIS attacks on hajis - The Islamic State is extending 
its reach in Saudi Arabia 
In associating the Islamic State with Saudis, tweets in the RWC assume a 
homogenous relationship that connects both: Saudis are presented as either sponsoring 
the Islamic State financially (examples 253 and 254) or the Saudis and the Islamic 
State adopting a similar ideology, i.e. following similar Islamic teachings. In example 
255, for instance, the tweet hypothesises that since the Islamic State faces “a cash 
crunch”, the Saudis must have “run out” of money as they are the primary financier of 
Islamic State and suggests that both sponsor terrorism. It also uses hashtags to tag the 
content of the tweet as “breaking news” information, which facilitates sharing the 





and Islamic State synonymously and posits the latter as an opponent of the Saudis, as 
they plan to extend their attacks to Saudi Arabia, yet the target of Islamic State is not 
the Saudis but rather pilgrims who will be victims of these attacks.  
7.9. Summary and discussion 
This chapter is devoted to answering RQ-3 (To what extent are Saudis represented 
differently by tweets in the Australia, Canada, GB, USA and rest of the world 
corpora?) using extensive keywords and concordance analysis. In addition, I also 
utilise intertextuality and interdiscursivity, discursive strategies and transitivity 
analysis to scrutinise the findings. The differences among the corpora are divided into 
two sections: keywords unique to each corpus and keywords more common to some 
corpora than others. Keywords unique to each corpus were identified by manually 
comparing the wordlists of each corpus with the remaining four corpora grouped 
together as a reference corpus, and the resulting unique keyword lists were then 
examined individually. As for keywords that were more common between some 
corpora and not others, these were also identified through manually comparing the 
keyword lists of each corpus, and common keywords were then grouped and 
thoroughly examined. 
             The discourse dominating each corpus resembles the overall discourse in the 
FCT, i.e. tweets present Saudis negatively by associating them with some of the main 
topics in the FCT: terrorism, violence and corruption. In the AUSC, CAC, GBC and 
USC, tweets depict Saudis in a common image, i.e. the Saudis are a threatening 
national source. In the AUSC, for instance, tweets warn against the Saudis’ plans to 
Islamise Australia, and in the CAC, Saudis threaten to strip Canada of its identity and 





UK, and in the USC, Saudis are represented as a threat to the US, given their 
responsibility for the 9/11 attacks. In the RWC, tweets present Saudis as a source of 
threat to less-empowered groups, such as foreign workers and housemaids.  
        The differences between the five corpora, however, do not reveal any counter 
discourses but, rather, the unique keywords in each corpus triangulate the negative 
findings in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. These unique keywords in the AUSC, CAC, GBC, 
and USC reveal other strategies, such as employing political hashtags and tagging 
Parliament and government representatives, to link Saudis negatively with local 
issues. For instance, In the AUSC, tweets use the hashtag #Auspol to highlight human 
rights violations against asylum seekers in Australia represented by concentration 
camps. The humanitarian situation of asylum seekers is feared to become worse if the 
relationships with the Saudis are maintained. In the CAC, tweets use hashtags devoted 
to Canadian local issues, such as #BarbaricCulturalPractices, which serve dual 
functions. First, to question the credibility of the PM and the MPs who associate with 
the Saudis given that it was the election period; and second, to warn against the 
imminent threat posed by the Saudis if they control the wheat board and buy 
Canadian-made arms. In the GBC, the hashtag #newsnight is deployed to warn against 
the Saudis’ plans to control the UK and spread their ideology of beheading and 
violence. Finally, in the USC, tweets tag the #GOPdebate programme to condemn 
Republicans who ally with the Saudis, such as Bush, since the Saudis were depicted 
as a threat to the US as the funders and executors of the 9/11 attacks.  
             In the RWC, the discourse surrounding Saudis is similarly negative. However, 
the topics and issues that tweets associate with Saudis differ from the other four 
corpora. Tweets, however, present Saudis negatively as racist and violent; the issues 





the amputated-arm maid and the conditions of Indian workers in Saudi Arabia. These 
issues also pose the Saudis as a threatening source by risking the lives of pilgrims and 
foreign workers through their recklessness and racist attitudes.  
             The intertextuality and interdiscursivity analyses substantiate the above 
findings. Tweets deploy hashtags and quote other tweets to recontextualise other 
issues and events so as to represent Saudis negatively and connect them to terrorism, 
manipulation and violence—this triggers assumptions regarding the media’s presence 
on Twitter. With tweets hashtagging TV debate programmes and online articles 
(through quoting news accounts), the media seem to contribute to a negative 
presentation of Saudis and construct them in adverse ways.  
             The findings of this chapter coincide with the previous findings in Chapters 5 
and 6. However, the tweets in each corpus utilise different ways that only support the 
overall negative stereotypes of Saudis on Twitter. The inclusion of Saudis as an 
electoral topic and as a means to criticise politics and national policies reflects the 
extent of accumulated, negative representations of Saudis in Western media. The 
outcomes of such media presentations do not only portray Saudis as a source of 
national threat but also contribute to rooting these negative stereotypes in Twitter 
discourse. These views may eventually reflect on the public’s attitudes towards and 
acceptance of Saudis in Western countries, which can, if promoted, lead to the 
normalisation of a non-acceptance of others’ ideology and motivate individual or 







Chapter 8. Conclusion 
8.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I aim to bring together the findings for the RQs to answer the 
overarching research question How are Saudis represented in English on Twitter by 
tweets in Australia, Canada, Great Britain, the United States and the rest of the world 
in September 2015, the period including two tragic events at Mecca? Having done 
this, I will also consider the limitations of the study (8.3), indicate how further 
research on the topic could supplement my findings (8.4) and identify the contribution 
of this research to the fields of CDS and CL regarding social media research (8.5). In 
the following section (8.2), I discuss the findings of each chapter guided by the 
research questions highlighted earlier in Chapter 1: 
1. How are Saudis represented across the five corpora?  
2. What discursive strategies are employed by tweets in the representation of 
Saudis? 
3. To what extent are Saudis represented differently by tweets in Australia, 
Canada, GB, the USA and the rest of the world corpora? 
4. What are the reasons and potential consequences for discourses about Saudis 
identified through the findings of the above research questions? 
Each question will be answered by offering overall conclusive findings for the four 
analysis chapters and explaining how these are used to arrive at answers. 
8.2. Summary of findings and discussion of the discourses about Saudis identified 
through findings for Research Questions 1–4 
The overall aim of this thesis was to investigate how Saudis were represented by 





misrepresenting social actors in the media could have negative consequences in the 
offline world. I also argued for Twitter as a valuable data source to examine the 
bottom-up discursive practices of tweets. This was followed by a literature review in 
Chapter 2 that discussed relevant studies from a discourse-historical perspective, 
which indicated how a relatively similar group (i.e. Muslims) are misrepresented in 
Western media and how such negative representations can prompt hostile attitudes 
and street violence. The review also pointed to an important gap in the literature, as 
there are very few studies dedicated to examining the representation of social groups 
on Twitter, particularly Saudis, from Corpus and Critical Discourse Studies 
perspectives.    
            The following Chapter 3 outlined the data and methodology used in this thesis. 
In the first part, I introduced Twitter as the data source, with a brief background of the 
platform and some of its well-known conventions. I also explained two key issues that 
would make researching Twitter data challenging, i.e. acquiring historical Twitter 
data and ethical considerations. The second part of this chapter explained in detail the 
methods I employed in analysing the data. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses 
were based on a corpus about Saudis, this was collected in the aftermath of the two 
tragic events in Mecca in 2015. This corpus was divided into five sub-corpora based 
on the geolocations of tweets (AUSC, CAC, GBC, USC, RWC). This step was 
essential to examine differences in the representation of Saudis by different English-
speaking countries. I then explained corpus-linguistic techniques, such as keywords, 
collocations, concordances and n-grams, that were combined with several CDS 
analytical tools and concepts (Chapter 2) to address the following research questions: 
          RQ-1 How are Saudis represented across the five corpora? Addressing this 





dominating themes and topics in the five corpora, after the two tragic events at Mecca, 
together in Chapter 4. This step was carried out by investigating and calculating 
keywords, i.e. lexical items that were numerically higher in the five corpora grouped 
together (the FCT) when compared to the reference corpus. These keywords were 
then grouped into thematic categories according to their cotexts. Such thematic 
categorisation facilitated locating salient themes and topics which tended to co-occur 
with Saudis in the FCT after the tragic events at Mecca. The second step was to 
examine these themes extensively through keyword and concordance analyses in 
Chapter 5. 
            Examining the themes generated by keywords analysis shared a common, 
negative discourse about Saudis in the FCT. The keyword analysis showed 
GEOGRAPHY, COUNTRIES and NATIONALITIES and WAR to be the most 
significant themes in the FCT after the tragic Mecca events. Though the crane 
collapse in Mecca coincided with the 14th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks in 2001, 
neither event seemed to skew the data. In fact, MECCA EVENTS keywords occupied 
only 14 per cent of the top 100 keywords in the FCT. Also, the 9/11 attacks coexisted 
with the crane collapse in only 19 tweets out of a total of 240. The significance of war 
as a keyword in the FCT indicated extensive news reporting of the wars in both 
Yemen and Syria. However, this reporting, when it involved Saudis, incorporated a 
negative contribution and, consequently, the representation was highly adverse and 
negative. Extensive concordance analysis of the WAR category in Chapter 5 revealed 
adverse portrayals of Saudis in the FCT, they were presented as committing war 
crimes against civilians in Yemen, such as targeting women and children and 
destroying the infrastructure.  
            In Syria, Saudis were depicted as funding and supporting terrorist groups and 





back into focus a media-problematised issue for the West, i.e. refugees fleeing to 
Europe. Tweets associated the claim that Saudis did not take in any refugees while 
building mosques for them in Germany to warn against a Saudi plot to “Islamise” 
Europe. Similar to the media representation of refugees and asylum seekers, tweets in 
the FCT referred to the Syrian refugees as an upcoming threat to Europe, intensified 
through a strategy of metaphor, such as “invasion” (Goodman & Speer, 2007), 
“flood” (Baker et al., 2008; KhosraviNik et al., 2012) and “extermination” of the 
West. Clearly, intertextuality reinforced this intimidating image of refugees and 
instantiated that Saudis were not only responsible for threatening the West by sending 
refugees, but also planned to threaten Western identity through the Islamification of 
Europe, which resulted in Islamophobic (Ekman, 2015) and Saudiphobic discourses.   
            MECCA TRAGIC EVENTS was the third top recurring theme in the FCT, 
with stampede recurring more frequently than crane collapse. Such human tragedies 
might have led somehow to a pause, an interruption, in the negative discourses about 
Saudis, but the ‘accumulation’ factor seemed so enormous that it did not trigger any 
sympathy or sentiment of condolences, but rather prompted negative representations 
of Saudis, such as their incompetence in handling the Hajj season and maintaining 
pilgrims’ safety, exploiting pilgrims and treating them with racist and inhuman 
attitudes. The crane collapse was also described as “karma” for the 9/11 attacks, the 
war in Yemen and for not taking in Syrian refugees. Metaphor was also at play in the 
tragic events category: tweets used “flooded” to describe international condolences 
and collocated them with “condemnation”, which entailed a negative evaluation of 
Saudis in relation to the stampede, suggesting that although condolence messages 
were very numerous, they were critical and adverse in their tone. 
            Another dominating theme was TERROR which highlighted several issues 





of Ali Al-Nimr and the same crucifixion penalty for women who practise witchcraft 
and sorcery. Other keywords included in the lemma FUND also connected Saudis with 
funding the 9/11 hijackers and other terrorist groups. Negative representations were 
also delivered through the theme of POLITICS, in which tweets condemned selling 
arms and weapons to the Saudis and allowing them onto the UNHRC. Selling arms to 
the Saudis was opposed by tweets as Saudis use them to kill civilians in Yemen or 
provide them to terrorist groups in Syria, such as ISIS. The Saudis getting a seat at the 
UNHRC was also attested to by tweets, which resulted in rejecting and questioning its 
credibility.  
           RELIGION is another theme which included discursive strategies that 
classified Saudis along a religious spectrum, such as Wahhabi and “radical”, and 
posited them on an extreme (dangerous) level of belief. These findings coincided with 
earlier research on Islam and Muslims in Western media, which often presented them 
as a threatening source to Western democracy and civilisation. Saudis were also 
represented as “fanatics” who aim at a religious war, targeting Western countries, 
values and democracy (Arif & Ahmad, 2016; Indah & Khoirunnisa, 2018; Moore et 
al., 2008), thereby promoting an 'Us' versus 'Them' discourse which presents Saudis 
as a threatening and dangerous outgroup.  
            The last theme that tweets associated with Saudis was OIL. The possession of 
oil, as perceived by tweets, serves the Saudis in two ways. First, possessing oil helps 
the Saudis to conceal their human rights violations and support terrorism and terrorist 
groups (e.g. ISIS and AlQaeda). Second, Saudis have gained in importance (and 
value) only because of oil. In the FCT, they are described in negative predicates, such 
as “Totalitarian regime”, “unapologetically oppressive”, “backwards”, “pig-ignorant”, 





   RQ-2 What discursive strategies are employed by tweets in the 
representation of Saudis?  This question was addressed in Chapter 6 using the corpus 
tool collocation. Tweets deploy different discursive strategies, such as nomination, 
predication, perspectivisation and intensification.  
  Tweets deploy nomination strategies mainly to present Saudis negatively. 
Besides referring to them in negative terms, tweets also use nomination strategies to 
describe other groups or objects negatively to emphasise Saudis’ adverse involvement 
or attitude. For instance, the war in Yemen is referred to as “genocidal”, “futile” and 
“drone” to highlight the Saudis’ adverse role in this war. Saudis are also referred to as 
“barbaric”, “ugly”, and “dirty zionist”. Similarly, tweets use nomination strategies to 
condemn the Hajj stampede and the Saudis’ attitude towards other pilgrims (e.g. 
Africans) by referring to them as “dirt poor” and “negros”, and the Saudis as 
“obscenely wealthy”, “fucking” and “racist”. Such opposing depictions vilify Saudis 
and promote racist discourse. The possession of oil and the concept of wealth are also 
associated negatively with Saudis through nomination strategies. Tweets refer to the 
Saudis as “those pigs”, “backward” and “ignorant”, which suggests a negative 
discourse prosody of worthlessness and insignificance. Adopting a dangerous Islamic 
thought is also highlighted by tweets through the keyword Wahhabi, which is 
intensified through complex phrases, such as “Wahhabi terror spreading”, “Wahhabi 
extremist” and “Wahhabi terrorists”. These strategies augment the negative stances of 
tweets and contribute to further xenophobic discourse and negative stereotypes of 
Saudis on Twitter.   
   Predication strategies also fulfil similar functions. Tweets use these strategies 
to sustain negative depictions of Saudis, which are highlighted throughout the 





Saudis as a negative other and a source of threat through different predicates, such as 
funding ISIS, sponsoring 9/11 attacks, Islamising Europe and beheading and 
crucifying dissidents. Saudis are also described as “fanatics” who embrace the 
Wahhabi doctrine and aim at a religious war, such as targeting Western countries, 
values and democracy (Arif & Ahmad, 2016; Indah & Khoirunnisa, 2018; Moore et 
al., 2008). Such depictions reinforce a 'Us' versus 'Them' discourse which constructs 
the Saudis as a threatening and dangerous outgroup. 
 Tweets also use perspectivisation strategies in the FCT through mental 
processes to express negative stances and points of view of Saudis. This strategy links 
tweets’ knowledge and perception (through cognitive processes think and know) or 
feelings and sentiments (through emotive processes love and hate) to similar negative 
depictions of Saudis recurring in Chapter 5. These processes involve predications 
expressing negative discourse prosody of war crimes, terrorism support and abusive 
wealth and power.   
  Another significant discursive strategy used by tweets to present Saudis in the 
FCT is metaphor, such as sexual and dehumanising animal metaphors, resulting in 
evoking a racist and xenophobic discourse about Saudis on Twitter. Tweets deploy 
sexual metaphors to associate Saudis, and the West (e.g. MPs), with corruption. 
Metaphoric expressions, such as “in bed with”, “prostitute themselves for” and 
“kisses ass”, associate Saudis negatively with secret deals and oil. Saudis are also 
compared to “cancer”, thereby painting an image of an uncontrolled, destructive force 
which constitutes a life-threatening source to others. Although cancer is in some cases 
curable, Saudis in the FCT are depicted as a “cancerous tumour” to emphasise the 
malignant nature of cancer, which can spread into neighbouring tissues, i.e. countries, 





cancer”: both correlate Saudis to epidemics, which evokes a sense of contamination 
and threat. In racism studies, metaphor has become a key notion, as many metaphors 
rely on Western dichotomies of 'Us' versus 'Them' in which race is the ultimate 
outcome (van Teeffelen, 1994). In the FCT, metaphors serve to promote adverse 
depictions and misconceptions and result in sustaining a xenophobic and Saudiphobic 
discourse on Twitter.   
  The collocation of Saudis with women in the FCT also discloses nomination 
and predication strategies that promote further negative representations. The 
nomination strategies refer to Saudis as “Wahhabi”, “barbaric murderous”, “sex 
maniac[s]”, “heartless”, “disgusting” and “arrogant”. Similarly, the predication 
strategies echo negative postures of violence and immorality. Tweets use predication 
strategies to ascribe Saudis with negative qualities, such as hating women, abusers, 
war criminals, matching ISIS in dealing with women and denying women freedom 
(e.g. enforcing certain dress codes and denying them jobs). These negative portrayals 
resonate with similar findings in Western media studies which depict Saudi women as 
“oppressed, deficient, subordinate, submissive, and non-agentive women who 
unquestioningly accept patriarchy and domination” (Alharbi, 2015, p. iv). In fact, 
misrepresenting Saudis view of women echoes similar findings in Western media 
studies which associate Muslim men negatively with women. According to Al-Hejin 
(2015), research in Western media “corroborates a misconception observed by a 
number of scholars that all that is negative or hostile in the Muslim ‘Other’ is 
perpetrated by men, while women are merely passive victims moving with the tide” 
(p. 12).                     
            RQ-3 To what extent are Saudis represented differently by tweets in the 





differences between the five corpora was accomplished through keyword and 
concordance analyses in Chapter 7. The discourse resulting from the analysis of 
unique keywords in each of the five corpora was mainly negative and triangulated the 
negative discourses in the FCT. The unique keywords sustained a common image, i.e. 
the Saudis are constructed as a threatening (national) source. In the AUSC, for 
instance, tweets warn against the Saudis’ plans to Islamise Australia, whereas in the 
CAC, Saudis threaten to strip Canada of its identity and security. In the GBC, Saudis 
are assumed to spread their (terroristic) ideology in the UK; and in the USC, tweets 
condemn aligning with the Saudis who represent a threat to the US, given their 
responsibility for the 9/11 attacks. In the RWC, tweets present Saudis as dangerous 
and a source of threat to less-empowered groups (e.g. foreign workers and 
housemaids).  
           Each of the five corpora represents Saudis negatively by associating them with 
national issues and polarises these negative representations through hashtags to frame 
Saudis as a national concern. Tweets use hashtags and tag PMs, MPs and political 
representatives to condemn and criticise associating with the Saudis in domestic and 
international issues. For example, in the AUSC, tweets use the election hashtag 
#Auspol to highlight human rights violations against asylum seekers in Australia, held 
in concentration camps. The humanitarian situation of asylum seekers threatens to 
become worse if the relationships with the Saudis are maintained. In the CAC, tweets 
use political hashtags and hashtags devoted to local Canadian problems (e.g. 
#BarbaricCultural-Practices), which serve a dual function. First, to question the 
credibility of the PM and MPs who associate with the Saudis (given that it was the 
election period); and second, to warn against the imminent threat that would be posed 





the GBC, the hashtag #newsnight is deployed to warn against the Saudis’ plans to 
control the UK and spread their ideology of beheading and violence. In the USC, 
tweets tag the #GOPdebate programme to condemn those Republicans who ally with 
the Saudis, such as Bush, since they present the biggest threat to the US as the funders 
and executors of the 9/11 attacks. Finally, in the RWC, tweets highlight the rape case 
of a Nepalese woman against a Saudi diplomat and the story of an amputated-hand 
maid to condemn the Saudis’ racist and inhuman attitude towards others, describing 
them as “savages”, “dictators”, “disgusting” and “rape terrorists”.  
            Examining the differences between the corpora also revealed some keywords 
that are common in some corpora and not others. For instance, the USC and RWC 
share keywords related to the Saudi women driving ban. Tweets associate Saudis 
negatively with the women driving ban, recalling issues of oppression, contradiction, 
terrorism and violence. Banning women from driving also prompted tweets to 
condemn several issues, such as Saudis’ chairing the UNHRC, using barbaric 
methods for punishment and financing ISIS. And even when lifting the driving ban 
was announced, tweets mocked the decision (through images and GIFs) and 
speculated that the Saudis would enforce conditions to hinder women driving. There 
are other keywords in common between the CAC, the USC and the RWC, these refer 
to different terms relating to ISIS. Tweets use these terms synonymously to refer to 
the well-known ISIS group. Using these terms in the three corpora has similar 
associations to those echoed in Chapters 5 and 6. Associating ISIL and Islamic State 
with Saudis mainly highlights their connection with ISIS, whether as supporters or 
founders of the group, or as embracers of the same (Wahhabi) religious thought.       
            RQ-4 What are the reasons for and the potential consequences of the 





Questions? The findings in Chapters 5–7 contribute to a hegemonic discourse which 
represented Saudis negatively across the corpora in the aftermath of tragic events in 
Mecca. The outcomes of such media presentations not only portray Saudis as a 
threatening national source but also contribute to rooting these negative stereotypes of 
Saudis among social media users. As explained earlier in Chapters 1 and 2, negative 
depictions in mass media can result in a negative impact on online discourse. Saudis 
are represented negatively, as embroiled in terror, extremism and violence, through 
relating them to the critical situation in the Middle East (e.g. the wars in Yemen and 
Syria), escalating the refugee crisis which threatens Europe and supporting terrorism 
and terrorist groups. Also, the inclusion of Saudis as electoral material and as a means 
to criticise politics and national policies is an indication of accumulated, negative 
representations of Saudis in Western media. The power of media discourse over the 
public can lead to evoking these negative depictions online, which can then result in 
intimidating and racist discourse about Saudis on Twitter. Negative stereotypes of 
Saudis in the media can be attributed to earlier Orientalists representations of Arabs 
and Muslims which focused on othering the Arab world (Altwaiji, 2014). These 
negative stereotypes have found their ways into mainstream media that normalise a 
prototypical ideology of Arabs and Muslims as evil terrorists sometimes driven by 
political and personal agendas. Moviemakers, for instance, are willing to perpetuate 
hate and “continue to indict Arabs on movie screens for as long as unjust images are 
tolerated” (Shaheen, 2003, p. 189). Consequently, media consumers are likely to be 
exposed to recurring negative stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims (as well as others), 
which can ultimately shape their conception and ideologies, and eventually their 
acceptance and tolerance of others. From a dialectical-relational perspective, and as 





but rather have dialectical, interrelated relationships with the society ,which can shape 
the nature of the discursive practices of social groups and the effects of discourse.  
            The dialectical relationships of media texts with consumers also indicate the 
importance of reception as one of the components of discursive practices (Fairclough, 
1992a). It seems crucial then to question the extent to which tweeters’ mental 
representations are likely to incorporate the media discourses that they are exposed to 
over time on Twitter. In fact, Teo (2000) asserts that “the active choices made in the 
way newspaper headlines, leads and captions are couched can have a very powerful 
ideological effect on readers’ perception and interpretation of people and events” (p. 
16). Al-Hejin (2007) asserts that readers’ context models can incorporate the 
discourses they are presented with in media texts. By examining readers’ comments 
on a BBC website forum discussing the probability of banning niqab in the UK, Al-
Hejin states that there are “strong intertextual links with the BBC news articles in the 
two months leading to the forum, suggesting a considerable uptake of the discourses 
readers were presented with” (cited in Al-Hejin 2012, p. 309). Hence, the 
homogeneity of tweeters’ representations of Saudis with earlier media representations 
of Muslims and Arabs is an indication of the power of the media over the reception of 
the audience and, consequently, the formation of their ideologies and perceptions of 
Saudis on Twitter. 
            Misrepresenting others in the media is documented in the literature as sparking 
hostile attitudes against targeted groups and warns against street violence prompted 
by negative depictions and hate speech. Consequently, negative stereotypes and 
Saudiphobic discourse in both the mass and social media may eventually be reflected 
in the public’s attitudes towards and tolerance of Saudis in Western countries, which, 





motivate individual or collective violence. As seen in Chapter 2, Muslims in Western 
countries are subject to violence and physical attacks, sparked by the media coverage 
of some events, such as tearing off headscarves (hijab) in public places, vandalising 
mosques (Awan & Zempi, 2017) physical violence, verbal abuse and sexual assault 
(Poynting & Noble, 2004). These attacks can be attributed to the distorted and 
prejudiced stereotypes of Muslims and Islam in Western media, which tend to ascribe 
Muslims collective responsibility after the violent actions of a few (Arshad, Setlur, & 
Siddiqui, 2015). Similarly, negative depictions of Saudis in the media can also lead to 
fuelling online Saudisphobic discourse and, consequently, materialising it as offline, 
street violence.  
            The findings of the current research contribute to the ongoing academic 
discussion on the relationship between traditional media and social media regarding 
whether social media at large represent a safe space for generating and maintaining 
alternative discourses, or if they reproduce and amplify existing hegemonic 
discourses, which may result in even stronger polarising effects on public discourses. 
Although it may be hard to draw precise conclusions here, owing to the lack of 
research on the discursive representations of Saudis in Western media, the analysis 
findings are in line with current research on Islam and Muslims in mainstream 
Western media. This research suggests that social media do not simply offer an 
alternative (countering) discourse, but rather can recontextualise traditional media 
discourse in misrepresenting Islam and Muslims, though social media discourse can 
be more aggressive and blunter. Beside inflicting harm and danger on others, some 
social media users put their privacy at risk by advocating online racism and cyberhate. 
Such users, particularly on Twitter, who disseminate hate content via accessible 





online practices. Though users acknowledge the terms of service and privacy settings 
before opening their accounts, default public settings and anonymity may prompt 
xenophobic and racist content which can eventually threaten users’ privacy if they are 
shared or leaked without their knowledge. 
8.3. Strengths and limitations of the study 
Some limitations of this research must be acknowledged. As far as the data are 
concerned, I narrowed down the focus on the topic of the representation of Saudis on 
Twitter to include only English tweets in the aftermath of the tragic events at Mecca 
over a one-month period. This narrowing down of the search query was essential, 
given the immense number of tweets generated daily by Twitter users, which 
necessitated locating a spike of events which could involve voluminous tweeting 
about Saudis. Historical Twitter data (as described in Section 3.2.3) were not 
accessible at the time of the study and were only affordable via university or company 
subscriptions. Data were purchased from a commercial, third-party company which 
has access to Twitter API, and consequently, it was inevitable to limit the search 
query and span.  
            The limitations also concern interpretation. My intention was to remain 
focused to what these tweets were suggesting and to deliver relevant and adequate 
examples that would show my analysis was defensible and valid. I strived to be 
unbiased in my stance as an analyst, but as a Saudi citizen myself, the negative and 
adverse discourse resulting from the data might possibly have influenced my analysis 
and claims. However, I have tried my best to be careful in selecting examples, 
drawing conclusions and making generalisations that objectively fulfil the aim and 





            Another point worth highlighting is the small size of the data set analysed in 
this research. The corpus comprised 44,961 tweets and excluded retweets. Due to time 
and word count limits, I opted to examine the original use of language in tweets to 
achieve as reliable results as possible. This, of course, does not underestimate the 
significance of retweets or liked tweets in the analysis, rather they can be another 
interesting area for future research.  
             Further, the corpus includes tweets that were decontextualised from their 
audio and visual elements. Although I frequently refer to Twitter for contextual 
information in tweets (such as when a tweet is a part of a conversational thread) and 
some visual elements were briefly addressed, a richer corpus would incorporate visual 
and metadata elements (such as weblinks and images) to allow a more 
comprehensive, multimodal analysis. This also includes Twitter metadata, i.e. 
hashtags, which constitute a significant facet of social media interaction.   
            Finally, given the scale and word limitations of a PhD thesis, some aspects of 
the analysis were not given as much attention as they could have. Ideally, I would 
have made a comparison between the representation of Saudis on Twitter and in other 
mass media outlets, such as newspapers, to investigate possible differences or 
similarities in the ways and strategies of representation, given that other media have a 
significant presence on Twitter (sections 2.3.5.2 & 7.9).  
              However, this research benefits from at least four strengths: 1) In terms of the 
data, Twitter is considered a genuine data and valuable social media source due to 
several important features, such as establishing communities, interaction and 
collective action groups (O'Leary, 2015, p. 227), and it can be good representation of 





representation of social groups (Saudis in this study) in social media, contrary to the 
(profound) existing research which has focused on the representation of other groups 
in traditional mass media. Social media research now requires the attention of 
researchers, especially from critical and corpus linguistics approaches. 3) The synergy 
of the methodological approaches of CDS and CL adopted in this thesis helped (to 
some extent) to reduce subjectivity during the analysis stage. Although, however, 
subjectivity can never be eliminated, even with quantitative analyses. Deciding upon 
cut-off points (without which qualitative analyses would not be feasible) and 
identifying various discourses are inherently subjective. 4) Corpus tools facilitated 
uncovering tweets’ views and representations as well as the discursive strategies 
deployed in those representations. These findings would not have been easily 
identified through mere qualitative analyses.    
8.4. Areas for future research 
Further research can address the above limitations. More specifically, as stated in 
Chapter 1, examining the bottom-up representation of other groups, such as social 
media data, still requires the attention of critical discourse researchers. Future 
research can also draw on comparative approaches to study social media texts, such as 
comparing the representation of social groups in social media and mass media.  
            It would also be interesting to examine the multimodal aspects of social media 
sites and how these are used to represent others. Examining the representation of other 
groups could also be significant after certain political events or speeches; researchers 
could examine the extent to which these events or speeches can have an impact on 





            Triangulating with other methods, such as ethnography and fieldwork, could 
also be an interesting area of study. Researchers could investigate whether media 
representations of other groups can affect/ influence users on social media sites in 
Western countries and to what extent those representations reflect their attitudes and 
the perceptions of others.   
8.5. Final remarks 
This study originated from a desire to provide evidence to myself and to other 
scholars that social media representations are significant and worthy of investigation. 
Although social media sites represent virtual reality, negative stereotypes of others 
can have their own negative (if not harmful) consequences in the real (offline) world. 
It is noteworthy to examine the effects of media negative representations of other 
groups on people’s ideologies and their acceptance of the other. My aspiration is that 
further research can draw attention to this problematic area and contribute to change, 
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Appendix A: Keywords lists in the AUSC compared to the reference corpus 
 (ordered by LL value) 
 
Keyword  Freq.  LL Keyword  Freq.  LL Keyword  Freq.  LL 
SAUDIS 491 7,7075 SAUDI'S 6 77 USA 10 34 
YEMEN 57 620 AUSTRALIA 13 75 FUNDED 5 33.9 
THE 449 360 NEWS 28 75 SHIITE 3 33.6 
SAUDI 37 335 WESTERN 11 70.6 MOSSAD 3 33.6 
RIGHTS 44 332 REFUGEES 11 70.6 NUSRA 3 32.7 
UN 43 330 FUNDING 11 70.5 ASBESTOS 3 32 
HAJJ 22 305 THEIR 35 65 AFGHANISTAN 5 31.8 
SYRIA 38 304 ISRAELIS 6 63 FELLOW 6 31.8 
HUMAN 47 285 SYRIAN 9 60.8 TORTURE 5 31.6 
ISIS 30 208 ARMING 6 59 TERRORISM 5 31 
ARABIA 19 173 UK 17 58.7 BOLT 4 31 
US 62 155 DEATHS 7 51 YEMENI 3 30.7 
RUSSIA 20 144 WAHHABISM 4 51 SUNNIS 3 30.7 
ARE 101 136 MUSLIM 10 49 WORLD 20 30.7 
BEHEAD 11 130 MOSQUES 4 46.6 BLAME 7 30 
IRAN 20 117 MODERATES 4 46.6 WIKILEAKS 3 30 
BOMBING 13 117 UNHCR 4 45.5 YOUNUSALGOHAR 3 29 
CRUCIFY 9 116 CIVILIAN 5 44.7 BOMB 8 29 
ASSAD 12 113.5 UNHRC 3 44 ETC 7 29 
AUSPOL 14 106.9 GULFIES 3 44 THEM 26 29 
ALNUSRA 7 103 WEAPONS 7 43 COUNTRIES 6 29 
ALLIES 10 101 QATAR 5 43 DEADLY 5 29 
ALQAEDA 8 100 WEST 12 42.9 CHRIDTIANS 5 28.8 
MUSLIMS 16 99.9 QAEDA 5 42 AUS 5 28.8 
MOSQUES 9 99 ATTACKS 8 41 COALITION 4 28 
PANEL 14 99 THEY 44 41 BUILD 8 27 
ISLAM 15 97.7 TIPS 7 40.5 COLLAPSE 4 26.6 
WAHHABI 7 97 JIHADIS 4 39.9 BARBARIC 8 26 
IRAQ 13 96 BBC 8 38.5 SYRIANS 3 26 
AS 62 92 BUSH 6 37.5 CRITICISE 3 25.9 
STAMPEDE 8 91 ALIMOHAMME
DALNIMR 
3 37.5 RUSSIA’S 3 25.6 
COUNCIL 13 88.5 FUND 7 37 AIRSTRIKES 3 25 
BEHEADING 7 82 TURKS 4 37 INVASION 4 25 
ISRAEL 13 79.5 JIHADISTS 4 36.6 THOUSANDS 5 24.6 
MECCA 7 78 MOSLEMS 3 35.9 TURKEY 5 24 
WAR 18 77.8 IRANIAN 5 34.9    







Appendix B: Keywords lists in the CAC compared to the reference corpus 
(To save space, the lists include the top 200 keywords in each of the remaining four corpora) 
 
Keyword  Freq.  LL Keyword  Freq.  LL Keyword  Freq.  LL 
SAUDIS  1,072 13,897 FUND 22 131.5 CRUCIFYING 5 65.7 
HARPER 111 1,217 SELLS 20 131 THEM 58 65 
SAUDI 115 1,086 BARBARIC 13 126.6 PUTIN 9 64 
CDNPOLI 86 943 HOUTHI 10 124.7 DEATHS 10 64 
ARMS 115 894.5 ASSAD 15 124 REBELS 8 63.5 
YEMEN 89 888 THEY 111 123 MOSQUES 7 63 
RIGHTS 102 769.5 THEIR 71 121.7 ASSETS 9 61.5 
HAJJ 60 764 RUSSIA 21 120.9 DEALS 19 59 
ISIS 88 650.5 CPC 12 120.6 BOMBS 10 57.7 
ARABIA 59 558.8 TERRORISTS 18 119.9 SAUD 5 57 
HUMAN 87 494.9 CANADA’S 13 118 CIVILIANS 9 56 
WEAPONS 54 454 SOLD 24 115 DISASTER 10 56 
ALLIES 35 368.8 ISRAEL 21 114.9 GOV 12 55 
CANADA 57 360 CIVILIAN 12 106.8 OUR 12 55 
OIL 54 326 TOLL 13 99 WESTERN 11 53 
WHEAT 32 313 CANADIAN 18 97.9 MILITARY 14 53 
STAMPEDE 27 306.7 BEHEADINGS 8 95 NDP 6 53 
IRAN 50 303 SAUDI’S 8 92 PRICES 11 52.8 
CRUCIFY 21 254 TAIZ 7 92 NIMR 4 52 
SELLING 43 250.7 DUCEPPE 7 92 CANADIANS 8 51 
DEAL 57 239 ISLAM 17 88 TALIBAN 10 50.9 
UN 40 239 FUNDING 16 88 INQUIRY 7 50 
SELL 43 235.9 VEHICLES 13 87 IRAN’S 6 50 
HARPER’S 18 212.5 CDN 9 84.7 BOMB 15 50 
ARE 189 207 FUNDED 12 82 ISIL 6 49 
REFUGEES 30 202.5 HYPOCRISY 11 81.9 SUPPORTING 12 49 
SYRIA 32 195 BOMBING 11 78 GLENCORE 4 47 
WAHHABI 15 189.6 BRITON 7 77.5 SYRIAN 9 46.7 
WAR 42 184 LAV 7 77.5 ALLY 10 45.9 
BEHEAD 17 184 CRIMES 12 77 SECRECY 5 45.8 
BARBARICCULT
URALPRACTICES 
14 184 TERRORISM 12 76 AL 13 45.8 
NIQAB 16 177 CWB 7 74 BLAME 12 45.7 
HOUTHIS 14 176.6 AGAINST 29 73 WAHHABISM 4 44.9 
CRANE 17 158.6 IRANIANS 7 72.6 TERROR 9 44 
BOARD 29 148 BILLIONS 12 70 SILENCE 11 43.9 
MECCA 14 148 YEMENI 7 70 FOREIGN 11 43.7 
MUNKDEBATE 11 144.5 WOMEN 32 69.8 SUPPORT 24 43 
BEHEADING 13 142.9 PILGRIMS 7 68.9 BILLION 12 43 
US 85 142.7 COUNCIL 13 68 COUNTRIES 10 42.9 
CRUCIFIXION 12 137 BEHEADERS 5 65.7 AMERICANS 11 42 







Appendix B: Keywords lists in the CAC compared to the reference corpus 
 
Keyword  Freq.  LL Keyword  Freq.  LL 
PRESSURE 11 40.9 GULF 5 31 
SHALE 5 40.7 WERE 29 31 
SHOULD 3 40.6 SILENT 8 31 
SYRIANS 5 40 LPC 3 31 
TERRORIST 9 40 STEPHENHARPER 3 31 
EGYPTIANS 4 40 ARAB 6 30.6 
DESCENDS 4 40 RAMBO 4 30.6 
MUSLIM 11 39.6 CHOPPING 4 31 
QATARIS 3 39 TARGETS 6 31 
LAVS 3 39 FRACKERS 3 29.8 
CONJOB 3 39 EXTREMIST 4 29.6 
STOPHARPER 3 39 BAHRAIN 4 29.6 
TRUDEAU 6 38.6 SALE 13 29.5 
NATIONS 7 38 COLLATERAL 3 28.8 
MUSLIMS 10 38 BINLADEN 3 28.8 
EXTREMISM 5 38 FLOG 3 28.8 
SHARIA 5 37 GRAIN 4 28.8 
TPP 6 35.9 ABUSES 4 28.5 
WIMP 4 35.8 PRICE 11 28 
PANEL 8 35.5 BUSH 6 28 
PHOTOSET 4 35 RIYADH 3 27.9 
HOSTAGES 4 35 FIGHTING 10 27 
COLLAPSE 6 35 CONTROL 11 27 
DALBY 3 34.9 CROWD 8 26.9 
ARABIA’S 3 34.9 DEATH 15 26.7 
DESPOTIC 3 34.9 GOVS 3 26.5 
RUSSIANS 4 34 DERAIL 3 26.5 
TENTS 4 34 GERMANY 7 26 
REGIME 6 33 PRACTICES 5 26 
STEPHEN 8 33 IRAQ 6 26 
VIOLATIONS 5 33 PENTAGON 5 26 
PENSION 5 33 FIGHT 15 26 
ALIMOHAMMEDALN
IMR 
3 32.7 BLAMED 4 26 
MOUNTING 4 32.6 USSR 3 25.9 
JIHAD 5 32.5 BEHEADED 3 25.9 
CRITICIZE 5 31.8 HUMANRIGHTS 4 25.8 
ADEN 4 31.7 IDEOLOGY 4 25.8 
CREATED 9 31.7 BIN 5 25.7 







Appendix C: Keywords lists in the GBC compared to the reference corpus  
Keyword  Freq.  LL Keyword  Freq.  LL Keyword  Freq.  LL 
SAUDIS 1,872 22,222 CORBYN 22 186 TURKEY 18 83 
YEMEN 189 1,859 STAMPEDE 18 175.5 TURKS 10 81.8 
HAJJ 147 1,733 THEM 124 172 SELLING 23 81.6 
SAUDI 169 1,501 ISRAEL 30 150.5 SUNNI 11 80.9 
RIGHTS 169 1,233 BOMBS 24 150 BRITISH 22 80.6 
HUMAN 166 957.6 MUSLIMS 31 149 HOSTAGES 9 80 
UN 115 781 CRANE 18 148.9 ISIL 10 79.5 
SYRIA 84 566.6 HIJACKERS 13 148.6 ALQAEDA 8 78.6 
ISIS 88 550 BLAME 32 145 MINA 11 78 
ARE 386 499 MINASTAMPEDE 12 143.8 BBC 20 78 
CAMERON 79 488 BARBARIC 16 142 BOMB 24 75 
UK 111 483 ARMING 16 140 YEMEN’S 8 75 
ARABIA 57 471 ISRAELIS 15 138 WEST 28 72 
CRUCIFY 36 405.6 TORIES 20 134 EAST 22 72 
IRAN 71 397 QATARIS 11 131.8 SHALE 9 72 
OIL 70 377.9 BRITON 12 125.9 CORBYN’S 7 71.7 
BOMBING 43 358 PANEL 23 122 QAEDA 8 71 
MOSQUES 33 331.6 AL 30 119.6 SUPPORT 41 71 
MECCA 31 320.8 CRIMES 19 117 AIRSTRIKES 9 68.7 
RUSSIA 50 312 BEHEADING 12 117 FOREIGN 18 68 
COUNCIL 46 297 YEMENI 12 115 FUND 16 68 
WEAPONS 42 286.6 ISLAM 24 113 TOLL 11 67.8 
ASSAD 33 278.5 HOUTHI 10 113 BRITAIN 14 67.6 
THEIR 135 245 CIVILIAN 14 112 ZIONISTS 8 67 
HOUTHIS 21 243.6 FUNDING 22 109.5 ABUSES 9 66 
CRUCIFIXION 22 237.9 REGIME 17 108.6 WAHHABI 6 62.9 
BEHEAD 23 230.8 DEATHS 17 106.7 BEHEADINGS 6 62.7 
SYRIAN 35 230.5 PUTIN 15 104 KINGDOM 13 62 
REFUGEES 37 222 DEAL 41 103 GOVERNMENT 22 62 
ARMS 45 221 INQUIRY 14 102 CONDEMN 9 62 
WAR 57 219.8 AMERICANS 24 100 BEHEADED 7 61.7 
CIVILIANS 30 219.7 NEWSNIGHT 14 100 SUNNIS 7 61 
MOJ 18 215.8 TERRORISM 17 99.9 AGAINST 34 57 
US 137 207.7 GERMANY 21 99 ALLAH 18 56.8 
ALLIES 23 202 WESTERN 20 97 KILLING 21 57 
PILGRIMS 20 201.6 CRUCIFYING 8 95.9 COLLAPSE 10 56.8 
IRANIANS 19 197.5 IRAQ 18 95.9 MAKKAH 6 56 
REBELS 23 197 PROTESTER 11 94 SUPPLIED 7 56 
RUSSIANS 20 195.6 BUILD 29 94 ARAB 11 56 
SAUDIARABIA 21 193.6 TERRORISTS 17 92 SHOULD 61 56 
THEY 185 187 YEMENIS 8 85.9 GULF 9 55.9 






Appendix C: Keywords lists in the GBC compared to the reference corpus  
Keyword  Freq.  LL Keyword  Freq
.  
LL 
EXECUTION 10 55 ARABS 6 41.6 
QATAR 8 53.9 SELLS 10 41.5 
RUSSIAN 14 53 SUPPORTING 13 41 
BLAMING 9 53 UAE 8 40 
CRITICISM 10 51.9 ANTIQUITIES 4 40 
WAHHABISM 5 51.5 TERROR 10 40 
BARBARIANS 5 51.5 INVESTIGATION 12 40 
WERE 50 51 BOMBED 6 39.6 
DISASTER 11 51 SUPPORTS 10 39.5 
INCOMPETENCE 7 50 INVESTIGATION 12 40 
BILLIONS 11 50 OFFICIALS 10 39 
ETC 16 50 MISSILES 5 39 
EID 6 49.9 BUSH 9 39 
SHIAS 5 49 TOLERATE 7 38.5 
SQUALID 5 49 WAHABI 4 38 
PAKISTANI 9 49 WHILE 34 38 
KILLED 23 49 INTELLIGENCE 10 38 
IRANIAN 9 48.6 STAKE 8 38 
ISLAMIC 11 48 THREAT 11 37.9 
UNHRC 4 47.9 SAYS 35 37 
HASHIMITES 4 47.9 MOUNTING 5 36.9 
ALWALEED’S 4 47.9 FRACKERS 4 36.8 
COUNTRIES 13 47.8 BRITS 6 36.7 
PILGRIMAGE 6 45.6 GOVT 13 36.7 
CCTV 7 45.5 TORY 9 36.7 
SELL 17 45.5 FEND 6 36.5 
TEENAGER 10 45 HUMANRIGHTS 6 36.5 
DEADLY 10 44.5 IDEOLOGY 6 36.5 
USA 20 43.7 CRUDE 6 36.5 
HAMAS 7 43.6 TRAGEDY 8 36 
MOSQUE 7 43 WASN 3 35.9 
SABIC 4 42.9 SEDATPEKER 3 35.9 
YEMAN 4 42.9 PIGGATE 3 35.9 
CRITICISE 6 42.9 FREERAIF 3 35.9 
PROTEST 11 42.6 CACHJOBS 3 35.9 
ATTACK 16 42.6 BANKROLLING 3 35.9 








Appendix D: Keywords lists in the USC compared to the reference corpus  
Keyword  Freq.  LL Keyword  Freq.  LL Keyword  Freq.  LL 
SAUDIS 2,736 30,516 HIJACKERS 23 250 BRITON 13 127.5 
SAUDI 287 2,542 BOMBING 34 245 PRICES 27 125 
YEMEN 244 2,287 BEHEAD 26 244.8 SHIITE 13 124.8 
HAJJ 147 1,622 GERMANY 44 235.9 QAEDA 14 124.7 
IRAN 181 1,182 AMERICANS 49 234 OPEC 14 124.7 
STAMPEDE 111 1,168 SUNNI 28 227 CRUCIFYING 11 123.6 
ARABIA 131 1,143 PANEL 38 208.6 TERRORISM 22 123 
OIL 171 1,073 GULF 29 208 FUND 27 121.7 
ISIS 155 1,010 PUTIN 28 203 DEADLY 23 120.9 
RIGHTS 150 952 THEM 163 200.6 TURKS 15 120.8 
SYRIA 114 745 MOSQUE 26 199 RAND 17 120 
HUMAN 150 727 DEATHS 30 196 KILLED 45 118.7 
MECCA 67 685.6 OBAMA 62 194.5 SUPPORT 64 117.6 
ARE 533 644.5 GOPDEBATE 21 190.8 HOUTHIS 11 116.7 
MOSQUES 63 625 COLLAPSE 28 189.8 AIRSTRIKES 15 115.8 
REFUGEES 91 623.8 IRANIAN 28 187.6 DEAD 56 115 
UN 103 602.8 ISLAM 38 184 KSA 13 113 
RUSSIA 86 556 RUSSIANS 20 180.5 NIMR 10 112 
US 272 546.9 WERE 109 177.6 HAJJSTAMPEDE 10 112 
ALLIES 58 536.8 BUILD 50 176.8 QATARIS 10 112 
ASSAD 62 533.8 COUNCIL 3 169 BLAMES 17 112 
ISRAEL 80 485.8 ISLAMIC 30 164.9 SYRIANS 14 110 
THEY 322 407 BLAME 39 163 SAUDI’S 11 109 
REBELS 46 404.6 SHALE 19 159.6 NUCLEAR 22 107.7 
THEIR 209 399 YEMENI 17 157.5 DISASTER 21 106.6 
IRANIANS 39 399 UNHRC 14 157 ARABS 14 106.5 
CRANE 45 397.9 ARMING 19 157 SADDAM 11 106 
WAR 92 370 INQUIRY 21 152 MERS 10 105.6 
CRUCIFY 34 356.5 ARMS 38 147 UAE 18 104.5 
CRUCIFIXION 34 352 ISRAELIS 17 146.9 EGYPTIANS 11 103.7 
PILGRIMS 34 334.9 MECCA’S 13 147 ARAB 19 102 
IRAQ 50 321.8 FUNDING 30 144.6 TRAGEDY 19 102 
MUSLIMS 59 311 MUSLIM 35 137.8 BIN 18 102 
BUSH 45 294.5 YEMENIS 13 134 ALWALEED’S 9 101 
SYRIAN 45 283 PILGRIMAGE 16 134 JORDANIANS 9 101 
CIVILIANS 40 282.6 RIYADH 14 134 DEAL 47 99 
WEAPONS 45 279 BOMBS 24 132 BLAMING 16 99 
BEHEADING 27 265.8 USA 45 132 PRICE 34 97.7 
TERRORISTS 42 265.6 TURKEY 28 131.8 HARPER 16 97.6 
HOUTHIS 24 261 OUR 152 131 IRAQIS 11 96 
SAUDIARABIA 29 275.9 SHIA 19 130.7 LADEN 13 92 






Appendix D: Keywords lists in the USC compared to the reference corpus  
Keyword  Freq.  LL Keyword  Freq.  LL 
ALLY 21 87 CIVILIAN 10 67 
REPORTS 35 87 TARGETS 14 66.6 
STATES 26 86.6 AMERICAN 32 66.6 
COUNTRIES 22 86.5 NUKES 10 65.9 
DIPLOMATIC 11 85 BARBARIC 9 65 
KINGDOM 18 84.6 ATTACKS 19 65 
AGAINST 48 84 RADICAL 13 65 
WAHHABI 8 83.6 SUPPORTING 20 65 
HOSTAGES 10 83 BBC 20 64 
BACKED 16 82.5 SAYS 55 64 
IRANS’S 11 82.5 EXTREMISTS 9 63 
IMMUNITY 11 82 CHAIR 18 62.6 
MILITARY 26 81.9 CONFLICT 17 62.6 
CRIMES 16  CNNDEBATE 6 61.6 
FUNDED 15 81 ARABIA’S 6 61.6 
FINANCED 10 80.9 HYPOCRISY 11 61 
BOMB 29 80.8 ATTACK 23 60 
CONTROL 31 80 CONDITIONED 8 60 
ALIMOHAMM
EDALNMIR 
8 79.9 REGIME 12 60 
BILLIONS 17 79 WEDDING 26 60 
LATES 44 78 SHARIA 9 59.7 
HEZBOLLAH 9 7 STAKE 12 57 
REFUGEE 17 75 MINASTAMPEDE 5 56 
NATIONS 15 75 HUTHIES 5 56 
ROUHANI 12 73.8 PRESSURE 19 56 
EGYPT 15 73 NEWS 57 56 
TERROR 17 72.7 AIDING 7 55.6 
MISSILES 9 72.5 ESCALATING 7 55.6 
QATAR 11 72 SLAVES 10 55.6 
KILLING 28 71.5 CONDEMN 9 54.6 
ETC 23 71 PALNES 10 55 
CONFORMS 8 70.8 CRUDE 9 54.6 
BARBARIANS 7 69 EID 7 54.6 
BEHEADINGS 7 69 RESPONSIBLE 14 54.5 
ABUSES 10 68.7 THEY’RE 40 54 
BOMBED 10 67.6 INVASIONS 6 53.9 
UNGA 6 67 PRODUCTION 15 53 







Appendix E: Keywords lists in the RWC compared to the reference corpus  
Keyword  Freq.  LL Keyword  Freq.  LL Keyword  Freq.  LL 
SAUDIS 14,640 116,388 CRIMES 156 868 BOMBS 102 482 
YEMEN 1,233 9,035 DEATHS 150 859 TERRORISM 98 477.6 
SAUDI 1,286 9,027 BLAME 214 859 FUNDED 92 474.9 
HAJJ 791 6,264 BEHEAD 117 853 QAEDA 67 474.8 
ARE 3,143 4,274 MINA 130 849 OBAMA 208 474 
IRAN 732 3,993 SYRIANS 118 823 GOVT 143 473 
ISIS 643 3,521 AGAINST 353 795 BUSH 100 463 
RIGHTS 624 3,340 BUILD 244 793 GULF 80 455 
ARABIA 457 3,094 IRAQ 156 784.7 PANEL 109 448.6 
SYRIA 534 3,013 TRAGEDY 137 735 WERE 407 447 
THEIR 1,288 2,728 GERMANY 165 729 ETC 139 445 
THEY 1,906 2,707 SUNNI 110 714.9 TENTS 63 433 
HUMAN 639 2,672 IRANIAN 125 712 WAHHABI 55 428 
UN 506 2,631 ARAB 133 710 UAE 83 421.5 
STAMPEDE 343 2,629 BEHEADING 96 709 TERROR 100 420 
OIL 531 2,600 PUTIN 117 703.8 AIRSTRIKES 66 419.9 
RUSSIA 399 2,226 REBELS 107 692.7 EAST 144 415.5 
WAR 548 2,193 ISRAELIS 96 677.7 HOUTHI 52 404.5 
REFUGEES 376 2,149 RUSSIANS 94 670.5 HAJJSTAMPEDE 49 390.5 
MOSQUES 283 2,125 QATAR 103 660.5 TOLL 73 386 
PILGRIMS 270 2,065 BLAMING 110 646 SANAA 51 383 
MECCA 258 1,958 CRUCIFIXION 85 639 FUNDING 101 382 
MUSLIMS 368 1,872 MINASTAMP- 
EDE 
77 613.6 DISASTER 87 380.5 
US 1,145 1,851 COUNTRIES 148 608.9 FUND 100 366.6 
ISRAEL 341 1,765 QATARIS 75 597.7 PAKISTAN 104 366 
ASSAD 242 1,642 TURKEY 139 597.6 SUNNIS 52 363.7 
BOMBING 240 1,561 KSA 83 594 DIPLOMAT 54 361.7 
IRANIANS 180 1,375 SAUDI’S 76 580 REGIME 74 360.5 
YEMENIS 157 1,229 SHOULD 529 572 WORLD 401 357 
ALLIES 169 1,175 ISLAMIC 119 549 BARBARIC 55 352 
THEM 902 1,162 MOSQUE 90 547 BODIES 86 345 
HOUTHIS 146 1,151 ARABS 83 545.5 BOMB 136 340.8 
ISLAM 238 1,132 UK 256 543 PILGRIMAGE 52 338 
MUSLIM 259 1,105 KILLED 221 539.5 BOMBED 56 336 
CIVILIANS 182 1,087 TURKS 80 538 RESPONSIBLE 85 333.6 
CRUCIFY 140 1,079 KILLING 186 531 WEST 162 333 
WEAPONS 199 1,059 COUNCIL 124 523 MONEY 301 326 
CRANE 154 1,050 COUNTRY 227 506 ARMING 52 325 





74 490 PAKISTANIS 50 317.9 
YEMENI 123 914.9 SHIA 84 488 CDNPOLI 59 315.8 






Appendix E: Keywords lists in the RWC compared to the reference corpus  
Keyword  Freq.  LL Keyword  Freq.  LL 
MILITARY 114 311.9 ANY 291 237.9 
COLLAPSE 64 311.8 RICH 113 237 
MIDDLE 140 311 INNOCENT 76 235 
CRITICISM 68 311 BILLIONS 62 233.5 
UNHRC 39 310.8 INCIDENT 76 235 
DEATH 191 310.8 ALLAH 91 231.9 
SHAME 112 309.7 ATTACK 102 231 
MUST 249 306.7 DEADLY 61 231 
CIVILIAN 52 305.9 PROXY 43 229 
HAJIS 38 302.8 AFRICANS 42 226.9 
REFUGEE 77 301.9 HYPOCRISY 47 224.6 
RUSSIAN 55 293.7 KILL 151 224.5 
HIJACKERS 89 293.5 WAHHABISM 30 224 
EGYPTIANS 38 287.5 BEHEADINGS 30 224 
ISIL 47 286.8 SAUD 30 224 
SHALE 46 286 EMIRATIS 28 223 
IRAN’S 46 284 BACKED 54 222 
THEMSELVES 114 281 SELLING 94 220 
MIGRANTS 63 278 DEAL 159 219.5 
BIN 61 276 NATIONS 54 219 
MISMANAGE-
MENT 
40 275.8 DIPLOMATIC 36 218.8 
TARGETS 65 275 MAKKAH 31 218 
KINGDOM 70 273.8 OPEC 33 216.7 
DEAD 195 268.5 IDEOLOGY 41 215.9 
MILLIONS 81 267 INDIAN 90 215 
MANY 284 265.8 JEWS 51 214.7 
FOREIGN 91 265 EID 33 213.9 
INDIA 142 261.9 EGYPT 54 213 
PALESTINIANS 47 260.7 SHIAS 29 211 
PRICES 77 258.8 MISSLES 33 211 
BLAMED  46 250.8 PRESSURE 83 211 
LADEN 44 248 ALIMOHAMME
DALNIMR 
28 208.5 
THOSE 251 247 INVESTIGATE 48 206.8 
SUPPORT 214 240.7 IMMUNITY 35 206.8 
DESTROYING 55 240 SHARIA 37 205 
VICTIMS 74 240 WAHABI 28 203.5 









Appendix F: Collocates of Saudis in the FCT  
(Due to space limitation, only the top 200 collocates are listed below)  
Collocate   LL  MI Freq.   Collocate             LL MI  Freq.   
SAUDIS 36,035 4.16 22,226 AMERICANS 108 3.61 165 
THE 5,216 3.47 11,036 ISRAELIS 106 3.77 112 
ARE 2,331 3.65 3,255 ISRAEL 104.5 3.37 300 
TO 1,263 3.25 5,296 SELLING 103.7 3.69 133 
AND 995.5 3.27 3,966 IRANIANS 102 3.57 174 
HAVE 684 3.49 1,400 CRITICISM  101.7 3.36 303 
WITH 582.5 3.42 1,435 ISIS 101.6 3.19 548 
FOR 502.9 3.26 2,054 SOME 99.9 3.89 83 
BY 469 3.44 1,109 BECAUSE 96.7 3.45 224 
SAUDI 317 1.73 376 DON’T 95.8 3.23 445 
ON 236 3.16 1,462 LOVE 94.9 3.64 136 
WERE 193.9 3.49 404 US 94 3.08 585 
YEMEN 188.9 3.20 996 SHOULD 93.9 3.48 197 
OF 184 2.99 2,751 MANY 93 3.89 77 
QATARIS 176 4.08 101 BLAMING 92.7 3.72 109 
DEADLY 166.8 4.02 102 NOT 90 3.03 1,082 
ARMS 169.5 3.54 307 HOW 89 3.19 486 
AS 165.8 3.21 826 SLAM 88.8 4.07 47 
OVER 166.8 3.42 412 UN 88.8 3.21 446 
HUMAN 163.6 3.28 633 OUR 88.5 3.23 417 
FACE 162.9 3.82 156 INVESTIGATE 85.7 3.97 59 
ALLIES 158.5 3.65 221 WINNING  82.8 3.22 394 
VIA 158 3.54 296 BOMBING 81 3.40 215 
TURKS 157.8 3.99 105 BUILD 79 3.40 212 
THEIR 156.7 3.17 933 THAT 78.7 3.01 1,075 
IN  150 2.97 2,719 WHEN 78.6 3.23 372 
HAJJ 146.5 3.24 658 AREN’T 78 3.64 111 
BLAME 146 3.61 222 RICH 76 3.63 101 
FRIENDS 140 3.63 203 ETC 74 3.55 132 
FROM 136.9 3.20 709 FUNDED 71.7 3.66 98 
TURKEY 134.6 3.73 155 FUND 69.8 3.56 121 
CRUCIFY 129.5 3.65 180 THESE 69.8 3.30 250 
WHO 128 3.24 581 SOLD 68.7 3.66 93 
IRAN 124.9 3.23 589 ARABIA 68 2.03 176 
DO 128 3.21 626 AGAINST 67.8 3.27 273 
DEAL 121.5 3.54 218 WHILE 67.5 3.40 180 
ABOUT 121 3.21 600 WAR 66 3.16 405 
OR 120 3.84 111 OUT 66 3.19 360 
PRESSURE 115.7 3.83 108 GET 66 3.24 300 
KNOW 114 3.43 280 OFFER 64 3.13 459 
QATAR  113.5 3.25 733 WOMEN  64 3.68 84 
MAKE 113 4.07 55 RIGHTS 63.6 3.09 553 
BEHEAD 112.6 3.67 148 DEATHS  63.6 3.34 200 





Appendix F: Collocates of Saudis in the FCT 
 
Collocate   LL  MI Freq.   Collocate             LL MI  Freq.   
MOST 62 3.90 50 TAKING 42.6 3.37 124 
TREAT 62 3.87 54 SELL 41 3.77 44 
BOMB 61 3.07 577 IF 41 3.93 31 
# 59 3.31 206 BLAMED 41 3.74 47 
ALL 58.7 3.07 562 BEEN 41 3.17 240 
WEALTHY 58.6 4.07 31 AFTER 40.8 3.20 214 
THINK 58 3.25 252 ROLE 40.5 3.64 58 
WEAPONS 57.5 3.29 217 EVERYWHERE 40 3.97 28 
DID 57.5 3.91 45 OWN 39.5 3.27 159 
ARMING 57 3.37 166 BED 39 3.78 41 
FUNDING 57 3.35 174 THAN 39 3.16 246 
HATE 56.8 3.69 73 AT 38.9 3.71 47 
SO 55.7 3.14 381 ALSO 38 3.82 37 
THOSE 55 3.26 232 KILLING 38 3.29 145 
ONLY 54.9 3.67 73 TOO 38 3.18 215 
DEAD 54.5 3.47 119 SUIT 37.9 4.01 24 
BLOCK 54 3.49 112 SUPPORTING 37.7 3.47 81 
BUT 53.5 3.01 704 PAY 36.8 3.43 90 
CAN 53 3.41 135 MUST 36.6 3.31 127 
EMIRATIS 52.6 3.99 35 WHY 36.6 3.00 518 
DISASTER 52.5 3.55 93 EVEN 36 3.17 216 
UP 52 3.13 375 TOLERATE 36 3.21 180 
HELPING 51.8 4.10 37 LET 36 3.13 253 
SUPPORT 51.7 3.37 149 COLLAPSE  36 3.49 75 
DEALS 50.9 3.72 60 JORDANIANS 36 3.88 30 
GROWING 50.7 3.88 43 ASK 35.9 3.43 88 
SELLS 50 3.80 50 FALL 35.7 3.78 37 
RESPONSIBLE 50 3.59 80 NEWS 35 3.38 100 
CRUCIFIXION 50 3.48 106 ACTIVE 34.9 3.95 25 
SAUDI’S 49 0.77 12 GOOD 34.8 3.16 211 
KILL 49 3.40 131 WANT 34.5 3.17 208 
MULL 49 4.07 26 PUTS 34.5 3.91 27 
LIKE 49 3.27 199 KUWAITIS 3.91 34.5 27 
BOARD 48.8 3.66 67 USE 3.35 34.5 107 
LAUNCH 47.5 3.89 39 STOP 34 3.60 53 
SAY 46.9 3.59 76 RACIST 34 3.00 486 
BUY 45.7 3.49 94 ANGRY 34 3.21 169 
CRANE 45 3.34 145 ARROGANT 34 4.07 18 
GIVE 44.5 3.34 142 CLARIFY 34 4.07 18 
REFUSE 44 3.91 35 RELATIONSHIP 34 3.74 39 
UK 44 3.19 240 HIJACKERS 33.5 3.58 55 
PAID 44 3.64 62 DEFEND 33 3.71 40 
THREE 43 3.71 53 MEAN 32.9 3.40 86 
UK 44 3.19 240 REPORT 32.8 3.40 88 





Appendix F: Collocates of Saudis in the FCT 
 
Collocate   LL  MI Freq.   Collocate             LL MI  Freq.   
READIES 32.7 3.87 28 FINANCED 31 3.76 34 
ACCOUNTABLE 32.7 3.87 28 PREPARE 31 3.90 25 
INVASIONS 32.6 2.99 499 HELPS 31 3.87 27 
MONEY 32.5 3.14 215 TWO 30.9 3.33 101 
MAKING 32 3.47 69 OTHERS 30.8 3.37 89 
HELPED 32 3.60 50 ATTACKS 30.8 3.46 69 
SUCK 31.5 3.95 23 OTHER 30.8 3.15 197 
CONTINUE 31 3.59 52 CHAIR 30.7 3.59 46 
SENDING 31 3.76 34 DOING    
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
